130 Nev., Advance Opinion SO
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
RENOWN REGIONAL MEDICAL No. 62666
CENTER, A NEVADA CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT FILED
COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
OCT 0 2 20i4
WASHOE; AND THE HONORABLE
BRENT T. ADAMS, DISTRICT JUDGE,
CL
BY
7313:1
TRACE K. UNDEmArq
(
Respondents,
and
MICHAEL WILEY, AN INDIVIDUAL,
Real Party in Interest.
Original petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a district
court order granting partial summary judgment in an action regarding a
hospital lien.
Petition granted in part and denied in part.
Holland & Hart, LLP, and Jeremy J. Nork, Frank Z. LaForge, and
Stephan J. Hollandsworth, Reno,
for Petitioner.
Snell & Wilmer, LLP, and William E. Peterson and Janine C. Prupas,
Reno; Leverty & Associates and Vernon Eugene Leverty and Patrick R.
Leverty, Reno,
for Real Party in Interest.
Matthew L. Sharp, Ltd., and Matthew L. Sharp, Reno,
for Amicus Curiae Nevada Justice Association.
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BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.'
OPINION
By the Court, CHERRY, J.:
A district court may grant summary judgment sua sponte if it
gives the defending party notice and an opportunity to defend. In this
case, the district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff on two
claims for relief that were not argued in the summary judgment briefing
or in oral argument. The district court did not give notice to the defendant
that it intended to do so. We conclude that the district court erred by
granting summary judgment on those two causes of action and grant, in
part, this petition for a writ of mandamus. We decline to consider the
other issues and arguments raised by the parties and therefore deny the
remainder of the petition.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Real party in interest Michael Wiley was injured in a
motorcycle accident for which he was not at fault. Wiley was treated for
his injuries at Renown Regional Medical Center. Renown did not bill
Wiley's health insurance plan administrator, Cigna, for the treatment.
Instead, it recorded a hospital lien against Wiley's potential tort recovery.
Nevertheless, Wiley sent his medical bills to Cigna. Cigna sent payment
to Renown in the amount of the special, discounted rates that Cigna had
previously negotiated with Renown. Cigna's discounted rates were set by
its provider agreement with Renown in which Cigna agreed to send
'The Honorable Kristina Pickering, Justice, did not participate in
the decision of this matter.
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patients to Renown and Renown agreed to provide Cigna and its members
with discounted rates. Renown did not accept this payment because it
believed that Cigna did not actually cover injuries caused by a third
party's negligence.
Wiley and the tortfeasor's insurer subsequently reached a
settlement. The insurer delivered two checks to Wiley. The first was
made out to Wiley. The second was made out to Renown in the amount of
Renown's standard, nondiscounted rates in order to satisfy Renown's
hospital lien. Wiley refused to give the check made out to Renown to
Renown. He believed that he was entitled to the full settlement payment
and that Renown should have accepted Cigna's payment as full and final
instead of recovering via the hospital lien. Because Wiley did not deliver
the check, Renown did not release its lien. Wiley was later refused a loan
on account of the outstanding lien.
Wiley brought a putative class action against Renown
regarding its lien practices. Wiley alleged, among other thing's, that
Renown's lien violated Nevada's hospital lien statutes, NRS 108.590 and
NRS 449.757, that Renown breached its provider agreement with Cigna,
and that Renown intentionally interfered with Wiley's policy with Cigna.
Renown moved for summary judgment, arguing that Wiley's Cigna policy
did not cover Wiley's treatments, that Wiley could not assert breach of the
provider agreement because he was not a third-party beneficiary to the
agreement, and that Renown did not violate NRS 108.590 or NRS 449.757.
The district court initially held that there were issues of
material fact and therefore denied the motion. Renown's arguments,
however, appear to have concerned entirely legal issues, not factual ones.
Renown requested a status conference, which the district court granted.
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At the status conference, the district court asked that the parties stipulate
to the facts relevant to the legal issues raised in Renown's initial motion
for summary judgment and then resubmit those issues in cross-motions
for summary judgment. 2 The district court wished to resolve, before class
discovery, the dispositive, preliminary legal issues, including whether
Wiley was a third-party beneficiary who could enforce the provider
agreement and whether Wiley's policy covered his injuries. The full
merits of Wiley's claims for breach of the provider agreement and
intentional interference with his Cigna policy were not at issue in the
summary judgment proceedings.
In accordance with the district court's request, Renown filed a
second motion for summary judgment, again arguing that Wiley's Cigna
policy did not cover Wiley's treatments, that Wiley was not a third-party
beneficiary to the provider agreement, and that Renown did not violate
MRS 108.590 or NRS 449.757. Wiley also filed a motion for summary
judgment, arguing that Renown violated NRS 108.590 and MRS 449.757.
The district court held a hearing on the summary judgment
motions and subsequently denied Renown's motion and granted Wiley's
motion. The court found, among other things, that Renown's lien practices
violated NRS 108.590 and MRS 449.757, that Wiley was a third-party
beneficiary to the provider agreement, and that Renown was not
permitted to decide whether Wiley's injuries were covered by his Cigna
policy. Notably, the court also found in favor of Wiley on his breach of
2 The parties stipulated to a set of hypothetical facts solely for
summary judgment purposes. We do not here opine on the propriety of
the district court accepting such stipulations.
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contract and intentional interference with contract claims, even though
the full merits of these claims were not specifically argued in the cross-
motions for summary judgment or at the hearing.
The district court stayed the remainder of the case so that
Renown could seek writ relief in this court. Renown then filed this
petition for mandamus relief challenging the district court's order.
DISCUSSION
"A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of
an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion." Inel
Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179
P.3d 556, 558 (2008) (footnote omitted); see NRS 34.160. "Ultimately, the
decision to entertain an extraordinary writ petition lies within our
discretion." Davis v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 129 Nev. , 294
P.3d 415, 417 (2013). "Neither a writ of mandamus nor a writ of
prohibition will issue if the petitioner has a 'plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.' Westpark Owners' Ass'n v. Eighth
Judicial Dist, Court, 123 Nev. 349, 356,167 P.3d 421, 426 (2007) (quoting
NRS 34.170, NRS 34.330). Generally, the availability of appeal after final
judgment is considered an adequate and speedy remedy that precludes
mandamus relief from orders granting partial summary judgment. See id.
However, we will exercise our discretion to consider petitions for such writ
relief when an important area of law needs clarification and judicial
economy is served by considering the writ petition. See id.; see also Int?
Game Tech., 124 Nev. at 197-98, 179 P.3d at 559.
In this case, the district court granted partial summary
judgment in Wiley's favor on his claims for breach of contract and
intentional interference with contract. These claims were nowhere
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mentioned in the six summary judgment briefs. And Wiley did not argue
his contract claims in the day-long hearing. Whether the district court
acted appropriately in granting summary judgment on these claims is an
important issue of law needing clarification and judicial economy is served
by our consideration of this petition. Int'l Game Tech., 124 Nev. at 197-98,
179 P.3d at 559. We therefore exercise our discretion to consider that
portion of this writ petition that concerns the district court's summary
judgment on claims for which no party sought summary judgment. We
consider this issue of law de novo, id. at 198, 179 P.3d at 559, and we
decline to consider the other issues raised in Renown's writ petition.
We have previously held that "[although district courts have
the inherent power to enter summary judgment sua sponte pursuant to
[NRCP] 56, that power is contingent upon giving the losing party notice
that it must defend its claim." Soebbing v. Carpet Barn, Inc., 109 Nev. 78,
83, 847 P.2d 731, 735 (1993). And we have called it "troubling" when a
district court grants summary judgment sua sponte without having taken
evidence in the form of affidavits or other documents. Sierra Nev.
Stagelines, Inc. v. Rossi, 111 Nev. 360, 364, 892 P.2d 592, 594-95 (1995). A
district court must not elevate "promptness and efficiency" over fairness
and due process by entering summary judgment before claims are properly
before it for decision. Id. at 364, 892 P.2d at 595. Thus, we take this
opportunity to reiterate that the defending party must be given notice and
an opportunity to defend itself before a court may grant summary
judgment sua sponte. See Soebbing, 109 Nev. at 83, 847 P.2d at 735; see
also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326 (1986) ("[Dlistrict courts
are widely acknowledged to possess the power to enter summary
judgments sua sponte, so long as the losing party was on notice that she
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had to come forward with all of her evidence."); Norse v. City of Santa
Cruz, 629 F.3d 966, 971-72 (9th Cir. 2010) (same)
Here, without briefing, argument, or even notice, the district
court granted summary judgment in favor of Wiley on his contract claims.
This amounts to the type of sua sponte summary judgment of which this
court and federal courts have disapproved. We therefore conclude that the
district court erred in granting summary judgment on Wiley's fifth and
eighth causes of action for breach of contract and intentional interference
with contract, respectively. Accordingly, we grant Renown's petition, in
part, and order the clerk of this court to issue a writ of mandamus
directing the district court to vacate that portion of its order granting
summary judgment to Wiley on his fifth and eighth causes of action. We
decline to consider the other issues and arguments presented in Renown's
writ petition and therefore deny the remainder of the petition. Davis, 129
Nev. at , 294 P.3d at 417.
We concur:
C.J. cc,t 441\
Hardesty
' J.
4:Le‘nare9
Parraguirre Douglas
Saitta
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