UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4234
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
GREGORY LAWRENCE TROPEA,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Newport News. Robert G. Doumar, Senior
District Judge. (4:13-cr-00075-RGD-DEM-1)
Submitted: September 23, 2014 Decided: October 6, 2014
Before KEENAN and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Ellenson, LAW OFFICE OF JAMES STEPHEN ELLENSON, Newport
News, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United States
Attorney, Richard D. Cooke, Assistant United States Attorney,
Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
In accordance with a written plea agreement, Gregory
Tropea pled guilty to three counts of receipt of child
pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2) (2012), and one count of
making a false statement to a probation officer, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001 (2012). He was sentenced to 336 months in prison.
Tropea now appeals, claiming that the district court erroneously
denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Finding no
error, we affirm.
Tropea contends he was unaware that, by pleading
guilty, he was waiving his right to appeal the district court’s
denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during a search
of a motel room. The record, which establishes that the
district court fully complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, is to
the contrary. Tropea acknowledged at his Rule 11 hearing that
he had read the plea agreement, understood it, and had reviewed
the agreement with his attorney. In the agreement, Tropea
waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence; there
was no reservation of the right to appeal the ruling on the
suppression motion. Further, the court inquired at the Rule 11
hearing whether Tropea had reserved his right to appeal the
suppression ruling. Both defense counsel and the Assistant
United States Attorney stated that he had not. Tropea had the
opportunity to disagree, but he said nothing.
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“A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a
guilty plea.” United States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376, 383-84
(4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead,
the defendant bears the burden of “show[ing] a fair and just
reason” for withdrawal. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B); United
State v. Ubakanma, 215 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2000). We review
for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea. Nicholson, 676 F.3d at 383.
Having thoroughly reviewed the record, we hold that
the district court did not abuse its discretion. First, the
court properly conducted Tropea’s Rule 11 proceeding. See
United States v. Bowman, 348 F.3d 408, 414 (4th Cir. 2003) (“a
properly conducted Rule 11 . . . colloquy leaves a defendant
with a very limited basis upon which to have his plea
withdrawn”). Additionally, the district court correctly applied
the factors set forth in United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245,
248 (4th Cir. 1991). Notably, Tropea offered no credible
evidence that his plea was unknowing or involuntary, he did not
assert his legal innocence, and the district court found that
allowing withdrawal of the plea would have both inconvenienced
the court and the Government and wasted judicial resources.
We accordingly affirm. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
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in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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