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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-14929
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cv-00768-RWS
ARLANDA A. SMITH,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
MARNE L. MERCER,
in her official and individual capacity with
the Dekalb County Police Department,
W.L. WALLACE,
in her official and individual capacity with
the Dekalb County Police Department,
WILLIAM O’BRIEN,
in his official and individual capacity with
the Dekalb County Police Department
VALDIS CULVER,
in his official and individual capacity with
the Dekalb County Sheriff’s Office,
NICK MENDEZ,
in his official and individual capacity with
the Dekalb County Sheriff’s Office, et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(October 7, 2014)
Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and COX, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Arlanda Smith, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals the district
court’s sua sponte, 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2) dismissal of his false arrest, false
imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims as barred by the applicable two-
year statute of limitations. The district court dismissed Smith’s pendent state-law
claims without prejudice as allowed by 28 U.S.C. §1367(c). We affirm.
These are the material facts construed in the light most favorable to Smith
(Doc. 1-1). He was arrested on July 5, 2010, for stalking in violation of O.C.G.A.
§16-5-90(a)(1). He contends that this arrest was a false arrest in violation of
Section 1983. Subsequently, he was incarcerated without a pre-commitment
hearing until a state court judge released him on his own recognizance on August
9, 2010. Smith contends that this incarceration was a false imprisonment in
violation of Section 1983. Finally, he was prosecuted for stalking and making
harassing phone calls. On March 7, 2011, he was acquitted of the former and
convicted of the latter. This prosecution, Smith contends, was a malicious
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prosecution in violation of Section 1983. Two years and four days later, Smith
filed this civil action.
We review de novo a district court’s Section 1915(e)(B)(2(ii) dismissal,
whether it is based on a determination that one or more claims in a complaint are
irremediably barred by the statute of limitations or simply fail to state a claim on
which relief can be granted. Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1162-63 (11th Cir.
2003).
The district court correctly determined that Georgia’s two-year personal
injury statute of limitations applied to all three of Smith’s Section 1983 claims.
DeYoung v. Owens, 646 F.3d 1317, 1324 (11th Cir. 2011); O.C.G.A. §9-3-33. The
district court correctly determined that Smith’s false arrest and false imprisonment
claims accrued on July 5, 2010, and August 9, 2010, respectively – dates that are
found in the complaint. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 397, 127 S. Ct. 1091,
1100 (2007). The false arrest and false imprisonment claims therefore, are
frivolous.
We separately address the malicious prosecution claims. Two of Smith’s
malicious prosecution “claims” are indisputably state-law claims. These are
Claims 5 and 10, and they are not before us. The district court declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over them, and Smith does not challenge that decision on
appeal.
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This leaves Smith’s “second” Claim 8, Doc. 1-1, ¶57, which is entitled
“Claims against All Defendants … Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.”
This claim reads, “Defendants intentionally and deliberately inflicted emotional
distress on Smith by violating his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and
by violating his rights against … malicious prosecution.” Id. (italics added for
emphasis). This court recognizes a Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim as a
hybrid of unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment and the common-law
tort from which the claim derives. See Wood v. Kessler, 323 F.3d 872, 881-82
(11th Cir. 2003). A Georgia plaintiff, such as Smith, pressing a Section 1983
malicious prosecution claim must prove (1) a criminal prosecution instituted or
continued by the [Section 1983] defendant, (2) with malice and without probable
cause, (3) that terminated in the [Section 1983] plaintiff’s favor, (4) that caused
damage to the [Section 1983] plaintiff, and (5) that resulted in unreasonable seizure
of the [Section 1983] plaintiff. Id. (citations omitted). Here, the factual recitation
in Smith’s complaint, coupled with paragraph 57, which ostensibly “states” the
claim, are devoid of any factual basis for satisfying the elements set forth in Wood.
Nowhere in Smith’s complaint do we find even “[f]ormulaic recitations of the
elements of [the] claim,” Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1153 (11th Cir.
2011), which, themselves, would not suffice to survive Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny.
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Smith has failed to state a Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim on which
relief can be granted.
AFFIRMED
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