J-S14021-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
KADIR JACKSON,
Appellee No. 1898 EDA 2013
Appeal from the Order June 5, 2013
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-51-CR-0001919-2011
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., OTT, J., and PLATT, J.*
DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED OCTOBER 09, 2014
I respectfully dissent. In my view, there was probable cause to arrest
Appellee. Therefore, I would conclude, under our standard of review, that
the trial court improperly granted Appellee’s motion to suppress his
confessional statements to the police. Accordingly, I would reverse and
remand.
The learned Majority acknowledges that “[p]robable cause justifying a
warrantless arrest is determined by the totality of the circumstances.”
Majority, at 6 (citing Commonwealth v. Galendez, 27 A.3d 1042, 1046
(Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied, 40 A.3d 120 (Pa. 2012)). Moreover, “[i]t
is the facts and circumstances within the personal knowledge of the police
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S14021-14
officer that frames the determination of the existence of probable cause.”
Id. Nevertheless, it concludes that “one cannot reasonably infer there was
sufficient information to warrant a belief that an offense had been committed
by Jackson, supporting probable cause for his arrest.” Id. at 9. I would
disagree.
“[P]robable cause does not involve certainties, but rather the factual
and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and
prudent persons act.” Commonwealth v. Simmen, 58 A.3d 811, 817 (Pa.
Super. 2012). Therefore, we review the facts under the totality of the
circumstances test “to avoid a decision that is totally devoid of [the]
commonsensical inferences [that are] drawn by trained police officers . . . .”
Commonwealth v. Smith, 979 A.2d 913, 917 (Pa. Super. 2009), appeal
denied, 993 A.2d 901 (Pa. 2010) (citation omitted).
Here, the record reveals that Detective Holmes, an experienced
homicide detective, had probable cause to arrest Appellee. The victim’s
girlfriend provided objective information that implicated Appellee, specifically
referencing an incriminating YouTube video and that Appellee was bragging
in the neighborhood about the murder. Detective Holmes went to Appellee’s
home to get his side of the story. While speaking with Detective Holmes on
his cell phone, Appellee lied about his whereabouts, falsely claiming he was
not at home. He agreed to meet the police but upon termination of the
phone call, immediately ran out through a rear door. The police lawfully
arrested Appellee.
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These facts taken collectively and interpreted “through the lens of [the
detective’s] training and experience” are legally sufficient to establish
probable cause for Appellee’s arrest. Id. at 920. Moreover, the alternate
inference that Appellee fled his home to meet the police does not negate the
probable cause for his arrest. See id. at 917 (“[P]robable cause exists when
criminality is one reasonable inference; it need not be the only, or even the
most likely inference . . . .”) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
Therefore, under the totality of the circumstances test, I would
conclude that, Detective Holmes had “reasonably trustworthy information
. . . to belie[ve] that an offense ha[d] been committed by the
[Appellee] . . . .” Simmen, supra at 817 (citation omitted). Furthermore,
because there was more than sufficient probable cause to arrest Appellee,
his confessional statements were not fruit of the poisonous tree. I would
reverse and remand.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
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