FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION OCT 10 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ZANE HUBBARD, No. 13-16814
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 1:13-cv-00761-MJS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS AND
REHABILITATION; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Michael J. Seng, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted September 23, 2014***
Before: W. FLETCHER, RAWLINSON, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Zane Hubbard, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**Hubbard consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
***
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional
violations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo.
Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order)
(dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). We may affirm on any ground
supported by the record, Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir.
2008), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Hubbard’s claims against the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), Pleasant
Valley State Prison, and Wasco State Prison as barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. See Krainski v. Nev. ex. rel. Bd. of Regents of Nev. Sys. of Higher
Educ., 616 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars suits
against the State or its agencies[.]” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted));
Brown v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying bar to
suit against CDCR); Allison v. Cal. Adult Auth., 419 F.2d 822, 823 (9th Cir. 1969)
(applying bar to suit against state prison).
The district court properly dismissed Hubbard’s claims against Memorial
Hospital because Hubbard failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the hospital
acted under color of state law. See Chudacoff v. Univ. Med. Ctr. of S. Nev., 649
2 13-16814
F.3d 1143, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth elements of § 1983 claim and
describing instances in which a private actor’s conduct constitutes state action).
To the extent that Hubbard alleged that the allegedly unconstitutional
conditions at Mercy Hospital were dictated by a state agency, dismissal was proper
because his claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Florer v.
Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 639 F.3d 916, 924 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[W]hen
private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions
governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumentalities of the State and
subject to its constitutional limitations.”). To the extent that Hubbard alleged that
Mercy Hospital violated his constitutional rights by acting under color of state law
though not at the dictation of a state agency, dismissal was proper because
Hubbard failed to allege facts sufficient to show that any purported violation was
caused by a hospital policy, regulation, official decision, or custom. See Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978) (explaining how a local
government entity may be held liable under § 1983); Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc.,
698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e see no basis in the reasoning
underlying Monell to distinguish between municipalities and private entities acting
under color of state law.”).
AFFIRMED.
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