When a detective presented the employee with a photo line-up, she
identified Owens as the male who made the purchase. Johansen testified
that she did not open an account at Office Depot, know anyone by the
name of Justin Owens, or give Justin Owens permission to be an
authorized user on any of her credit accounts. We conclude that the jury
could reasonably infer from the evidence presented that Owens committed
burglary, theft, and the fraudulent use of a credit or debit card, see NRS
205.060(1); NRS 205.0832(1); NRS 205.760(1); and the jury's verdict will
not be disturbed on appeal where, as here, is it supported by sufficient
evidence, see Bolden v. State, 97 Nev. 71, 73, 624 P.2d 20, 20 (1981).
Next, Owens argues that the district court erred by denying
his motion for a mistrial based on a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963), because the State failed to disclose a surveillance videotape
from another store. We review a district court's resolution of a Brady
claim de novo. See Mazzan v. Warden, 116 Nev. 48, 66, 993 P.2d 25, 36
(2000). "To prove a Brady violation, the accused must make three
showings: (1) the evidence is favorable to the accused, either because it is
exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the State withheld the evidence, either
intentionally or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice ensued, i.e., the evidence
was material." State v. Huebler, 128 Nev. , 275 P.3d 91, 95 (2012)
(internal quotation marks omitted), cert denied, U.S. , 133 S. Ct.
988 (2013).
Owens claims that the videotape was exculpatory and
material because it likely depicted a female using Johansen's information
to obtain goods fraudulently at another store and because his sole defense
was that someone else, maybe female, used his identification in order to
obtain goods under Johansen's name. We agree that the videotape
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evidence was favorable and withheld by the State, however we disagree
that prejudice ensued. Because evidence was presented that Johansen's
information had been used at various different stores under various names
to obtain goods fraudulently, Owens fails to demonstrate that the evidence
was material, i.e., that "there is a reasonable probability that the result
would have been different if the evidence had been disclosed." Mazzan,
116 Nev. at 66, 993 P.2d at 36. Therefore, we conclude that the district
court did not err by determining that the State did not violate Brady or
abuse its discretion by denying Owens's motion for a mistrial. See Rose v.
State, 123 Nev. 194, 206-07, 163 P.3d 408, 417 (2007) (we review a district
court's denied of a motion for a mistrial for an abuse of discretion).
Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.
J.
Pickering
-\--CUult_occm
•• J.
Parraguirre
J.
Saitta
cc: Hon. Douglas Smith, District Judge
Justice Law Center
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
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