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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
LINWOOD CHESTER COPELAND
Appellant No. 575 MDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order of March 4, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-22-CR-0005742-2012
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., WECHT, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED OCTOBER 23, 2014
Linwood Chester Copeland appeals from the order dismissing his first
petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 9541-46. Specifically, he claims ineffective assistance of plea counsel.
We affirm.
On June 10, 2013, following oral and written guilty plea colloquies,
Copeland entered a negotiated guilty plea to indecent assault, unlawful
contact of a minor, and corruption of minors.1 The same day, he was
sentenced to not less than two and a half nor more than five years’
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3126(a)(7), 6318(a)(1), and 6301(a)(1)(ii),
respectively.
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incarceration each for indecent assault and corruption of minors, and two
years’ supervision for unlawful contact with a minor, all to be served
consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of five to ten years’ incarceration
plus two years’ supervision. Copeland did not file post-sentence motions or
a direct appeal. Following evaluation by the Sexual Offender Board, on
September 4, 2013, Copeland was determined to be a sexual offender
subject to registration upon release. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.12.
On December 4, 2013, Copeland filed a pro se PCRA petition, claiming
ineffective assistance of counsel because his sentences were ordered to be
served consecutively instead of concurrently and because counsel failed to
correct this oversight upon Copeland’s request. The PCRA court appointed
counsel, who filed a Turner/Finley no-merit letter2 on January 24, 2014,
stating that, upon her independent review, Copeland’s petition had no merit.
On February 3, 2014, the PCRA court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw
and issued notice pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907
of its intent to dismiss Copeland’s petition without a hearing. Copeland
responded pro se on February 21, 2014, stating that he wished to proceed
with his petition and that he “[did] have merit in [his] complaints.” Reply to
Order of Intention to Dismiss, 2/21/2014. On March 4, 2014, the PCRA
court dismissed Copeland’s petition.
____________________________________________
2
See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
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Copeland timely filed a pro se notice of appeal, and pursuant to the
PCRA court’s order, a timely concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal on April 16, 2014. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The PCRA court entered
its opinion pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a) on
April 23, 2014, incorporating by reference its memorandum opinion of
February 3, 2014.
Copeland raises one issue for our review: “Was [Copeland] denied the
effective assistance of counsel where trial counsel refused to file withdrawal
of [his] plea, reconsideration, and modification of the 5-10 year sentence[?]”
Copeland’s Brief at 7 (unnumbered).
On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard of review
calls for us to determine whether the ruling of the PCRA court is
supported by the record and free of legal error. The PCRA
court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support
for the findings in the certified record.
Commonwealth v. Lewis, 63 A.3d 1274, 1278 (Pa. Super. 2013).
To prevail on a claim alleging counsel’s ineffectiveness under the
PCRA, Appellant must demonstrate (1) that the underlying claim
is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel’s course of conduct was
without a reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s
interest; and (3) that he was prejudiced by counsel’s
ineffectiveness, i.e. there is a reasonable probability that but for
the act or omission in question the outcome of the proceeding
would have been different.
It is clear that a criminal defendant’s right to effective counsel
extends to the plea process, as well as during trial. However,
[a]llegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a
guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the
ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an involuntary or
unknowing plea. Where the defendant enters his plea on the
advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on
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whether counsel’s advice was within the range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.
Commonwealth v. Wah, 42 A.3d 335, 338-39 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations
and quotation marks omitted).
Copeland contends that his plea was involuntary because counsel led
him to believe that if he pleaded guilty to the felony charges he would
receive a sentence of two and a half to five years each, to run concurrently.
Copeland’s Brief at 8. This claim is belied by the record.
On June 10, 2013, Copeland submitted a written guilty plea colloquy,
in which he acknowledged that his attorney had explained the charges and
associated maximum penalties, that he was satisfied with his attorney and
his representation, and that his plea was voluntarily made and in his best
interests. Written Plea Colloquy, 6/10/2013. At the plea hearing, the court
conducted an additional oral colloquy, at which the following was elicited:
[The Commonwealth]: . . . It is my understanding the defendant
is prepared to enter a guilty plea pursuant to a negotiated
plea agreement in this matter; specifically, the defendant
would receive a sentence of five to ten years in a State
Correctional Institut[ion] and that he would receive a
consecutive two years of probation.
* * *
In addition, the defendant would be subject to the
standard conditions for sexual offenders.
It’s my understanding further, Your Honor, that he is
willing to be sentenced today so that he can be transferred
to SCI, and that we would do the Megan’s Law hearing
during a subsequent proceding. And we would just submit
a court order to Your Honor for the evaluation.
The Court: Excellent.
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[The Commonwealth]: Sir, is that your understanding of the
agreement in this case?
[Copeland]: Yes.
Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”) Guilty Plea, 6/10/2013, at 2-3. Additionally, the
Commonwealth asked Copeland, “Do you understand that by signing this
colloquy that you are indicating you understand everything in it, you’ve
reviewed it with your attorney, and it is your intention to enter a guilty plea
to the charges pursuant to the negotiated guilty plea agreement?” to which
he responded, “Yes.” Id. at 5. The court accepted the guilty plea and
counsel for Copeland requested that the court “impose the negotiated
agreement in this case.” Id. at 7. Thus, the court structured Copeland’s
guilty pleas to Count 1 and Count 3 to two and a half to five years each, to
be served consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of the agreed-to five- to
ten-year sentence. Id. at 12.
It is well-settled that “[a] defendant is bound by the statements he
makes during his plea colloquy, and may not assert grounds for withdrawing
the plea that contradict statements made when he pled.” Commonwealth
v. Stork, 737 A.2d 789, 790-91 (Pa. Super. 1999). Consequently, where
Copeland agreed with the Commonwealth that he had knowingly and
voluntarily negotiated a sentence of five to ten years’ incarceration, N.T. at
2, he cannot now claim that he believed the two-and-a-half to five year
sentences on Counts 1 and 3 would be ordered to be served concurrently.
Therefore, there is no underlying merit to his claim that his negotiated guilty
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plea was involuntary or unknowing, and his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel on this ground fails. Wah, 42 A.3d at 338-39. The record supports
the findings of the PCRA court, and Copeland is not entitled to relief on this
claim.
Additionally, Copeland contends that counsel was ineffective for failing
to file a motion to correct his sentence.
“Counsel’s failure to file post-sentence motions [does] not fall within
the narrow ambit of ineffectiveness claims requiring no finding of prejudice.”
Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 296 (Pa. Super. 2011); cf.
Commonwealth v. Ousley, 21 A.3d 1238, 1245 n.8 (Pa. Super. 2011)
(“Inasmuch as the filing of a post-sentence motion is not necessary in order
to preserve a legality of sentencing claim for direct appeal, and there is no
merit to Appellant’s underlying legality of sentencing claim, we find no relief
is due.”).
Here, Copeland was informed of his post-sentencing rights in his
written guilty plea colloquy, and agreed that “the only things that can be
raised on appeal are the voluntariness of the plea, the jurisdiction of this
court to hear the plea, and the legality of whatever sentence is imposed.”
Written Plea Colloquy, 6/10/2013, at 2-3; see also Commonwealth v.
Stewart, 867 A.2d 589, 591 (Pa. Super. 2005) (“A plea of guilty forecloses
challenges to all matters except the voluntariness of the plea, the
jurisdiction of the court, or the legality of the sentence.”).
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Copeland’s only challenge to his guilty plea is on the grounds of
involuntariness, a claim which, as previously discussed, lacks merit.
Therefore, Copeland has not proven that he was prejudiced by counsel’s
failure to file a post-sentence motion to correct his sentence.3 See Corley,
31 A.3d at 296; Ousley, 21 A.3d at 1245 n.8. Thus, Copeland’s allegation
of ineffective assistance of counsel on this ground does not merit relief.
Wah, 42 A.3d at 338-39. Accordingly, the PCRA court did not err in
dismissing his petition. Lewis, 63 A.3d at 1278.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/23/2014
____________________________________________
3
We further observe that there is no support in the record for
Copeland’s claim that he, in fact, requested that counsel file post-sentence
motions or a direct appeal. See Lewis, 63 A.3d at 1278.
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