UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4011
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL JAMES TAYLOR,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Bryson City. Martin K.
Reidinger, District Judge. (2:11-cr-00022-MR-DLH-10)
Submitted: October 20, 2014 Decided: October 29, 2014
Before KEENAN and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jacob H. Sussman, TIN, FULTON, WALKER & OWEN, PLLC, Charlotte,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Anne M. Tompkins, United States
Attorney, William M. Miller, Assistant United States Attorney,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Michael James Taylor pled guilty to conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of
methamphetamine and more than 500 grams of a mixture or
substance containing methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846
(2012), and was sentenced to a below-Guidelines sentence of 324
months’ imprisonment. He appeals, claiming that the district
court erred in denying his motion for appointment of a mental
health expert prior to sentencing and that his sentence is both
procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We affirm.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2012), the district court
may, at its discretion, authorize appointed counsel “to obtain
investigative, expert, or other services necessary for adequate
representation,” provided the expertise is necessary “and that
the person is financially unable to obtain them.” Id. The
district court’s denial of authorization for an expert witness
is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Hartsell,
127 F.3d 343, 349 (4th Cir. 1997).
We find that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Taylor’s motion for appointment of a
mental health expert to assist with sentencing. The district
court had before it extensive background information in Taylor’s
presentence report, as well as information contained in the
motion and testimony presented at the hearing. The record
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clearly establishes that the district court considered all of
this information in fashioning a sentence below the applicable
Guidelines range of 360 months to life imprisonment.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying “an
abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007). We must first review for “significant procedural
error[s],” including, among other things, improperly calculating
the Guidelines range. Id. Only if this court finds a sentence
procedurally reasonable may it consider its substantive
reasonableness. Id. A sentence imposed within the properly
calculated Guidelines range is presumed reasonable by this
court. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007);
United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 217 (4th Cir.
2010).
We have reviewed the record on appeal, including the
transcript of Taylor’s sentencing hearing, as well as the
parties’ briefs, and find that his sentence is both procedurally
and substantively reasonable. The court properly calculated the
advisory Guidelines range and conducted an “‘individualized
assessment’ based on the particular facts of the case before
it.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir.
2009). We find that Taylor cannot overcome the presumption of
reasonableness accorded his sentence. See United States v.
Susi, 674 F.3d 278, 289 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting that a below-
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Guidelines sentence, like a within-Guidelines sentence, is
presumed reasonable on appeal).
We therefore affirm Taylor’s sentence. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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