UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4020
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ROBERT TAYLOR, a/k/a Boy Fat,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (5:93-cr-00132-F-1)
Submitted: August 23, 2013 Decided: September 24, 2013
Before NIEMEYER and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Robert Taylor appeals the sentence of fifty-one
months’ imprisonment that he received after the district court
revoked his supervised release. Taylor alleges the district
court imposed a procedurally unreasonable revocation sentence
because it relied primarily upon the presumed severity of his
pending state charges (possession with intent to sell marijuana,
and maintaining a vehicle, dwelling, and place for controlled
substances), to determine his imprisonment term and it failed to
address his mitigation arguments. For the reasons that follow,
we affirm.
The district court heard arguments from the parties,
gave Taylor an opportunity to address the court himself, and
decided to impose a fifty-one-month sentence. The court noted
that Taylor’s offense was a Grade A violation, and that his
criminal history category of VI gave him a sentencing range of
51-60 months under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7B1.4(a)
(2012).
A district court has broad discretion to impose a
sentence upon revoking a defendant’s supervised release. United
States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). We will
affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release
if it is within the applicable statutory maximum and not
“plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433,
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437, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). In determining whether a
revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first assess the
sentence for unreasonableness, following generally the
procedural and substantive considerations that we employ in our
review of original sentences. Id. at 438.
A supervised release revocation sentence is
procedurally reasonable if the district court considered the
Sentencing Guidelines’ Chapter 7 advisory policy statements and
the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors it is permitted to
consider in a supervised release revocation case. 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3583(e) (West 2000 & Supp. 2013); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439.
Although a district court need not explain the reasons for
imposing a revocation sentence in as much detail as when it
imposes an original sentence, it still must provide a statement
of reasons for the sentence imposed. Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547.
A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if the
district court stated a proper basis for concluding that the
defendant should receive the sentence imposed, up to the
statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Only if a sentence
is found procedurally or substantively unreasonable will we then
decide whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable. Id. at
439. A sentence is plainly unreasonable if it is clearly or
obviously unreasonable. Id.
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Taylor contends that his sentence is procedurally
unreasonable because the district court relied primarily on the
presumed severity of his pending state charges and failed to
explain why it rejected his arguments for the imposition of a
lower sentence. Taylor’s primary mitigation argument was that
he believed the state charges would be reduced to a misdemeanor,
because there were only 114 grams (four ounces) of marijuana
involved. We conclude that this contention is without merit.
In announcing its sentence, the district court
discussed several of the § 3553(a) factors it was allowed to
consider in imposing a revocation sentence under § 3583(e):
Taylor’s criminal history, adequate deterrence for criminal
conduct, and that Taylor had violated his release within eleven
days of being released from incarceration, a clear breach of the
court’s trust. (J.A. 14-15). Assuming without deciding that
Taylor’s revocation sentence was unreasonable, because the
district court failed to provide an adequate explanation
grounded in relevant § 3553(a) factors for imposing a fifty-one-
month prison term, we conclude that the sentence is not “plainly
unreasonable” because the sentence does not exceed the
applicable statutory maximum, 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(1) (2006); 18
U.S.C.A. § 3583(e)(3), and Taylor does not point to facts
establishing that the sentence is clearly or obviously
unreasonable.
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s sentence.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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