IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-50671
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
GERALD WAYNE INMAN, also known as Gerald Inman,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. W-99-CR-64-5
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May 2, 2002
Before JONES, SMITH and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Gerald Wayne Inman (“Inman”) appeals his convictions and
sentences for a methamphetamine-distribution conspiracy and
possession with intent to distribute amphetamine. Inman first
contends that the district court erred in not suppressing evidence
seized pursuant to a search warrant because he alleged that the
warrant did not describe the place to be searched with
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 01-50671
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particularity and thus violated the Fourth Amendment. Inman
concedes that he did not file a motion to suppress the seized
evidence in the district court. Because Inman failed to move to
suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the allegedly
unconstitutional search warrant, he waived the right to contest the
admission of the evidence and is barred from raising the issue in
this appeal. See United States v. Chavez-Valencia, 116 F.3d 127,
129-33 (5th Cir. 1997).
Inman next contends that the evidence was insufficient to
convict him of conspiracy and that the evidence, at most,
established a buyer-seller relationship.1 He contends that the
evidence was insufficient to convict him of possession of
amphetamine and that the indictment was constructively amended
because the evidence showed that the substance was methamphetamine,
not amphetamine.
A reasonable jury could have found from the testimony
that both Inman and one of his methamphetamine suppliers knew that
the drugs were intended for redistribution; thus, the evidence was
sufficient to establish a drug distribution conspiracy. See United
States v. Casel, 995 F.2d 1299, 1306 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
Williams v. United States, 510 U.S. 978 (1993). In light of a Drug
Enforcement Administration forensic chemist’s testimony that the
substance possessed by Inman was methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
1
Inman’s challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to support his
stolen motor vehicle conviction is considered in the related appeal, Case No.
01-50681.
No. 01-50671
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type of amphetamine, the evidence was also sufficient to convict
Inman of possession of amphetamine.
Finally, Inman contends that the district court erred by
not making particularized findings following Inman’s objection to
the presentence report (“PSR”) on drug quantity. Inman did not
object to the district court’s failure to make particularized
findings on drug quantity at sentencing, and therefore this issue
is reviewed for plain error. See United States v. Calverley, 37
F.3d 160, 162-64 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). The district court did
not err in adopting the findings in the PSR and thereby making
implicit findings as to drug quantity; the findings in the PSR are
clear and Inman offered no evidence to rebut the reliability of the
information relied on by the probation officer. See United States
v. Carreon, 11 F.3d 1225, 1231 (5th Cir. 1994); see also United
States v. Gaytan, 74 F.3d 545, 558 (5th Cir. 1996) (“The defendant
bears the burden of demonstrating that information the district
court relied on in sentencing is materially untrue.”) (internal
quotation and citation omitted). Moreover, even if, as Inman
contends, the district court erred by not making findings as to
whether the offense level should be 18 (as suggested by the
Government at sentencing) or 20 (as set forth in the PSR adopted by
the court), Inman’s substantial rights were not affected. Inman
was sentenced under the multi-count adjustment set forth at
U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4 and his sentence would have been the same
regardless whether the grouped drug counts were assigned an offense
No. 01-50671
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level of 18 or 20. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4. Inman does not reassert
the contention made in his PSR objections that the offense level
should have been 14; accordingly, that argument is abandoned. See
Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993).
AFFIRMED.