UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4406
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JOSEPH IRA PATTERSON, III,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Huntington. Robert C. Chambers,
Chief District Judge. (3:05-cr-00196-1)
Submitted: October 23, 2014 Decided: November 4, 2014
Before NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Brian J. Kornbrath, Acting Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D.
Byrne, Appellate Counsel, Mary Lou Newberger, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. R.
Booth Goodwin II, United States Attorney, Joseph F. Adams,
Assistant United States Attorney, Huntington, West Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Joseph Ira Patterson, III, appeals from his
thirty-month sentence entered pursuant to the revocation of his
supervised release. On appeal, Patterson argues that his
sentence is longer than necessary to address the purposes of
supervised release, was improperly based upon the seriousness of
his criminal conduct while on supervised release, and is, thus,
plainly unreasonable. We affirm.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a
sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United
States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). We will
affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release
if it is within the applicable statutory maximum and not
“plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433,
438 (4th Cir. 2006). In exercising its discretion, the district
court “is guided by the Chapter Seven policy statements in the
federal Guidelines manual, as well as the statutory factors
applicable to revocation sentences.” Webb, 738 F.3d at 641.
“Chapter Seven instructs that, in fashioning a
revocation sentence, ‘the court should sanction primarily the
defendant’s breach of trust, while taking into account, to a
limited degree, the seriousness of the underlying violation and
the criminal history of the violator.’” Id. (quoting U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A(3)(b) (2012)). In
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determining the length of a sentence imposed upon revocation of
supervised release, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012) requires a
sentencing court to consider all but two of the factors listed
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). One of the excluded factors is
the need for the sentence “to reflect the seriousness of the
offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), Crudup,
461 F.3d at 439. We have recognized that “[a]lthough § 3583(e)
enumerates the factors a district court should consider when
formulating a revocation sentence, it does not expressly
prohibit a court from referencing other relevant factors omitted
from the statute.” Webb, 738 F.3d at 641. As long as a court
does not base a revocation sentence predominately on the omitted
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) factors, “mere reference to such considerations
does not render a revocation sentence procedurally unreasonable
when those factors are relevant to, and considered in
conjunction with, the enumerated § 3553(a) factors.” Id. at
642.
A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if
the district court states a proper basis for concluding the
defendant should receive the sentence imposed, up to the
statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Only if a sentence
is found procedurally or substantively unreasonable will this
court “then decide whether the sentence is plainly
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unreasonable.” Id. at 439. A sentence is plainly unreasonable
if it is clearly or obviously unreasonable. Id.
Patterson argues that his sentence was longer than
necessary, based in part on the fact that the district court
placed undue weight on the seriousness of his armed robbery
offense, which led to the revocation of his supervised release.
In addition, Patterson avers that the district court failed to
give appropriate consideration to the four years he spent in
state prison for that offense. Because Patterson challenges the
district court’s reliance on an inappropriate factor and did not
argue for a sentence below the Policy Statement range, review is
for plain error. Webb, 738 F.3d at 640. Under plain error
review, Patterson must show that (1) the court erred, (2) the
error was clear or obvious, and (3) the error affected his
substantial rights. Id. at 640-41. Even if Patterson meets his
burden, we retain discretion to recognize the error and will
deny relief unless the error “seriously affect[s] the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at
641 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In this instance, the district court directly
addressed Patterson’s argument that he had already been punished
for the robbery by noting that Patterson had not yet served a
sentence or otherwise been punished for violating the conditions
of supervised release. The court observed that Patterson’s
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order of supervision specifically prohibited him from engaging
in criminal conduct and that Patterson engaged in such conduct
within a year of his release. The court also noted that
Patterson had been given a lenient original sentence and that
his breach of trust was very serious.
It is clear from the district court’s statement that
Patterson’s breach of trust was the main reason that the
district court imposed the sentence it did. Although the court
did rely on the seriousness of Patterson’s criminal conduct
while on supervised release, this factor is essentially
“redundant with matters courts are already permitted to take
into consideration.” United States v. Lewis, 498 F.3d 393, 400
(6th Cir. 2007). Further, the court’s consideration of the
seriousness of the crime was consistent with recognizing the
magnitude of Patterson’s breach of trust. See Webb, 738 F.3d at
642 (approving references to omitted sentencing factors that
were related to references to permissible sentencing factors).
Thus, there was no error, much less plain error.
Accordingly, we affirm Patterson’s sentence. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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