J-S65022-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
ALVAN WILSON,
Appellant No. 3586 EDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of May 20, 2011
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0011393-2009
BEFORE: PANELLA, OLSON and PLATT,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 13, 2014
Appellant, Alvan Wilson, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered on May 20, 2011, as made final by the denial of an oral motion
challenging the weight of the evidence, following his bench trial convictions
for third-degree murder, criminal conspiracy, and possession of an
instrument of crime.1 We affirm.
The trial court summarized the relevant factual and procedural
background of this matter as follows:
[At approximately 7:00 p.m., on Saturday, March 22,
2008], three men – [Appellant], along with co-defendant
Rayvon Richburg,[2] and a third man Raphael Richburg –
____________________________________________
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c), 903, and 907, respectively.
2
This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence of co-defendant, Rayvon
Richburg. See Commonwealth v. Richburg, 1559 EDA 2011 (filed May
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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knocked on the front door of Fatima [Dennis’] home located
at [] Street.[3] Fatima [Dennis] answered the knock and
allowed Raphael Richburg to enter her home to speak with
her boyfriend, James Lane. Rayvon Richburg remained in
the front doorway and [Appellant] remained near the street.
Soon, a heated argument over drugs erupted between
Raphael Richburg and James Lane, in which both men
discharged their firearms two times. Each suffered a single
perforating contact gunshot wound of the chest.
Although severely injured, both men were able to move and
their skirmish continued onto the front porch. As the men
exited [] Street, two things happened in a matter of
seconds: (1) Rayvon Richburg fired shots in James Lane’s
general direction while escorting Raphael Richburg[] off the
front porch; and (2) [Appellant] fired shots as well.
At approximately 7:05 p.m., Philadelphia Police arrived at
the scene. Officers found James Lane lying on the front
porch of [] Street with a gun next to his lifeless body.
Twenty-one packets of crack-cocaine were subsequently
found on this property. Raphael Richburg was alive, but
severely wounded, in front of [] [] Street. Paramedics
rushed him to the Hospital of the University of
Pennsylvania, where he was pronounced dead at 7:37 p.m.
Fifty-four packets of crack-cocaine fell from his body while
at the hospital.
The medical examiner conducted autopsies on the bodies of
the decedents and concluded that the manner of death for
both was homicide.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/14/2014, at 2-3.
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
14, 2013) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 315 EAL 2013 (Pa.
2013).
3
Throughout its opinion, the trial court refers to the homeowner as Ms.
“Davis,” while Appellant’s and the Commonwealth’s briefs refer to her as Ms.
“Dennis.” For the purpose of our memorandum, we refer to the homeowner
as Ms. Dennis. We have also redacted the address and street name of the
residence at issue.
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Appellant proceeded to a non-jury trial for the events occurring on
March 22, 2008. On March 4, 2011, the trial court found Appellant guilty of
the aforementioned crimes. The trial court held a sentencing hearing on
May 20, 2011. At sentencing, Appellant orally moved to challenge the
weight of the evidence. The trial court denied relief and proceeded to
sentencing, wherein it imposed an aggregate term of imprisonment of eight
to 16 years. No direct appeal was taken. On February 15, 2012, Appellant
filed a pro se petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9542-9546. The trial court appointed counsel who filed an
amended PCRA petition requesting nunc pro tunc relief. Following an
evidentiary hearing on December 6, 2013, the trial court reinstated
Appellant’s appellate rights. This timely appeal resulted.4
Appellant presents the following issues for our review:
I. Is [Appellant] entitled to an arrest of judgment with
regard to his convictions for murder of the third
degree, criminal conspiracy and possessing an
instrument of crime since the evidence was
insufficient to sustain the verdicts as the
Commonwealth failed to sustain its burden of proving
[Appellant’s] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?
II. Is [Appellant] entitled to a new trial with regard to his
convictions for murder of the third degree, criminal
____________________________________________
4
On December 19, 2013, Appellant filed a nunc pro tunc notice of appeal.
The trial court issued an order directing Appellant to file a concise statement
of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant
complied timely. The trial court issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a) on April 14, 2014.
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conspiracy and possessing an instrument of crime
since the verdicts of guilt are against the weight of the
evidence?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, which we consider
under a well-accepted standard of review:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of
evidence is whether, viewing all the evidence admitted at
trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there
is sufficient evidence to enable the factfinder to find every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In
applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence
and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. In
addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
defendant’s guilt may be resolved by a fact-finder unless
the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of
law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden
of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.
Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must
be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the
credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence
produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the
evidence.
Commonwealth v. Muniz, 5 A.3d 345, 348 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal
citations and quotations omitted), appeal denied, 19 A.3d 1050 (Pa. 2011).
Appellant’s appeal argues that there was insufficient evidence to
convict him of third-degree murder, criminal conspiracy, and possession of
an instrument of crime. We therefore set forth the statutory elements for
each of Appellant’s three convictions.
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“Third[-]degree murder occurs when a person commits a killing which
is neither intentional nor committed during the perpetration of a felony, but
contains the requisite malice.” Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d
1128, 1142 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citations omitted), appeal denied, 987 A.2d
161 (Pa. 2009). Malice is an essential element of murder, including third-
degree murder. Commonwealth v. Marquez, 980 A.2d 145, 148 (Pa.
Super. 2009). Malice may be found where the actor consciously disregards
an unjustified and extremely high risk that the actor's conduct might cause
death or serious bodily injury. Id. Malice may be inferred from “the
attending circumstances of the act resulting in the death.” Commonwealth
v. Lee, 626 A.2d 1238, 1241 (Pa. Super. 1993) (citations omitted). “One
such circumstance is evidence that the defendant used a deadly weapon
upon a vital part of the victim's body; this inference alone is sufficient to
establish malice.” Id.
Appellant was also convicted of criminal conspiracy to commit murder,
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a)(1) (codifying the offense of criminal conspiracy).
Pursuant to that statute:
A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons
to commit a crime if with the intent of promoting or facilitating
its commission he:
(1) agrees with such other person or persons that they or
one or more of them will engage in conduct which
constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to
commit such crime.
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Id. In addition, subsection (e) of the conspiracy statute provides that “[n]o
person may be convicted of conspiracy to commit a crime unless an overt
act in pursuit of such conspiracy is alleged and proved to have been done by
him or by a person with whom he conspired.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(e).
Further:
Circumstantial evidence may provide proof of the conspiracy.
The conduct of the parties and the circumstances surrounding
such conduct may create a “web of evidence” linking the accused
to the alleged conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt.
Additionally:
An agreement can be inferred from a variety of
circumstances including, but not limited to, the relation
between the parties, knowledge of and participation in the
crime, and the circumstances and conduct of the parties
surrounding the criminal episode. These factors may
coalesce to establish a conspiratorial agreement beyond a
reasonable doubt where one factor alone might fail.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 121-122 (Pa. Super. 2005),
quoting Commonwealth v. Greene, 702 A.2d 547, 554 (Pa. Super. 1997)
(internal citations omitted).
Finally, Appellant was convicted of possession of an instrument of
crime. Pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907(b), “[a] person commits a
misdemeanor of the first degree if he possesses a firearm or other weapon
concealed upon his person with intent to employ it criminally.” Based upon
that language, to sufficiently establish the crime, the Commonwealth must
present evidence that, inter alia, the defendant possessed the firearm or
other weapon, with an intent to use the tools for some criminal purpose.
Commonwealth v. Hardick, 380 A.2d 1235, 1236 (Pa. 1977).
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Based upon review of the certified record, the parties’ submissions,
and the trial court’s opinion, we find that the trial court has thoroughly and
accurately set forth why the evidence in this matter was sufficient to convict
Appellant of the aforementioned crimes. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/5/2012,
at 3-8. Consequently, we affirm on the basis of the trial court opinion and
adopt it as our own.
Appellant, however, challenges the trial court opinion, arguing that the
evidence was insufficient to convict him of any of the charged crimes
because, according to Appellant, within its assessment of the sufficiency of
the evidence, the trial court improperly relied upon inadmissible evidence.
Appellant’s Brief at 13-31. Appellant argues that the trial court improperly
admitted eyewitness statements from two witnesses who, after providing
their statements, recanted and/or gave conflicting testimony. Id. at 14-16,
22-23. Appellant argues that the “Commonwealth’s evidence in this regard
was speculative, conjectural and inherently inconsistent, contradictory and
unreliable and did not sustain the Commonwealth’s burden beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Id. at 22. Absent the eyewitness statement, Appellant
argues that there was no corroborating physical evidence tying him to the
crimes. Id. at 22-25. Consequently, Appellant argues that his judgment of
sentence should be reversed, because the Commonwealth failed to prove his
identity as the perpetrator of the crimes alleged. Id. at 25-27. Finally,
Appellant contends that there was no evidence presented at trial that he was
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engaged in a conspiratorial relationship or acted as an accomplice with his
co-defendants. Id. at 29-31.
Appellant’s argument, however, is flawed for multiple reasons. Most
fundamentally, pursuant to Pennsylvania precedent, when considering the
sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court is “required to consider all
evidence that was actually received, without consideration as to the
admissibility of that evidence.” Commonwealth v. Palmer, 751 A.2d 223,
227 (Pa. Super. 2000); Commonwealth v. Reed, 990 A.2d 1158, 1161
(Pa. 2010) (holding that “the entire trial record should be evaluated and all
evidence received considered, whether or not the trial court’s rulings thereon
were correct.”) Therefore, even if the eyewitness statements were
improperly admitted at trial, the trial court was obligated to consider them
for sufficiency review purposes. We also note that witness statements to
police that are later recanted may supply a sufficient evidentiary basis to
establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Subsequent recantation does not
defeat the factfinder’s right to credit prior statements or testimony in
considering a defendant’s guilt or innocence. See Commonwealth v.
Hanible, 30 A.3d 426, 443 (Pa. 2011) (“[T]he mere fact that [a witness]
recanted a statement he had previously made to the police certainly does
not render the evidence insufficient to support [Hanible’s] conviction.
Rather, the jury was free to evaluate both [the witness’] statement to police
as well as his testimony at trial recanting that statement, and free to believe
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all, part, or none of the evidence.”). Thus, there was no error in the trial
court relying on prior statements that were subsequently recanted at trial.
Additionally, Appellant’s contention that the eyewitness statements
should not have been relied upon because Appellant believes that they were
untrustworthy and unreliable challenges the weight of the evidence, not its
sufficiency. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Murray, 597 A.2d 111 (Pa.
Super. 1991) (distinguishing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence
from challenges to the weight of the evidence).
Finally, we note that the arguments presented in Appellant’s brief
ultimately focus on and challenge the admission of evidence, not its
sufficiency. Within his brief, Appellant does not identify which elements of
his respective crimes were insufficiently proven; instead, he directs his
entire argument to the admission of the eyewitness statements. If Appellant
wanted to appeal the admission of the eyewitness statements, he was
obligated to challenge their admission through an objection at trial and then
follow-up with a subsequent appeal. Review of the certified record,
however, reveals that the eyewitness statements were admitted based upon
a stipulation from counsel, and Appellant’s trial counsel did not lodge a
contemporaneous objection preserving his right to appeal their admission.
Appellant’s effort to recast his claim as a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence is unavailing. Thus, Appellant’s first issue lacks merit.
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Next, Appellant challenges the weight of the evidence to support his
convictions. Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 607:
A claim that the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence shall be raised with the trial judge in a motion for
a new trial:
(1) orally, on the record, at any time before
sentencing;
(2) by written motion at any time before sentencing;
or
(3) in a post-sentence motion.
See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607. At the sentencing hearing, Appellant made an oral
motion challenging the weight of the evidence. Thus, he properly preserved
his current claim.
Our Supreme Court has determined:
A motion for a new trial alleging that the verdict was
against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the
discretion of the trial court. An appellate court, therefore,
reviews the exercise of discretion, not the underlying
question whether the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence. The factfinder is free to believe all, part, or none
of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the
witnesses. The trial court will award a new trial only when
the jury's verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock
one's sense of justice. In determining whether this standard
has been met, appellate review is limited to whether the
trial judge's discretion was properly exercised, and relief will
only be granted where the facts and inferences of record
disclose a palpable abuse of discretion. Thus, the trial
court's denial of a motion for a new trial based on a weight
of the evidence claim is the least assailable of its rulings.
Commonwealth v. Weathers, 95 A.3d 908, 910-911 (Pa. Super. 2014),
citing Commonwealth v. Diggs, 949 A.2d 873, 879–880 (Pa. 2008).
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In this case, the trial court concluded that it “heard credible testimony
that, inter alia, [Appellant] and his co-defendant went armed to the location
where the incident occurred and then, when gunfire rang out, both men
simultaneously pulled out weapons and began firing.” Trial Court Opinion,
4/14/2014, at 9. As a result, two men were killed. Hence, Appellant, while
engaged in a conspiracy, used an instrument of crime that resulted in death.
Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant’s bench trial convictions for third-
degree murder, criminal conspiracy, and possession of an instrument of
crime does not shock one’s sense of justice. As such, Appellant’s second
issue is without merit.
Based upon the reasons set forth in the trial court’s April 14, 2014
opinion, the evidence was more than sufficient, and not against its weight,
to convict Appellant of the aforementioned crimes. We therefore affirm
Appellant’s judgment of sentence on the basis of the trial court opinion. The
parties are instructed to attach a copy of the trial court’s April 14, 2014
opinion to all future filings regarding this appeal. Prior to attaching that
opinion, however, we instruct the parties to redact any reference to the
street name and number where the incident in this matter took place.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/13/2014
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