Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before Nov 14 2014, 6:18 am
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
CASEY J. LINDEMAN GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Lindeman Law, LLC Attorney General of Indiana
Huntingburg, Indiana
MICHAEL GENE WORDEN
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
RYAN K. HENSLEY, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 19A04-1403-CR-113
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE DUBOIS SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Mark R. McConnell, Judge
Cause No. 19D01-1106-FD-333
November 14, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAY, Judge
Ryan K. Hensley appeals the amount of credit for time served assessed by the Dubois
Superior Court in its order to revoke probation. Finding no error in the trial court’s denial of
the additional credit time sought by Hensley, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2011, the State charged Hensley with Class D felony theft,1 and he entered a guilty
plea pursuant to an agreement that provided the charge would be amended to Class A
misdemeanor conversion.2 In accordance with the terms of the plea agreement, the trial court
sentenced Hensley to one year at the Dubois County Security Center, suspended the sentence
to supervised probation, and noted Hensley had credit for 72 actual days served.
In March 2012, the State petitioned to revoke Hensley’s probation on the ground he
had committed an offense in Vanderburgh County. He was served with the petition while he
was in jail in Vanderburgh County. The Dubois Superior Court held a revocation hearing on
November 13, 2013, at which Hensley admitted the violation and the court revoked his
probation. The trial court imposed a sanction of 365 days in the Dubois County Security
Center, ordered the sentence for the probation violation to be served consecutive to the
sentence for the Vanderburgh County offense, and credited Hensley with 72 actual days
served.
During the process of preparing the probation-revocation appeal, Hensley’s counsel
came to believe the Dubois Superior Court had inaccurately calculated Hensley’s credit time.
1
Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2.
2
Ind. Code § 35-43-4-3.
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Counsel petitioned for a stay of Hensley’s appeal and a remand to the trial court, and we
granted that motion, dismissing Hensley’s appeal without prejudice and remanding for the
trial court to address Hensley’s allegation that the court erred in calculating his credit time.
Hensley filed a Motion to Amend Credit Time that alleged Hensley was due fifteen
additional days of credit for time he served between October 29, 2013, when his pre-trial
confinement ended in Vanderburgh County, and November 13, 2013, when his probation
revocation hearing was held in Dubois County. The trial court denied Hensley’s motion for
additional credit time in an order that provided the following:
The matter came before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Amend
Credit Time filed on February 7, 2014. The Court having reviewed said
Motion finds as follows:
1. The Defendant, Ryan K. Hensley seeks additional credit time
from 10/30/13 to 11/13/13 toward his sentence in the above-captioned cause.
2. The Abstract of Judgment from Vanderburgh County in Cause
No. 82C01-1203-FB-00298 shows that Defendant was sentenced in
Vanderburgh County on 10/30/13. He was sentenced to a 6 year executed
sentence at the Indiana Department of Corrections. He was given credit for
time served of 608 actual days. This left him with 974 days to serve assuming
he received 608 days of good time credit.
3. The Chronological Case Summary in the Dubois County Case,
Cause No. 19D01-1106-FD-333, shows that Defendant was not even in Dubois
County for most of the period for which he seeks credit. He was booked in to
the Dubois County Security Center on 11/11/13 and was sentenced in the
revocation matter on 11/13/13 to 221 days. Furthermore, this sentence was to
be served consecutive to the Vanderburgh County case, 82C01-1203-FB-
00298. Thus Defendant’s 221 day sentence in the Dubois County matter
would not begin until the Vanderburgh County sentence was complete. The
Vanderburgh County sentence would not be complete, according to the
Abstract, until March 1, 2015, (assuming good time credit and no time cuts).
Therefore, Defendant is not entitled to any credit time in the Dubois County
matter for the period from 10/30/13 to 11/13/13. That time should be applied
toward his Vanderburgh County sentence.
Based upon the foregoing Defendant’s Motion to Amend Credit Time is
hereby denied.
3
(App. at 24-25.)
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
To the extent a sentencing decision is not mandated by statute, we will reverse a trial
court’s decision only for an abuse of discretion. James v. State, 872 N.E.2d 669, 671 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2007). An abuse of discretion will be found if the trial court’s decision is against
the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Felder v. State, 870 N.E.2d 554,
560 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
Hensley argues he has not received the credit time to which he was entitled because
there were uncredited days from October 30, 2013, to November 13, 2013 – between his
sentencing in Vanderburgh County and his probation revocation hearing in Dubois County.
We disagree.
Indiana Code § 35-50-6-3 provides that a defendant earns credit time for each day he
or she is confined while awaiting trial or sentencing. However, where a defendant is
awaiting trial or sentencing on more than one offense and consecutive sentencing is imposed,
“credit time is deducted from the aggregate total of the consecutive sentences, not from an
individual sentence.” State v. Lotaki, 4 N.E.3d 656, 657 (Ind. 2014).
While Lotaki was serving a seventeen-year sentence imposed in 2005, he battered a
prison employee in 2010. Id. After convicting Lotaki of battery, the trial court imposed a
three-year sentence and ordered it served consecutive to the 2005 sentence. Id. However,
the trial court then awarded Lotaki 471 days of credit for time served between the charge and
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the sentencing, plus 471 days of Class I credit time, against the battery sentence. Id. Our
Indiana Supreme Court held that award of credit time against a consecutive sentence “was
error” and explained:
[T]he time Lotaki spent incarcerated awaiting trial on the battery charge was
time he was serving the 2005 sentence, and he received credit for that time
against the 2005 sentence. To award credit for this time against the battery
sentence rather than against the aggregate of the consecutive sentences would
result in more credit to which he was entitled and would effectively enable him
to serve part of the consecutive sentences concurrently.
Id.
Hensley’s probation revocation sanction was ordered served consecutive to his six-
year sentence in the Vanderburgh County case, which he was to begin serving on
“10/30/2013.” (App. at 23.) Thus, the dates for which Hensley requests credit, between
October 30, 2013, and November 11, 2013, were days that Hensley was serving his sentence
for his conviction in Vanderburgh County. As a result, he is not entitled to any additional
credit time against his sentence in the present case from October 30 until November 11. See
Lotaki, 4 N.E.3d at 657.
Because Hensley has not demonstrated an abuse of the trial court’s discretion, we
affirm.
Affirmed.
VAIDIK, C.J., and FRIEDLANDER, J., concur.
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