UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4327
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
TYRONE YANCEY, a/k/a Whoadie,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the United
States of Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (5:13-cr-00191-FL-1)
Submitted: November 18, 2014 Decided: November 20, 2014
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Dennis M. Hart, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Jennifer P.
May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Tyrone Yancey pleaded guilty pursuant to a written
plea agreement to distribution of heroin, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012). He received an eighty-seven-month
sentence. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there
are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but questioning whether
Yancey’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary in light of the
drug quantity attributed at sentencing, the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11
hearing was adequate, the sentence imposed by the district court
was reasonable, and ineffective assistance of counsel or
prosecutorial misconduct is evident on the record. Yancey has
not filed a pro se supplemental brief. The Government declined
to file a response. We affirm.
Because Yancey did not move to withdraw his plea, we
review his Rule 11 hearing for plain error. United States v.
Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). Here, we find no
error, as the district court fully complied with Rule 11 when
accepting Yancey’s plea. Given no indication to the contrary,
we therefore conclude that Yancey’s plea was knowing and
voluntary, and, consequently, final and binding. See United
States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th Cir. 1992).
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Next we review Yancey’s sentence for reasonableness
using an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The court first reviews for significant
procedural error, and if the sentence is free from such error,
we then consider substantive reasonableness. Id. at 51.
Procedural error includes improperly calculating the Sentencing
Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines range as mandatory,
failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors, and
failing to adequately explain the selected sentence. Id.
Substantive reasonableness is determined by considering the
totality of the circumstances, and if the sentence is within the
properly-calculated Guidelines range, this court applies a
presumption of reasonableness. United States v. Strieper, 666
F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2012). The district court imposed a
sentence of eighty-seven months, which was within the Sentencing
Guidelines range. We conclude that Yancey has not rebutted the
presumption of reasonableness and that the court did not abuse
its discretion in imposing the chosen sentence.
Although counsel raised whether Yancey received
ineffective assistance of counsel, he stated that he could find
no evidence of ineffective assistance. Unless an attorney’s
ineffectiveness conclusively appears on the face of the record,
ineffective assistance claims are not generally addressed on
direct appeal. United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 435 (4th
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Cir. 2008). Instead, such claims should be raised in a motion
brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012), in order to permit
sufficient development of the record. United States v.
Baptiste, 596 F.3d 214, 216 n.1 (4th Cir. 2010). Because there
is no conclusive evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel
on the face of the record, we conclude that any claim should be
raised, if at all, in a § 2255 motion. Neither is prosecutorial
misconduct evident on the record.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm Yancey’s conviction and sentence. This
court requires that counsel inform Yancey, in writing, of the
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Yancey requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Yancey. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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