An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA14-404
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 2 December 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Onslow County
No. 12 CRS 54423
DARREN LYCELL SKINNER
Defendant
______________________________
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Onslow County
Nos. 12 CRS 54424-25
HARRY D. NORTHINGTON, JR.
Defendant
Appeal by defendants from judgments entered 20 December
2013 by Judge Jack W. Jenkins in Onslow County Superior Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 September 2014.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by David W. Boone, Special
Deputy Attorney General, and M. Denise Stanford, Assistant
Attorney General, for the State.
Patterson Harkavy LLP, by Narendra K. Ghosh, for defendant-
appellant Darren Lycell Skinner.
Staples S. Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Paul M. Green,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant Harry
D. Northington, Jr.
DAVIS, Judge.
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Darren Lycell Skinner (“Skinner”) and Harry D. Northington,
Jr. (“Northington”) (collectively “Defendants”) appeal from
their respective convictions for extortion and nonfelonious
obstruction of justice. Northington also appeals from his
convictions for second-degree kidnapping and conspiracy to
commit second-degree kidnapping. After careful review, we
conclude that Defendants received a fair trial free from
prejudicial error.
Factual Background
The State’s evidence at trial tended to establish the
following facts: On the evening of 15 June 2012, Jane Roe1
(“Roe”) went to the home of Sarah Baglioni (“Baglioni”) to
babysit Baglioni’s two children. Roe arrived at the house at
approximately 10:45 p.m., and Baglioni, her boyfriend Chris
Jones (“Jones”), and another woman, Brittany Morgan, left
shortly afterward to go to Alexander’s, a local nightclub. The
children went to sleep, and Roe went outside on the porch to
smoke marijuana and drink a shot of liquor. She then went back
inside, turned on the TV, and fell asleep on the couch in the
1
A pseudonym is used throughout this opinion to protect the
privacy of the victim and for ease of reading.
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living room. When Roe woke up, Baglioni had returned, and Roe
overheard her informing someone over the telephone that a safe
was gone. Approximately five minutes later, Jones arrived at
the house and began questioning Roe about the safe’s
whereabouts. When Roe explained that she had been asleep and
did not know where the safe was, Jones repeatedly hit her in the
face. Jones then picked up a kitchen knife and threatened to
stab her. Roe maintained that she did not know where the safe
was, and Jones informed her that “one of his boys was coming
over . . . [and] he was kind of crazy.” Jones referred to the
person as “Moisture,” a nickname that Roe later discovered
belonged to Northington.
When Defendants arrived at the house, Northington ordered
that Roe be placed in the bathroom. Roe complied because she
was afraid of Defendants and Jones. At that point, Northington,
Jones, and Skinner — who went by the nickname “Menace” —
followed her into the bathroom. Northington “smack[ed]” Roe’s
face with a butcher knife and then proceeded to place the tip of
the knife to the back of her head, telling her that if she did
not tell him where the safe was he was going to cut through the
back of her head like “how butter slices.” Northington told Roe
to take off her clothes, and when she complied, he ran the
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butcher knife up and down her body and told her he was going to
slit her throat.
Northington instructed Roe to touch herself, causing Roe to
fear that he was going to rape her. Jones then told Northington
“that it was enough” and allowed Roe to put on her clothing.
After Roe dressed, Skinner told her if she told anyone what
happened, he would be the last person she saw from “the other
end of the barrel.” Northington told her that if she talked to
anyone, they would come to her house and rape and kill her in
front of her son and his father. Before she was allowed to
leave, she was warned that she “was going to be followed home,
to make sure [she] didn’t stop at the police station.” Roe left
the residence and drove straight to the home of her son’s
father.
The next day, Roe told her mother and younger sister about
these events. Roe’s mother urged her to tell the police, but
Roe refused at first because of Defendants’ warning that they
would kill her if she told anyone what had happened. She agreed
to go to the hospital at around 10:00 p.m. that night because
her head was hurting. Two law enforcement officers interviewed
Roe at the hospital, took a statement, and photographed the
injuries to her face and body.
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On 12 February 2013, an Onslow County grand jury indicted
Defendants on charges of first-degree kidnapping, felony
conspiracy, extortion, and felonious obstruction of justice.
The grand jury also returned bills of indictment charging
Skinner with simple assault and charging Northington with
assault with a deadly weapon.2 The cases were joined, and a jury
trial was held beginning on 16 December 2013.
On 20 December 2013, the jury returned verdicts finding
Skinner guilty of nonfelonious obstruction of justice and
extortion and not guilty of all remaining charges. The jury
found Northington guilty of nonfelonious obstruction of justice,
extortion, second-degree kidnapping, and conspiracy to commit
second-degree kidnapping. The trial court sentenced Skinner to
a presumptive-range term of 21 to 35 months imprisonment for
extortion and 120 days imprisonment for nonfelonious obstruction
of justice to begin at the expiration of the first sentence.
The trial court consolidated Northington’s kidnapping and
conspiracy offenses and sentenced him to a presumptive-range
term of 33 to 52 months imprisonment. The trial court
consolidated the extortion and nonfelonious obstruction of
justice offenses and sentenced Northington to 21 to 35 months
2
The State later dismissed the assault charges against both
Defendants.
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imprisonment following the expiration of the first sentence.
Defendants gave notice of appeal in open court.
Analysis
On appeal, Defendants contend that the trial court erred in
denying their motions to dismiss the obstruction of justice
charges based on the insufficiency of the evidence. Northington
also argues that the trial court committed plain error in its
instructions to the jury. We address each argument in turn.
I. Obstruction of Justice
Defendants argue that their charges for obstruction of
justice should have been dismissed because “there was no
evidence that [Defendants’] conduct actually hindered the
administration of justice.” We disagree.
When reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to
dismiss for insufficient evidence, this Court must determine de
novo “whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each
essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense
included therein, and (2) of defendant’s being the perpetrator .
. . .” State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 378, 526 S.E.2d 451, 455
(citation omitted), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 890, 148 L.Ed.2d 150
(2000). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
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conclusion. Evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable
to the State with every reasonable inference drawn in the
State’s favor.” State v. Lucas, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 758
S.E.2d 672, 676 (2014) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
In In re Kivett, 309 N.C. 635, 670, 309
S.E.2d 442, 462 (1983), our Supreme Court
confirmed that “[o]bstruction of justice is
a common law offense in North Carolina” that
was not abrogated by Article 30 of Chapter
14 of the General Statutes, which sets out
statutory “obstruction of justice” offenses.
The Court then adopted the following
definition of the common law offense: “‘At
common law it is an offense to do any act
which prevents, obstructs, impedes or
hinders public or legal justice. The common
law offense of obstructing public justice
may take a variety of forms . . . .’” Id.
(quoting 67 C.J.S. Obstructing Justice §§
1,2 (1978)).
State v. Wright, 206 N.C. App. 239, 241, 696 S.E.2d 832, 834-35
(2010). Thus, in order to survive Defendants’ motions to
dismiss the obstruction of justice charges, the State was
required to present substantial evidence that Defendants
“committed an act that prevented, obstructed, impeded, or
hindered public or legal justice.” State v. Cousin, ___ N.C.
App. ___, ___, 757 S.E.2d 332, 338, disc. review denied, ___
N.C. ___, 762 S.E.2d 446 (2014).
At trial, Roe testified that both Defendants threatened her
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life if she spoke with law enforcement officers or anyone else
about what had happened to her. Specifically, Skinner told her
if she told anyone what happened, he would be the last person
she saw from “the other end of the barrel,” and Northington said
that if she talked to anyone, they would come to her home and
rape and kill her in front of her son and his father. She
further testified that once she was finally permitted to leave
Baglioni’s house, Defendants and Jones told her that she “was
going to be followed home, to make sure [she] didn’t stop at the
police station.” Roe stated that she drove by the police
station that evening and thought about stopping to report the
crimes committed against her but decided against it “because
they told [her] they were going to kill [her], and [she] didn’t
want to put [her] family or [her]self in any more danger.”
Roe testified that the next day, she spoke to her mother,
who urged her to speak to the police but that she “didn’t want
to go” and “wasn’t going to tell anybody” based on the threats
Defendants made to her. That night, Roe acquiesced to her
mother’s request that she go to the hospital to seek treatment
for her injuries. Her mother then informed her that two law
enforcement officers were going to be there and would want to
talk to her about what happened. It was only then that Roe gave
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a statement and allowed the officers to photograph the injuries
to her face and body.
Taken in the light most favorable to the State, Roe’s
testimony that because of Defendants’ threats she delayed
notifying law enforcement personnel about the crimes committed
against her for approximately 18 hours constitutes substantial
evidence that Defendants committed an act which prevented,
obstructed, impeded or hindered public or legal justice. See
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 623 (11th ed. 2005)
(defining “impede” as “to interfere with or slow the progress
of”); id. at 588 (defining “hinder” as “to make slow or
difficult the progress of”; “to hold back”; or “to delay,
impede, or prevent action”). Thus, because there was
substantial evidence of each essential element of obstruction of
justice and that Defendants were the perpetrators, we conclude
that the trial court properly denied Defendants’ motions to
dismiss.
II. Jury Instructions
Northington also argues that the trial court’s jury
instructions concerning the charge of felonious conspiracy were
improper “because the doctrine of acting in concert, applied to
the conspiracy charge, had the effect of eliminating the
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requirement of a specific agreement to commit kidnapping.” He
admits that he failed to object to the jury instructions at
trial and that our review is consequently limited to determining
whether the alleged instructional error rose to the level of
plain error.
Under the plain error standard,
defendant must show that the instructions
were erroneous and that absent the erroneous
instructions, a jury probably would have
returned a different verdict. The error in
the instructions must be so fundamental that
it denied the defendant a fair trial and
quite probably tilted the scales against
him. It is the rare case in which an
improper instruction will justify the
reversal of a criminal conviction when no
objection has been made in the trial court.
In deciding whether a defect in the jury
instruction constitutes plain error, the
appellate court must examine the entire
record and determine if the instructional
error had a probable impact on the jury’s
finding of guilt.
State v. Smith, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 736 S.E.2d 847, 850-51
(2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Northington points to the following portion of the trial
court’s instructions as the basis for his plain error argument:
The defendant, Harry D. Northington,
Jr., has been charged with feloniously
conspiring to commit first-degree
kidnapping.
For a defendant to be guilty of a
crime, it is not necessary that the
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defendant do all of the acts necessary to
constitute the crime. If two or more
persons join in a common purpose to commit
felonious conspiracy, each of them, if
actually or constructively present, is
guilty of a crime and also guilty of any
other crime committed by the other, in
pursuance of the common purpose to commit
felonious conspiracy, or as a natural and
probable consequence thereof.
The trial court then instructed the jury as to the elements of
conspiracy to commit first-degree kidnapping. Northington
contends that by instructing on the theory of acting in concert
in conjunction with conspiracy to commit first-degree
kidnapping, the trial court permitted the jury to find him
guilty of conspiracy “based on mere guilt by association with
Jones.” He asserts that the acting in concert component of the
instruction eviscerated the requirement of a specific agreement
to commit kidnapping and instead allowed a finding of guilt
based simply on proof that Northington shared a common purpose
with Jones to “conspir[e] to commit some unspecified unlawful
act.” We disagree.
After explaining the elements of conspiracy to commit
first-degree kidnapping, the trial court continued its
instructions as follows:
If you find from the evidence, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that on or about the
alleged date, the defendant, Harry D.
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Northington, Jr., agreed with Chris Jones
and Darren Skinner to commit first degree
kidnapping and that the defendant, Harry D.
Northington, Jr., and those persons
intended, at the time the agreement was
made, that it would be carried out, it would
be your duty to return a verdict of guilty
as to the defendant, Harry D. Northington,
Jr. If you do not so find, or have a
reasonable doubt as to one or more of these
things, you would not return a verdict of
guilty of felonious conspiracy to commit
first-degree kidnapping as to the defendant,
Harry D. Northington, Jr., but will
determine whether he is guilty of felonious
conspiracy to commit second-degree
kidnapping.
For you to find the defendant, Harry D.
Northington, Jr., guilty of felonious
conspiracy to commit second-degree
kidnapping, the State must prove three
things, beyond a reasonable doubt. First,
that the defendant, Harry D. Northington,
Jr., and Chris Jones and Darren Skinner
entered into an agreement. Second, that the
agreement was to commit second-degree
kidnapping.
Second-degree kidnapping is the
unlawful removal of a person from one place
to another, without that person’s consent,
for the purpose of terrorizing that person.
And third, that the defendant, Harry D.
Northington, Jr., and Chris Jones and Darren
Skinner intended that the agreement be
carried out at the time it was made.
If you find from the evidence, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that on or about the
alleged date, the defendant, Harry D.
Northington, Jr., agreed with Chris Jones
and Darren Skinner to commit second-degree
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kidnapping and that the defendant, Harry D.
Northington, Jr., and those persons intended
at the time the agreement was made that it
would be carried out, it would be your duty
to return a verdict of guilty as to the
defendant, Harry D. Northington, Jr. If you
do not so find, or have a reasonable doubt
as to one or more of these things, it would
be your duty to find the defendant, Harry D.
Northington, Jr., not guilty.
These instructions, when viewed in their entirety, make
clear that in order to find Northington guilty of conspiracy to
commit kidnapping, the jury was required to determine that he
specifically (1) entered into an agreement with his co-
conspirators (2) to commit a kidnapping (3) that they intended
to carry out at the time the agreement was made. See State v.
Roach, 358 N.C. 243, 304, 595 S.E.2d 381, 420 (2004) (“[W]hen
instructions, viewed in their entirety, present the law fairly
and accurately to the jury, the instructions will be upheld.”);
see also State v. Canady, 191 N.C. App. 680, 689, 664 S.E.2d
380, 385 (2008) (“When reviewing jury instructions, it is not
enough for the appealing party to show that error occurred in
the jury instructions; rather, it must be demonstrated that such
error was likely, in light of the entire charge, to mislead the
jury.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), disc.
review denied, 363 N.C. 132, 673 S.E.2d 662 (2009).
Although an instruction on the theory of acting in concert
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generally permits a finding of guilt when the defendant does not
complete each particular act constituting the crime himself but
rather shares in a common purpose to commit the crime with his
co-perpetrators, we believe that the instructions here —
considered in their totality — were sufficiently clear in
informing the jury that it was required to find that Northington
himself entered into an agreement with others to commit a
kidnapping. See State v. Ledwell, 171 N.C. App. 328, 333, 614
S.E.2d 412, 415 (“The crime of conspiracy is an agreement to
commit a substantive criminal act . . . .”), disc. review
denied, 360 N.C. 73, 622 S.E.2d 624 (2005). Moreover, we note
that the jury ultimately found Northington guilty of conspiracy
to commit second-degree kidnapping, and the trial court only
included an instruction on acting in concert in its charge on
conspiracy to commit first-degree kidnapping. Thus, assuming —
without deciding — that the challenged portion of the jury
instructions was erroneous, we conclude that Northington has
failed to show plain error.3
3
Northington also appears to make a brief argument that his
conviction for conspiracy to commit second-degree kidnapping
must be set aside because “[he] alone stands convicted of
conspiracy” since Skinner was acquitted of the offense and the
State voluntarily dismissed the conspiracy charge against Jones.
While “[t]he general rule is that if all participants charged in
a conspiracy have been legally acquitted, except the defendant,
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Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we conclude that Defendants
received a fair trial free from prejudicial error.
NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
Judges HUNTER, Robert C., and DILLON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
then the inconsistent charge or conviction against the sole
remaining defendant must be set aside[,] . . . . the dismissal
of a charge[] pursuant to a plea agreement does not constitute
an acquittal at law.” State v. Saunders, 126 N.C. App. 524,
527-28, 485 S.E.2d 853, 855 (1997). Thus, because Jones and
Skinner were not both acquitted of conspiracy, the trial court
was not required to set aside Northington’s conspiracy
conviction. See State v. Essick, 67 N.C. App. 697, 701, 314
S.E.2d 268, 271 (1984) (“In the absence of acquittals of all
named co-conspirators, the defendant’s conviction will stand.”).