J-S73016-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: J.R., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: C.T., MOTHER
No. 1268 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Entered July 3, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Orphans’ Court at No: 45 of 2014
BEFORE: BOWES, J., WECHT, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED DECEMBER 03, 2014
C.T. (“Mother”) appeals the July 3, 2014 order that terminated her
parental rights to J.R. (“Child”).1 After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the procedural and factual history of this
case as follows:
This matter comes before the court on the Petition filed by the
Lancaster County Children and Youth Social Service Agency
(hereinafter “Agency”) to terminate the parental rights of [J.R.
(“Father”)] and [Mother (collectively, “Parents”)], birth parents
of [J.R. (“Child”).] The petition was filed on January 8, 2014 and
notice in accordance with the provisions of the Adoption Act was
provided to Parents. The petition was served on Parents on
February 25, 2014. [Child] has now been in placement for
almost 18 months. A full hearing was held on March 25, 2014,
and then additional testimony was presented on April 22, 2014.
Juvenile records were incorporated fully at the termination
hearing on March 25, 2014.
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1
The court also terminated the parental rights of J.R. (“Father”) in the
July 3, 2014 order. Father also filed a notice of appeal which was docketed
at 1325 MDA 2014. That appeal is disposed of in a separate memorandum.
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* * *
The relevant facts are as follows: [Child] is a minor child born [in
November 2012], in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. At the
time of [Child’s] birth, Mother and Father were living together in
a motel room at Penns Woods Inn, in Manheim with three other
people. Additionally, Mother had a previous history with the
Agency, and her first[-]born child was placed with a family friend
under a safety plan that was developed due to neglect [of the
child] while under Mother’s care. Mother’s older child was
subsequently adopted by the resource family.
Due to these concerns, [Child] was released from the hospital
under a safety plan on December 13, 2012. On December 15,
2012, the safety plan family contacted the Agency and stated
they were no longer willing to keep the child. [Child] has been
in Agency care since December 16, 2012. [Child] was placed in
the resource home that adopted his older half-brother and has
done very well there. At the time of placement, the Agency was
very concerned with Mother and Father’s inappropriate housing,
Mother’s mental health and their parenting skills.
The court approved a Child Permanency Plan that included the
following goals for both Mother and Father: mental health,
parenting, income, housing, and commitment to the child. At
the hearing, the caseworker testified that she had provided them
with information on low-income housing and how to apply for it.
She also spoke to them about websites they could use to find
housing and how to look in the newspaper. At that time, the
caseworker also offered to continue providing the information
and assist in filling out applications. Both parents have
completed their mental health goals, have demonstrated a
commitment to the child by regularly attending visits, and now
have sufficient income. However, Parents have been unable or
unwilling to find appropriate housing for the child. Mother and
Father were also unable to start working on the parenting goal,
as the Personalized Parent Trainer [(“PPT”)] could only be put in
place once the housing goal was met.3 In addition to verbal
communication, the Agency sent letters to Parents on June 6,
2013, August 5, 2013, September 4, 2013 and December 9,
2013 in which [it] encouraged Parents to keep the Agency
updated and to find housing so that a referral to a [PPT]
program could be made. [Child] has now been in placement for
almost 18 months.
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3
The Agency determined that a parenting class would not
be sufficient to satisfy the parenting goal, due to Mother’s
demonstrated parenting deficits with her older child.
At the first review hearing on June 4, 2013, the caseworker
testified that Mother and Father were still residing at the Penns
Woods Inn, but they had plans for housing. The caseworker also
testified that she explained to Mother and Father that she could
not make a referral to a Personalized Parent Trainer until there
was more stable and appropriate housing. The caseworker
stated, “I think that they’re both committed to getting housing,
and I think that knowing that the biggest step, being the
parenting, can’t start until that happens . . . I think, if anything,
they’re definitely going to make sure they have it done now.”
The caseworker testified that, in 2013, Father was reporting to
the Agency that he was making $800 per week. In actuality,
Father had made approximately $5,000 for the entire year of
2013. Mother reported to the Agency that she was filing for SSI
and would receive around $900 per month. Based upon the
income being reported to the caseworker, the Agency did not
provide services to help Parents apply for low-income housing.
Additionally, Parents repeatedly indicated to the caseworker that
they were identifying appropriate housing and therefore did not
need support finding a place to live. The parents are solely
responsible for the misinformation given to the Agency and
Court concerning their income and housing prospects, which
directly affected the services provided to them.
Father first told the Agency that he had trouble locating housing
in October of 2013, after the child had been in placement for 10
months. At a hearing before the Master on October 2, 2013, the
caseworker stated: “The income is less than we expected. Part
of the Agency’s sort of hands-off approach at finding housing
was an impression to us that they had sufficient funds . . . So
there will be some additional efforts put forth in terms to help to
find some housing.” The caseworker again stated that the PPT
would only be willing to work with the family in a potentially
permanent home, and they would not accept a referral while
Mother and Father continued to reside in the motel. [The]
caseworker also testified that Parents indicated that part of their
struggle finding housing was their low credit score. The
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caseworker had made calls to Tabor[2] but had not been called
back. The caseworker also testified that she was going to ask
Mother and Father to sign a release so she could talk with the
landlord to figure out what it would take for Parents to switch
from the motel room to an apartment on the same premises.
The caseworker spoke with Father in November 2013, and he
told her that a family friend was willing to rent them a basement
apartment for $250 or $500 a month,13 which was less than
what they paid to the motel. The caseworker testified that at
that time she told Father that was a good option, because even
if it was not appropriate for the child, they would save money to
put towards an apartment. The caseworker stated that Father
told her in December that moving into the basement apartment
would not happen, as he did not think it would be the right place
for the child. At this point, [Child] had been in Agency custody
for a year.
13
The record is unclear. The caseworker originally
testified that the rent of the basement apartment would be
$450-$500, but later stated that it was $250. Parents
were paying about $750/month at the motel where they
were staying.
At the initial termination of parent rights and review hearing on
February 25, 2014, the caseworker stated that the parents had
progressed only minimally on their child permanency plans since
the first review. The caseworker stated, “They certainly took a
lot of steps early on, but there seems to be not much follow-
through lately.” [He] testified that parents still did not have
stable income, they continued to reside in the Penns Wood Inn,
and therefore had not been referred for parenting. The
caseworker also testified that Parents had completed the mental
health component of their plans and continued to attend and
behave appropriately at visits [with Child], however they did not
seem dedicated to completing their plans. The caseworker
stated that [he] was suspicious as Parents kept telling [him] that
they were applying for housing, but had not provided [him] with
any names, applications, or records of income.
____________________________________________
2
Tabor is a Lancaster County community organization that assists with
housing and provides financial counseling.
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Father testified at the [February 2014] hearing that he was laid
off from Good’s Dairy in November of 2013, where he worked for
8 years, and only earned approximately $5,000 before he was
let go in 2013. He had earned approximately $800 per [week]
(approximately $40,000 a year) in prior years. He stated that
he had filed for unemployment but was denied due to inadequate
hours, and at the time of the hearing his appeal was still
pending. Father stated that he was unable to obtain
employment because he needed Monday afternoons off in order
to attend visits. Father told the Court that his friend was buying
a lot with a house on it, and hopefully they could move in by
March 1, 2014. The caseworker met with Father on March 3,
and he told the caseworker that he would be meeting with the
landlord later that week to sign a lease. Prior to the termination
of parental rights hearing on March 25, 2014, Father informed
the caseworker that they would not be moving into that property
in the immediate future as the current tenant was still living in
the house and the potential landlord had not purchased the
property yet. At this point [Child] had been in care
approximately 15 months.
The termination of parental rights hearing was continued to April
22, 2014 in order for Parents to prepare their testimony and the
potential landlord’s testimony. When the Court reconvened in
April, Parents had changed their plan yet again, and were no
longer going to live in the house from the March hearing, and
were now planning on renting a house with Father’s birth
mother, [D.C.].29 Both Father and [D.C.] testified that they had
signed a lease on a duplex, and would be moving in June 1,
2014. A copy of the lease was presented at the hearing, marked
as an exhibit and admitted to the record. As of the June 1, 2014
occupancy date, [Child] would be in care for approximately 16
months.
29
Father’s birth mother has a history with the Agency.
She placed Father for adoption when he was an infant.
Father did not have any contact with his birth mother until
very recently.
Trial Court Memorandum and Order (“T.C.M.”), 7/3/2014, at 1-6 (some
footnotes omitted; minor modifications to capitalization and punctuation).
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Following the hearings, on July 3, 2014, the trial court issued a
memorandum and order that terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental
rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8) and (b). On July 24, 2014,
Mother filed a notice of appeal and a concise statement of errors complained
of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). On August 13,
2014, the trial court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.
Mother raises two issues for our review:
A. Did the court err by allowing the Children and Youth Agency
to determine the requirements needed to satisfy the
parenting goal of the child permanency plan and then finding
that Mother failed to complete the Agency’s parenting
requirements, rather than making an independent judicial
determination?
B. Did the court err in finding that the Children and Youth
Agency provided sufficient assistance to the parents regarding
the completion of the parenting and housing goals of the child
permanency plan such as would justify termination of their
parental rights?
Mother’s Brief at 4.
Our standard of review is as follows:
In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, our
scope of review is comprehensive: we consider all the evidence
presented as well as the trial court’s factual findings and legal
conclusions. However, our standard of review is narrow: we will
reverse the trial court’s order only if we conclude that the trial
court abused its discretion, made an error of law, or lacked
competent evidence to support its findings. The trial judge’s
decision is entitled to the same deference as a jury verdict.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
Further, we have stated:
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Where the hearing court’s findings are supported by competent
evidence of record, we must affirm the hearing court even
though the record could support an opposite result.
We are bound by the findings of the trial court which have
adequate support in the record so long as the findings do not
evidence capricious disregard for competent and credible
evidence. The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of
the evidence presented, and is likewise free to make all
credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.
Though we are not bound by the trial court’s inferences and
deductions, we may reject its conclusions only if they involve
errors of law or are clearly unreasonable in light of the trial
court’s sustainable findings.
In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).
The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to section
2511(a)(8) and (b), which provides in relevant part:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
* * *
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with
an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date
of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the
removal or placement of the child continue to exist and
termination of parental rights would best serve the needs
and welfare of the child.
* * *
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
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consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.
To terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a)(8), the following factors must be demonstrated: (1)
the child has been removed from parental care for 12 months or
more from the date of removal; (2) the conditions which led to
the removal or placement of the child continue to exist; and (3)
termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child. Section 2511(a)(8) sets a 12-month time
frame for a parent to remedy the conditions that led to the
[child’s] removal by the court. Once the 12-month period has
been established, the court must next determine whether the
conditions that led to the child’s removal continue to exist,
despite the reasonable good faith efforts of [the child welfare
agency] supplied over a realistic time period. Termination under
Section 2511(a)(8) does not require the court to evaluate a
parent’s current willingness or ability to remedy the conditions
that initially caused placement or the availability or efficacy of
[the child welfare agency’s] services.
In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations omitted).
With that background, we turn to Mother’s first issue. Mother argues
that the trial court abdicated its role to the Agency in allowing the Agency to
determine that a PPT was the only method by which Mother could satisfy the
parenting goal. Mother also contends that, prior to the termination
proceedings, the trial court did not clearly state that working with a PPT was
the only possible way to meet the goal. Mother’s Brief at 7-9.
The trial court stated that, based upon Mother’s previous involvement
with the Agency, it had “serious concerns” about Mother’s ability to parent.
Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 8/13/2014, at 1. Therefore, the trial court
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determined that a PPT was necessary to alleviate those concerns, that
parenting classes or other alternatives would not have provided enough
guidance to ensure that Mother could parent Child adequately, and that the
PPT was the only method by which Mother could meet her goal. Id. at 1-2.
Because Mother’s housing was not appropriate, the PPT could not work with
Mother in her residence to assess her parenting or work with her and Child.
Id. at 2.
We find nothing in the record to contradict the trial court’s statements.
At the last permanency review in February 2014, the trial court stated that
the parenting referral could not occur until housing had been secured. Notes
of Testimony (“N.T.”), 2/25/2014, at 31-32. Further, the record supports
the court’s concerns about Mother’s parenting skills. With regard to Mother’s
other child, among other issues, the child was found with overflowing
diapers, Mother had left medication on the floor to which the child had
access, and Mother ignored the child while he was crying. N.T., 3/25/2014,
at 51-52. While the court did state in a footnote that the Agency determined
that Mother required a PPT, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the
court abdicated its role and did not adopt that requirement. Further, Mother
points to no case law that prohibits a trial court from adopting a agency’s
recommendations.
In her second issue, Mother argues that the Agency did not make
reasonable efforts to assist Mother in meeting her goals. Specifically,
Mother contends that the Agency should have not conditioned the parenting
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goal upon her attaining adequate housing. Mother also argues that the
Agency did not provide adequate assistance to Mother in finding housing.
Mother contends that the record does not support the trial court’s
determination that Mother and Father were not credible regarding their
housing. Mother’s Brief at 9-11.
Matthew McCafferty, the caseworker, testified that he tried to get
Mother assistance through Tabor, but was unable to do so. N.T., 2/25/2014,
at 17, 20. Mr. McCafferty had been informed about various plans from
Mother and Father about housing, but that Mother and Father never
provided any details, such as lease applications, names of contacts, or any
records. Id. at 19-21. Mr. McCafferty stated that housing has been a main
issue for Mother and that he had attempted to stress the importance of
adequate housing since he became involved in the case. Id. at 22. At the
termination hearing, Mr. McCafferty testified that Mother or Father told him
four or five different times that they had secured housing, only to have it not
work out. N.T., 3/25/2014, at 19, 33. Additionally, Parents’ place at the
motel was a single, small room with a microwave and an adjoining
bathroom. Id. at 19-20.
The trial court concluded that Mother misled the Agency about the
housing situation. T.C.M. at 7. The court found that Mother was aware that
housing was a paramount issue and that she did not progress toward
meeting this goal. Id. Further, Mother’s lack of transparency about housing
caused the Agency to provide less assistance than it might otherwise have
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provided. T.C.O. at 2. The trial court concluded that Mother and Father
were the sole cause of their lack of appropriate housing. T.C.M. at 8.
We previously have affirmed the termination of parental rights where a
parent has made progress toward his or her goals, but has not yet remedied
all the conditions that lead to removal. See In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999,
1005 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc) (“[A]lthough Mother exhibited substantial
progress in meeting the Agency's objectives, she ultimately was unable to
care for C.L.G. because, twelve months later, she could not provide the
requisite parenting and adequate housing.”). Here, Mother made progress
on her mental health goals. However, she has not secured housing, which
has also prevented her from starting the program that was necessary to
ensure that she can safely and adequately care for Child. While Mother
blames the Agency for not providing enough services, the record supports
the trial court’s conclusion that it was Mother who was not forthcoming with
the Agency. Further, as noted above, the court and Agency had adequate
reasons to require a PPT. The PPT would only work with Mother and Child on
parenting once Mother had adequate housing. Mother was aware of this
requirement, and it was her failure to secure reasonable housing that
delayed her ability to focus upon the necessary parenting skills training.
Even if Mother’s most recent proposed housing alternative with D.C.
comes to fruition, Mother still would have to complete her parenting goal
before Child could be returned. Child had already been in the Agency’s
custody for almost eighteen months when the trial court ruled. It is
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unknown how much longer it would take Mother to complete her goals, or
even if she can complete them. “[A] child’s life ‘simply cannot be put on
hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the
responsibilities of parenting.’” In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 732 (Pa. Super.
2008) (quoting In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1276 (Pa. Super.
2003)). Based upon the record before us, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/3/2014
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