C.J.R. v. G.A.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2771-13T3

C.J.R., a minor, by his
father and guardian ad litem,
CHRISTOPHER REES, and
CHRISTOPHER REES, individually, APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

Plaintiffs-Appellants, December 8, 2014

v. APPELLATE DIVISION

G.A.,

Defendant-Respondent,

and

GERALD J. ALESSI,

Defendant.

____________________________________

Argued November 17, 2014 - Decided December 8, 2014

Before Judges Sabatino, Simonelli, and
Guadagno.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County,
Docket No. L-0576-12.

John D. Borbi argued the cause for
appellants (Borbi, Clancy & Patrizi,
attorneys; Mr. Borbi, on the brief).

Ann L. Longo argued the cause for respondent
(Naulty, Scaricamazza & McDevitt, LLC,
attorneys; Gerald X. Smith, of counsel and
on the brief; Ms. Longo, on the brief).
 The opinion of the court was delivered by

SABATINO, P.J.A.D.

With his Medford youth lacrosse team in the lead, less than

twenty seconds remaining on the game clock, and the ball nestled

in the basket of his stick, a Medford player was struck in the

forearm by an opposing player on the Marlton team. The blow

knocked the Medford player to the ground. Referees whistled

play to a halt and ended the game. The Medford player was taken

to a hospital, where he was treated for a fracture.

Seeking to recover damages for his personal injuries, the

Medford player, a minor, and his father filed suit in the Law

Division against the opposing player, who was eleven years old

at the time of the incident. Plaintiffs also named the Marlton

player's father as a co-defendant. The trial court granted

summary judgment to both defendants. The court concluded that

the facts relating to the conduct producing this youth sports

injury, even when viewed in a light most favorable to

plaintiffs, were insufficient to support this cause of action.

Plaintiffs now appeal, solely challenging the dismissal of their

claims against the other minor.

We affirm the entry of summary judgment in this case of

first impression under New Jersey law. We concur with the

motion judge that the defendant minor breached no legal duty in

2 A-2771-13T3
causing the plaintiff minor to sustain this unfortunate sports-

related injury.

We reach our conclusion by applying a double-layered

analysis, one which counsel on appeal mutually accepted as an

appropriate distillation of the relevant tort principles

separately pertaining to adult sporting activities and to the

conduct of minors. The inquiry we have fashioned examines: (1)

whether the opposing player's injurious conduct would be

actionable if it were committed by an adult, based on sufficient

proof of the defendant's intent or recklessness as required by

the Supreme Court's case law; and, if so, (2) whether it would

be reasonable in the particular youth sports setting to expect a

minor of the same age and characteristics as defendant to

refrain from the injurious physical contact.

For the reasons we explain in this opinion, the record in

this case reflects that, at the very least, the second query

must be answered here in the negative. Summary judgment was

therefore appropriately granted to the defendant minor.

I.

The facts presented to us are not complicated. We derive

them substantially from the deposition testimony of plaintiff

3 A-2771-13T3
C.J.R.,1 his parents, and his team's coach.2 We consider those

facts in a light most favorable to plaintiffs. Brill v. Guardian

Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995); see also W.J.A.

v. D.A., 210 N.J. 229, 237 (2012) (applying the same standard on

appeal of a summary judgment order).

In 2011, C.J.R. and defendant G.A. were each enrolled by

their respective parents in a recreational lacrosse league. At

the time of the game incident in question, C.J.R. was twelve

years old and G.A. was eleven years old. G.A. was five feet

tall and weighed seventy-six pounds. C.J.R. was two to four

inches taller and about fourteen pounds heavier than G.A.

Based on their relative skill levels, C.J.R. and G.A. were

assigned to the league's "5/6 combination" division, which was a

level composed of youths who were not assigned to either the

sixth grade "A" teams or the fifth grade "A" teams. As C.J.R.'s

coach Brian Bennett explained in his testimony, the "5/6

combination" level essentially involved what is commonly known

as a "B" team level, meaning that the skill sets of the players

1
We have elected to use initials for the plaintiff minor
("C.J.R.") and the defendant minor ("G.A."). The record does not
provide a middle initial for G.A.
2
No depositions were taken of any other parties or witnesses,
including the defendant minor, the defendant minor's parents,
the opposing coach, the referees, or any spectators.

4 A-2771-13T3
in that division generally were not as advanced as those who

were on the "A" teams. C.J.R. played for the Medford team and

G.A. played for the Marlton team.

The physical contact between G.A. and C.J.R. occurred near

the end of a game on May 7, 2011. The Medford team was in the

lead.3 C.J.R. received the ball at midfield with less than twenty

seconds left on the game clock. As described by Coach Bennett,

C.J.R. began running towards the sideline. According to

Bennett, C.J.R. was trying to keep possession of the ball and

maintain the lead until time expired.

As described by C.J.R.'s mother,4 who had been watching from

the sidelines, G.A. was running "full force" diagonally across

the field towards C.J.R. As she phrased it, G.A. was also

"roaring" unintelligibly. She observed that G.A. had his head

"tucked down," with his arms at his side. C.J.R.'s mother did

not see the moment of the ensuing collision of the two boys

3
At the motion argument in the trial court counsel for both
parties agreed that the score was then 5-4, consistent with
defendant's interrogatory answers. C.J.R.'s mother vaguely
asserted at her deposition that C.J.R.'s team was "up by several
points," but that is not corroborated or substantiated.
4
C.J.R.'s father did not attend the game.

5 A-2771-13T3
because she had averted her attention to pick up some empty cups

on the sideline.5

Coach Bennett also observed G.A. approach C.J.R. According

to Bennett, G.A. "left his feet" and "hit [C.J.R.] with either

his helmet or his stick right across the midsection." As Bennett

recalled it, G.A. had both hands on his stick. Bennett observed

that G.A. simultaneously hit not only the back6 of C.J.R.'s torso

but also C.J.R.'s left arm, because C.J.R. had been "rocking his

stick" and "twisting."

According to Bennett, upon impact, C.J.R. left his feet and

immediately went to the ground. G.A. "bounced off" C.J.R. and

also went to the ground. C.J.R. then got back up and began to

take off his gloves to "see how [his] arm was, [discovering] it

was broken." C.J.R. was conscious the entire time.

Up until that point in the game, C.J.R. had no interactions

with G.A. that he could remember. Indeed, according to C.J.R.,

he had no idea who G.A. was prior to their collision. He could

5
C.J.R.'s mother was a parent designated to pick up cups and
debris left on the sidelines that day.
6
In his own deposition, C.J.R. recalled that G.A. had approached
him from the front, not the back. Given our obligation to
consider the record in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, we
ignore this discrepancy and accept the contrary testimony that
G.A. had approached C.J.R. from the rear.

6 A-2771-13T3
only recall that G.A. was wearing an orange jersey bearing the

number thirty-six.

Following the collision, the two referees threw down

penalty flags. G.A. was escorted off the field, and an ambulance

was called for C.J.R. Soon thereafter, the referees declared the

game over, allegedly without explaining why, even though about

seven seconds were left on the game clock.7 No penalty was

called or imposed.

An ambulance arrived at the field, and C.J.R. was brought

to a local emergency room. He underwent an open reduction

surgery to repair his left arm the same day. According to

plaintiffs' medical expert, C.J.R. had "both bones of forearm

fracture treated with intramedullary rodding of the radius."

C.J.R.'s forearm was kept in a long-arm cast for several

weeks, and thereafter in a short-arm cast. He missed about a

week to ten days of school but, according to C.J.R.'s deposition

testimony, he was otherwise unaffected. The surgery left him

with a four-centimeter scar. In addition, C.J.R. claims that his

7
In a signed statement, Coach Bennett suggested that the reason
the referees terminated the game was due to a "Warrior Lacrosse"
rule, a copy of which is contained in plaintiffs' appendix. As
is relevant here, the rule provides that "[o]fficials will have
authority to terminate a boys' youth game in response to
flagrant acts of unsportsmanlike behavior including excessively
rough play[.]"

7 A-2771-13T3
forearm periodically aches. His doctor notes that he has some

residual difficulties with flexion and dorsiflexion, which

particularly affect him when wrestling.

Subsequently, C.J.R.'s father Christopher Rees filed a

personal injury action on C.J.R.'s and his own behalf in the Law

Division, naming as defendants G.A. and G.A.'s father, Gerald

Alessi. As to G.A., the complaint alleged that he "acted

negligently and impacted with [C.J.R.] during the course and

play of the lacrosse game, so as to cause [C.J.R.] injury."

Plaintiffs subsequently amplified their claims against G.A.,

contending that the defendant minor had been "reckless" and

thereby would be liable under tort liability principles

established by the Supreme Court in adult sport-related

contexts. See, e.g., Schick v. Ferolito, 167 N.J. 7 (2001);

Crawn v. Campo, 136 N.J. 494 (1994). G.A.'s father, meanwhile,

was claimed to be liable for C.J.R.'s injury under a theory of

negligent parental supervision.

Defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court

granted summary judgment to G.A.'s father, a ruling which

plaintiffs have not appealed.8 However, the court denied the

8
The father's dismissal was consistent with principles of law
that restrict a parent's liability for injuries inflicted by his
or her child to limited circumstances in which the parent "knows
or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his
(continued)

8 A-2771-13T3
motion as to G.A. without prejudice, allowing plaintiffs to take

additional depositions. When those depositions were completed,

G.A. renewed his motion, and plaintiffs filed opposition. Among

other things, plaintiffs stressed that G.A. had violated the

rules of the game by approaching C.J.R. in a blind-side manner

from the rear, leaving his feet with his arms down, and engaging

in what is known as a disallowed "take-out check."9

Based on the record after fuller discovery had been

completed, the motion judge, Judge Marc M. Baldwin, granted

summary judgment to G.A. and dismissed plaintiffs' claims

against that minor. In his oral ruling, Judge Baldwin concluded

that plaintiffs had failed to create a genuine issue of material

fact to establish that G.A. had engaged in a reckless form of

conduct of a degree or nature sufficient to justify imposing

(continued)
child" and also "knows or should know of the necessity and
opportunity for exercising such control." Mazzilli v. Selger, 13
N.J. 296, 302 (1953); see also Buono v. Scalia, 179 N.J. 131,
143 (2004) (noting the scope of a parent's immunity from tort
liability as to his or her conduct implicating "legitimate
child-rearing issues"). Here, the record is bereft of evidence
that G.A.'s father had the capacity to control his son's on-the-
field conduct during the lacrosse game, let alone proof that the
father knew or should have known that he possessed such control
and that it was necessary to exercise it.
9
According to the rules of the game reproduced in plaintiffs'
appendix, a "take-out check" is defined as "any body check in
which the player lowers his head or shoulder with the force and
intent to put the other player on the ground."

9 A-2771-13T3
liability upon a minor of his age in this sports-related

setting.

The judge indicated that G.A.'s age was "critical" to his

analysis. The judge noted that he might have denied the motion

if, hypothetically, G.A. had been seventeen years old at the

time of the incident and had a more mature understanding of the

consequences of his behavior. However, given that G.A. was much

younger than that at the time of the game, the judge ruled that

he had not acted with the level of recklessness required under

the law to create liability.

Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration, clarifying for the

court that G.A. was eleven years old at the time of the

incident, and not age ten as had been suggested at the prior

motion argument. The court denied the motion, finding the one-

year difference in age inconsequential. This appeal followed.

II.

To date, there are no reported opinions in our State

analyzing the alleged tort liability of a minor who inflicts an

injury upon another minor while they are participating in a

youth sports activity. Two distinct strands of the law guide

our analysis: (1) the cases establishing the liability of adults

who intentionally or recklessly injure another person in a

sporting activity; and (2) the cases that limit the potential

10 A-2771-13T3
tort liability of minors, depending upon their age and other

characteristics.

A.

Our Supreme Court has issued two seminal opinions

explicating the standards for tort liability of adults who

injure others while engaging in a sporting activity: Crawn,

supra, 136 N.J. at 494, and Schick, supra, 167 N.J. at 7.

The plaintiff's complaint in Crawn concerned injuries

arising from a defendant crashing into a plaintiff at home plate

during an adult "pickup softball game." Crawn, supra, 136 N.J.

at 496-99. After canvassing the relevant law of various other

jurisdictions, the Court adopted a standard that requires a

plaintiff to demonstrate a defendant's intentional infliction of

injury or recklessness in order to establish tort liability in

the context of recreational sports. Id. at 501-08. As the Court

recognized in Crawn, "[p]hysical contact is an inherent or

integral part of the game in many sports." Id. at 504. "In

addition, the physicality of sports is accompanied by a high

level of emotional intensity." Ibid. Consequently, the Court

imposed a high burden on plaintiffs seeking tort recovery for

injuries they sustain as mutual participants in adult sporting

events. "The heightened recklessness standard recognizes a

commonsense distinction between excessively harmful conduct and

11 A-2771-13T3
the more routine rough-and-tumble of sports that should occur

freely on the playing fields and should not be second-guessed in

courtrooms." Id. at 508.

The Court reaffirmed and applied these tenets in Schick, a

case in which the plaintiff, a golfer on a course, was injured

after being hit in the head by another golfer's errant tee shot.

Schick, supra, 167 N.J. at 11-13. In determining that summary

judgment was inappropriate, the Court relied on several key

facts that could show defendant's "disregard of a high and

excessive degree of danger." Id. at 19. Specifically, the Court

noted that the defendant had waved the plaintiff off in an

effort to induce him to move from his location in proximity to

the tee box, and that the defendant then hit his tee shot anyway

without assuring that the plaintiff had moved safely out of the

way. Id. at 21.

As the Court ruled in Schick, this tee-box scenario

presented "a set of facts that a jury could find constitutes

reckless conduct because it may reflect a conscious choice of a

course of action with knowledge or reason to know that the

action will create serious danger to others." Ibid. (emphasis

added). The Court elaborated on the meaning of this

"recklessness" standard in the sports context:

an actor acts recklessly when he or she
intentionally commits an act of an

12 A-2771-13T3
 unreasonable character in disregard of a
known or obvious risk that was so great as
to make it highly probable that harm would
follow, and which thus is usually
accompanied by a conscious indifference to
the consequences. The standard is objective
and may be proven by showing that a
defendant proceeded in disregard of a high
and excessive degree of danger either known
to him or her or apparent to a reasonable
person in his or her position. Reckless
conduct is an extreme departure from
ordinary care, in a situation in which a
high degree of danger is apparent. Reckless
behavior must be more than any mere mistake
resulting from inexperience, excitement or
confusion, and more than mere
thoughtlessness or inadvertence, or simple
inattention[.]

[Id. at 19 (emphasis added) (citations and
internal alterations omitted) (quoting
Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 34
at 212 (5th ed. 1984)).]

So defined, this recklessness standard of care "has been applied

in New Jersey to sporting environments that span team

competitions, one-on-one competitions, and individualized

sporting endeavors." Id. at 14.

B.

The second strand of precedent that must be considered in

this youth sports injury context is the law generally governing

the potential tort liabilities of minors. In New Jersey,

children under the age of seven are protected by a rebuttable

presumption that they are incapable of negligence. See Bush v.

N.J. & N.Y. Transit Co., 30 N.J. 345, 358 (1959); see also

13 A-2771-13T3
Berberian v. Lynn, 179 N.J. 290, 298 (2004) (noting that long-

standing presumption). Above this seven-year-old line of

demarcation, our law applies a fact-sensitive and context-

specific approach, examining the age and other characteristics

of the defendant minor, and the surrounding circumstances.

As the Supreme Court has instructed, "a child's conduct

should be measured in light of his or her capacity to exercise

care under all attendant circumstances." Berberian, supra, 179

N.J. at 298 (citing Cowan v. Doering, 111 N.J. 451, 459 (1988)).

Underpinning this modified standard for minors is the notion

that "the younger the child, the greater the risk, for younger

children are less able -- and less likely -- to discern danger."

Jerkins v. Anderson, 191 N.J. 285, 295 (2007) (citing Bush,

supra, 30 N.J. at 355).

In this regard, the Court has observed that "'[c]hildren

have a known proclivity to act impulsively without thought of

the possibilities of danger,' and '[i]t is precisely th[at] lack

of mature judgment which makes supervision so vital.'" Id. at

296-97 (quoting Titus v. Lindberg, 49 N.J. 66, 75 (1967)

(alterations in original)).

This restrictive approach to the liability or comparative

fault of children is further reinforced in the current model

14 A-2771-13T3
civil jury charges applicable to minors who are seven years and

older. As the charges explain:

[a] child, old enough to be capable of
negligence, is required to act with the same
amount of care as children of similar age,
judgment and experience. In order for you to
determine whether a child has acted
negligently, you should take into
consideration the child's age, intelligence
and experience. Also you must consider the
child's capacity to understand and avoid the
danger to which he/she was exposed in the
actual circumstances and situation in this
case. You, the jury, must decide the factual
question of whether this child was
comparatively negligent.

[Current N.J. Model Jury Charges (Civil) §
7.11(A) (1991) (emphasis added).]

Although the model charge refers to concepts of a child's

"negligence" rather than his or her "recklessness," we discern

no reason to apply a different approach when deciding if a given

set of facts satisfies the latter standard of conduct. In each

instance, one must consider the child's age, characteristics,

and the surrounding circumstances.

We now consider the interplay between the recklessness

standard applied in adult sports injury cases and the standards

governing child tort liability. The closest published case on

point in our state is Calhanas v. South Amboy Roller Rink, 292

N.J. Super. 513, 522 (App. Div. 1996). In Calhanas, the adult

plaintiff was skating at a roller rink when he was cut off by a

15 A-2771-13T3
zig-zagging child skater and thereafter sustained injuries. Id.

at 516-17. In determining whether the trial court's grant of

summary judgment for the defendant roller rink was appropriate,

we were called upon to interpret certain portions of the New

Jersey Roller Skating Rink Safety and Fair Liability Act,

N.J.S.A. 5:14-1 to -7.

Of particular import in Calhanas was N.J.S.A. 5:14-6, a

provision which, in essence, immunizes a roller rink from

injuries sustained by skaters arising from "inherent risks of

roller skating, insofar as [those] risks are obvious and

necessary." Calhanas, supra, 292 N.J. Super. at 521 (quoting

N.J.S.A. 5:14-6). In construing that provision, we observed that

a "similar standard was enunciated in [Crawn, supra, 136 N.J. at

508]." Calhanas, supra, 292 N.J. Super. at 521.

Upon concluding that summary judgment was improvidently

granted on the record facts in Calhanas, we reasoned that the

child

who collided with Manuel Calhanas had been
skating in an obviously reckless manner for
some minutes before the collision. They both
testified that the child was skating at a
high rate of speed with no one accompanying
him, weaving in front of people and cutting
across the rink, rather than proceeding
around the rink in a circular fashion as he
should have.

[Id. at 522 (emphasis added).]

16 A-2771-13T3
 Although perhaps illustrative of a roller rink's potential

liability that can stem from a child's recklessness under the

roller rink statute, Calhanas does not resolve the present

question of a minor's own common law duties in the context of a

youth sporting game. Rather, Calhanas only signifies that the

reckless acts that may give rise to tort liability cannot be

acts which are "inherent" in a recreational activity. Notably,

the minor who caused the accident in Calhanas was not identified

or sued. Id. at 517-18

Cases in other states have applied a comparable

recklessness standard, or its equivalent, in ascertaining

whether a minor can be liable for personal injuries that he or

she inflicts during a youth sporting activity. See, e.g.,

Keller v. Mols, 509 N.E.2d 584, 584-86 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)

(holding that a fourteen-year-old plaintiff injured by a

thirteen-year-old defendant in a floor hockey game on a

neighbor's patio was precluded from recovery for injuries on a

simple negligence theory); Ramos v. City of Countryside, 485

N.E.2d 418, 418-20 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (concluding that a

fourteen-year-old boy who struck an eight-year-old boy in the

eye with a ball while playing the game of "bombardment" could

not be held liable for the younger boy's injury on a theory of

negligence, since both youths were participating in a sporting

17 A-2771-13T3
event); Leonard ex rel. Meyer v. Behrens, 601 N.W.2d 76, 81

(Iowa 1999) (applying the recklessness standard to two fifteen-

year-old litigants for injuries occurring during their paintball

game); Kabella v. Bouschelle, 672 P.2d 290, 294 (N.M. Ct. App.

1983) (holding that a minor plaintiff could not sue another

minor for mere negligence for injuries sustained in an informal

game of tackle football; a viable claim must be predicated upon

reckless or intentional conduct); Marchetti v. Kalish, 559

N.E.2d 699, 703-04 (Ohio 1990) (applying a recklessness standard

to a fifteen-year-old defendant who collided with a thirteen-

year-old plaintiff causing a broken leg).

Distilling these authorities to a cohesive rule of law to

apply when, as here, a minor injures another minor in a sporting

activity, we adopt a "double-layered" approach. The two layers

of that analysis are as follows: (1) whether the opposing

player's injurious conduct would be actionable if it were

committed by an adult, evaluating whether there is sufficient

proof of the defendant player's intent to inflict bodily injury

or recklessness; and, if so, (2) whether it would be reasonable

in the particular youth sports setting to expect a minor of the

same age and characteristics as the defendant to refrain from

the injurious physical contact.

18 A-2771-13T3
 This dual-tiered approach captures the essence of two

strands of law that we have previously outlined. Moreover, the

approach reflects the long-standing public policies that

disfavor the unfettered tort liability of fellow sporting

participants, and also curtail the tort liability of children

who cause third parties to sustain personal injuries.

We can readily take judicial notice that children,

particularly younger children, often need years of training,

coaching, and experience to learn and adhere to the rules of a

competitive sport. Children will inevitably commit fouls in

sporting activities out of inexperience, youthful exuberance,

lack of self-discipline, clumsiness, immaturity, frustration, or

some combination of those traits.10 Their propensity to make

physical and mental errors is compounded in sports such as

lacrosse, which have complicated rules and which inherently

involve a high degree of physical contact with opposing players.

It would be unfair to hold children who engage in such sporting

10
This principle is recognized in the U.S. Boys Youth Lacrosse
Rules. Under the paragraph titled "Violent Collisions," the
Rules provide that "[s]ome body contact is permitted at all
levels of boys' youth lacrosse, with progressively more age-
appropriate contact permitted as players become more physically
mature and learn proper checking techniques." U.S. Lacrosse,
2014 U.S. Lacrosse Boys Youth Rules, http://www.uslacrosse.org/
portals/1/documents/pdf/participants/players/2014-boys-youth-
rules.pdf.

19 A-2771-13T3
activities to the same expectations and standards of conduct as

adult athletes.

Nor should the prospect of a lawsuit crop up every time

that a referee calls a foul on a child who is learning how to

play the game. The law should not unduly discourage our youths

from taking advantage of opportunities through organized sports

to appreciate and cultivate the virtues of teamwork and physical

conditioning.

That said, we are cognizant of the serious and sometimes

long-lasting injuries that can be suffered by children when they

take part in sporting activities with their peers. For instance,

we are well aware of the heightened public attention that has

recently been focused upon concussions and similar injuries to

young athletes. In light of those legitimate safety concerns,

we by no means intend by this opinion to endorse or promote a

laissez-faire attitude that is oblivious to the risks of such

injuries. Nor do we overlook the efforts of coaches, parents,

referees, and equipment manufacturers who are striving to make

youth sports safer.

All we have done in this opinion is to attempt through our

double-layered analysis to integrate established rules of law,

rules that already regulate the liability of adult sport

participants and of child defendants in tort cases. If new or

20 A-2771-13T3
different liability principles would be preferable, the

Legislature is free, of course, to enact them.

Applying the well-settled general legal principles here,

and viewing the record in a light most favorable to plaintiffs,

we are satisfied that the trial court correctly granted summary

judgment to the defendant minor in this case. G.A. was only

eleven years old when this incident took place. He was playing

in a program level designed for less-experienced or less-

proficient lacrosse players of his age. Although he may well

have committed a foul by approaching C.J.R. in the manner that

has been described, that mistake must be considered in context.

The game was apparently close, and time was running down.

G.A.'s team could not tie or win the game unless it got control

of the ball back. There was no proof of any pre-existing enmity

between C.J.R. and G.A. earlier in the game. In fact, C.J.R. did

not even realize at the time of the collision who the opposing

player was that hit him.

Even assuming, for the sake of argument, there could be a

triable issue of recklessness here if the boys had been adults,

we are satisfied that there is no need to try this case when one

necessarily considers the second layer of analysis that takes

into account their status as minors. A reasonable jury could

not find the facts of this particular case here rising to a

21 A-2771-13T3
level of recklessness that would or should make this eleven-

year-old lacrosse novice monetarily liable for his misguided

actions on the field. Although C.J.R.'s injury is regrettable,

it is one of those unfortunate occasional consequences of minors

playing in a rough-and-tumble sport.

Affirmed.

22 A-2771-13T3