FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 10 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
YOLANDA JONES, No. 11-55613
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 5:10-cv-01399-CJC-DTB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
WELLS FARGO BANK, NA,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Cormac J. Carney, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 2, 2014**
Before: GOULD, BERZON, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
Yolanda Jones appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing her
action arising from foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review de novo. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
2005). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Jones’s claims of fraud and
misrepresentation because Jones did not allege facts sufficient to show that she
either actually or justifiably relied on the alleged misrepresentations. See Small v.
Fritz Cos., 65 P.3d 1255, 1258, 1262 (Cal. 2003) (listing elements of fraud under
California law). Whether framed as a fraudulent misrepresentation or as a
fraudulent omission, Jones could not have relied on Wells Fargo’s statements
because her own pleadings state that it was “clear” after her interaction with Wells
Fargo and before she agreed to the loan that she “could not afford such high
monthly payments.”
Also, the district court properly dismissed Jones’s claim alleging fraudulent
business acts under California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) because Jones
did not allege facts sufficient to show that she actually relied on the alleged
misrepresentation of her income and financial assets in accepting her loan. See In
re Tobacco II Cases, 207 P.3d 20, 26 (Cal. 2009) (stating that for a private plaintiff
to have standing to bring a UCL claim alleging a fraudulent business act or
practice, that individual “must demonstrate actual reliance on the allegedly
deceptive or misleading statements, in accordance with well-settled principles
regarding the element of reliance in ordinary fraud actions”).
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Finally, Jones’s contention that the district court should have considered her
realtor’s declaration attached to Jones’s opposition to the motion to dismiss is
unpersuasive. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688–89 (9th Cir.
2001) (stating that a court must generally refrain from considering extrinsic
evidence in deciding a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and may
consider documents not physically attached to the complaint only if their
authenticity is uncontested and the complaint necessarily relies on them, or if they
are matters of public record subject to judicial notice).
AFFIRMED.
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