NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted December 11, 2014*
Decided December 12, 2014
Before
DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge
JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
No. 14‐2612
SUSAN ANN SANDS WEDEWARD, Appeal from the United States District
Plaintiff‐Appellant, Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.
v. No. 13‐cv‐100‐bbc
LOCAL 306, NATIONAL POSTAL Barbara B. Crabb,
MAIL HANDLERS UNION, Judge.
Defendant‐Appellee.
O R D E R
Susan Ann Sands Wedeward, a former postal worker, appeals the grant of
summary judgment for her union, National Mail Handler’s Local 306, which, she
asserted, breached its duty of fair representation in connection with her efforts to
challenge her discharge by the United States Postal Service. We affirm.
* After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is
unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See FED. R. APP. P.
34(a)(2).
No. 14‐2612 Page 2
Wedeward’s dispute with the union began in 2006, when she injured her back
lifting mail bags and had her request for worker’s compensation denied. She blamed the
union for not interceding with the Post Office to fix the paperwork that led to the denial
of her claim (the injury description did not match the incident report). Wedeward took
some time off after her injury and upon her return was moved to light duty.
Four years later her supervisor told her that she would have to resume regular
duty unless she updated the medical documentation supporting her light‐duty
restriction. Wedeward initially agreed to provide documentation but changed her mind
because, she told her union steward, she already had documented the permanent nature
of her disability. After learning that Wedeward would be removed from light duty, the
union steward encouraged Wedeward to provide the documentation. Wedeward didn’t,
and was removed from light duty. Wedeward refused reassignment, did not return to
work, and was marked “AWOL.”
The union challenged the AWOL designation in grievances filed on Wedeward’s
behalf. At a “day in court” session conducted by management (to give Wedeward a
chance to respond to disciplinary charges), Wedeward and the union maintained that
she was disabled, disputed the charge that she had been “AWOL,” and criticized
management’s forcing her to choose between working at the risk of further injury or
simply going home. Management eventually disciplined Wedeward for being “AWOL”
and discharged her.
The union continued to challenge Wedeward’s discharge through the grievance
procedure outlined by the collective bargaining agreement. At the Step One meeting (an
initial attempt to resolve the grievance with a supervisor), the union again argued that
Wedeward should not have had to choose between accepting the reassignment or going
home. Although management offered to rescind its discipline as long as Wedeward
provided the necessary medical documentation, she rejected the offer. The case
proceeded to Step Two (at which management prepares an official decision explaining
its reason for rejecting the grievance), and the union and Post Office agreed to hold the
case in abeyance pending resolution of the social security disability claim that
Wedeward had filed. At Step Three (where the union appeals the Step Two decision) the
Post Office again denied the grievance. The union then exercised its discretion to bring
Wedeward’s grievance to arbitration, in the hope that she could obtain a settlement that
would allow her to leave on disability retirement rather than under discipline. Delays
ensued, first because the arbitrator was unavailable and later because the union’s
advocate retired, and then the arbitration was suspended while the union negotiated a
No. 14‐2612 Page 3
new collective bargaining agreement. When the arbitration was rescheduled, Wedeward
informed the union she no longer wished to proceed, so the union withdrew from the
arbitration.
Wedeward then sued the union in Wisconsin state court, asserting that the union
denied her fair representation in her challenge to her discharge and in her 2006
application for worker’s compensation. The union removed the case to federal court.
The district court granted summary judgment for the union. The court
determined that the union did not breach its duty of fair representation in her dispute; to
the contrary, the union made extensive efforts to help her challenge her discharge at all
stages of the grievance process. Wedeward, the court added, failed to produce any
evidence to raise a question of fact about whether the union acted with discrimination,
hostility, or arbitrariness in its representation. And to the extent that Wedeward believed
that the union denied her fair representation in her attempts to obtain worker’s
compensation, she had no claim, the court concluded, because the worker’s
compensation program run by the Postal Service was not covered by its collective
bargaining agreement with the union.
Wedeward’s arguments on appeal are difficult to pin down, but she seems to
suggest that the union breached its duty of fair representation by allowing her
arbitration to be postponed. But the district court correctly concluded that Wedeward
provided no evidence to suggest that the union acted in a manner that was “arbitrary,
discriminatory, or in bad faith.” Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967). See also Truhlar v.
U.S. Postal Serv., 600 F.3d 888, 892–93 (7th Cir. 2010) (to show arbitrariness, the union
must have acted “so far outside a wide range of reasonableness, as to be irrational”)
quoting Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int’l v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991); Nemsky v. ConocoPhillips
Co., 574 F.3d 859, 866 (7th Cir. 2009) (to show bad faith the plaintiff must provide
subjective evidence the union official’s decisions were improperly motivated). Not only
was the rescheduling of the original arbitration outside the union’s control—because of
the arbitrator’s unavailability, the advocate’s retirement, and the negotiation of the new
collective bargaining agreement—but Wedeward herself decided not to proceed with
the arbitration when it was rescheduled.
Wedeward also maintains that the union breached its duty of fair representation
with regard to her 2006 worker’s compensation claim when it failed to correct
misstatements on the forms that characterized how her injury occurred. But as the court
properly explained, the union owed her no such duty because the worker’s
No. 14‐2612 Page 4
compensation process is not covered by the collective bargaining agreement. See White v.
White Rose Food, a Div. of DiGiorgio Corp., 237 F.3d 174, 183 (2d Cir. 2001) (no breach of
union’s duty of fair representation where there was no duty to inform members about an
amendment to a settlement agreement); Freeman v. Local Union No. 135, Chauffeurs,
Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers, 746 F.2d 1316, 1321–22 (7th Cir. 1984) (“union was
under no duty to provide [plaintiff] with more legal assistance than bargained for or
required by law.”).
AFFIRMED.