UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4473
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RICKY LEE COKER, a/k/a Ricky Lee Delyea,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Terry L. Wooten, Chief District
Judge. (3:13-cr-00865-TLW-3)
Submitted: December 2, 2014 Decided: December 19, 2014
Before DUNCAN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jeremy A. Thompson, LAW OFFICE OF JEREMY A. THOMPSON, LLC,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Tommie DeWayne
Pearson, Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ricky Lee Coker pleaded guilty to one count of
knowingly and with intent to defraud, did use an unauthorized
access device in order to obtain something of value, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2), (c)(1)(A)(i) (2012). Coker
was sentenced to thirty months’ imprisonment, the low end of the
Sentencing Guidelines sentence, and three years’ supervised
release, and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of
$484,334.97. His counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that given Coker’s
appellate waiver, there are no viable arguments that could be
raised outside the scope of the waiver or any viable challenges
to the validity of the waiver, but raising for the court’s
consideration, whether the district court erred in determining
the amount of loss attributed to Coker. Coker was informed of
the opportunity to submit a pro se supplemental brief, but did
not. The Government declined to file a brief. We affirm.
We review a sentence for abuse of discretion. Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Generally, this requires
a two-step analysis. United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473
(4th Cir. 2007). We first review the sentence for significant
procedural error, “such as failing to calculate (or improperly
calculating) the [Sentencing] Guidelines range, treating the
Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.]
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§ 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly
erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen
sentence[.]” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. If there are no procedural
errors, then we consider the substantive reasonableness of a
sentence, “taking into account the ‘totality of the
circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the
Guidelines range.’” Pauley, 511 F.3d at 473 (quoting Gall, 552
U.S. at 51). “[A]n appellate court is allowed to presume that a
district court’s chosen sentence is substantively reasonable if
it is within a correctly calculated Guidelines range.” United
States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010).
In assessing a challenge to the district court’s
application of the Guidelines, we review the district court’s
factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de
novo. United States v. Alvarado Perez, 609 F.3d 609, 612 (4th
Cir. 2010). We conclude that there was no error with regard to
the court’s decision to find that Coker should be held
responsible for $484,334.97, both as a matter of determining the
amount of loss under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 2B1.1(b)(1)(H) (2013), and as a matter of restitution, which
was mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1) (2012). We have
reviewed the other issues Coker raised at sentencing and
conclude that there were no errors with the court’s findings.
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We also conclude there were no other procedural or substantive
sentencing errors.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm Coker’s conviction and sentence. This court
requires that counsel inform Coker, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Coker requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Coker.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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