This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A13-2094
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Lukas Roy Miller,
Appellant.
Filed December 29, 2014
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Rodenberg, Judge
Roseau County District Court
File No. 68-CR-12-1096
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, John B. Galus, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and
Karen M. Foss, Roseau County Attorney, Roseau, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Davi E. Axelson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant Lukas Roy Miller challenges his conviction for second-degree sale of a
controlled substance, arguing that (1) the substance the jury found him to have sold was
not a prohibited “hallucinogen” at the time of the sale; (2) evidence of threats to a witness
by a third party was improperly admitted at appellant’s trial; and (3) the prosecutor
committed misconduct during the trial. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to
the district court.
FACTS
On August 3, 2012, Roseau police conducted a controlled-buy operation at
appellant’s residence with a then-confidential informant (CI), later identified as A.L.
Again, on August 10, 2012, Roseau police conducted another controlled-buy operation at
appellant’s residence with a different CI.1 During each controlled-buy operation, each CI
obtained a substance later identified as 25I-NBOMe, a substance that witnesses would
later testify is an analog to an hallucinogen, 2C-I.
A.L., the CI in the August 3 controlled-buy operation, was an acquaintance of
appellant’s. He testified at trial that he, appellant and Jesse Berggren, appellant’s
roommate, were at appellant’s residence on August 2. A.L. testified that appellant and
Berggren told him that they had “synthetic acid,” that they gave him 10 tabs to “try out,”
and that he took one tab that night. He also testified that he told appellant and Berggren
that his own father “used to be a hippie and he used to do these types of things,” and that
he could sell synthetic acid to his father and others in Grygla. A.L. also testified that he
arranged with Berggren to purchase 100 tabs of the synthetic acid for $200. On August
3, A.L. went to the Roseau police station with the 10 tabs of 25I-NBOMe he allegedly
1
Appellant was acquitted of charges from the controlled-buy operation on August 10,
2014. The facts related to that incident are not relevant to appellant’s arguments on
appeal.
2
received from Berggren and appellant, and offered to assist the police as a CI in
purchasing more of the substance from appellant and Berggren.2 A.L. testified that
Berggren said he would not be at the residence on August 3, but that appellant would be
there and A.L. “was to communicate with [appellant].”
In the afternoon of August 3, police conducted a controlled-buy operation in
which A.L. allegedly purchased 100 tabs of synthetic acid from appellant at appellant’s
home. An audio recording of the operation was admitted at trial, but much of the
conversation between appellant and A.L. was inaudible. A transcript was provided to the
jury as the recording was played during trial. Appellant is transcribed as saying,
concerning the substance delivered to A.L., “like some people, some people sell it as
meth[,] but I just tell them what the f--k it is.” A.L. left appellant’s residence and turned
over to police the 100 tabs of a substance later tested and found to be 25I-NBOMe.
Appellant was charged with second-degree sale of a controlled substance in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.022, subd. 1(3) (2012), on August 3; conspiracy to commit
a fourth-degree controlled substance crime (sale) in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.024,
subd. 1(1) (2012), on August 10; and sale of a noncontrolled substance represented as a
controlled substance in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.097, subd. 1(1) (2012), on
August 3.
A.L. testified for the prosecution at trial, consistent with the foregoing. Appellant
testified that he did not sell A.L. anything when A.L. visited his home on August 3.
2
It is unclear from the record whether appellant claims to have received a total of 10 or
11 tabs of the substance on August 2.
3
Instead, he testified that A.L. “had some of that 25I stuff” on August 2 and that “he said
he [sells it as acid] in Grygla.” Appellant testified that, on August 3, A.L. walked into his
home while appellant and his girlfriend were doing laundry and called appellant’s name.
A.L. began talking about what appellant believed was A.L.’s plan to sell drugs to people
in Grygla. Appellant testified that, after some conversation, A.L. asked him if he had
“anything to put that in,” referring to a bag A.L. had in his hand containing “those same
paper squares that he had” the night before. Appellant testified that he then shook his
head to signal no and kept folding clothes while A.L. “started talking about the Grygla
people again.” Appellant testified that he told A.L. at that point, “I’d tell people what it
is,” meaning that he did not think it was right to represent the drug as one thing when it
was something else.
During the three-day jury trial, the prosecutor asked Sergeant Jeff Klein of the
Roseau Police Department, about threatening text messages allegedly received by A.L.
from Jesse Berggren. The following questioning occurred without objection from
appellant:
Q: Okay. Were you ever contacted by Mr. [A.L.] after
August 3rd, 2012 at all with any relation to this incident or
Jesse Berggren? Was there any mention of that --
A: Oh, yes. January 14th, 2013, [A.L.] came into my office,
reported to me about some phone calls that he’d been
receiving during the night . . . Jesse Berggren was trying to
get ahold of him. [A.L.] -- Mr. A.L. indicated that he didn’t
want to talk to him. Mr. Berggren had left a phone message.
I can’t remember what that said. I don’t have a copy of that
or anything. But Mr. Berggren did send texts to Mr. [A.L.] in
regards to this case.
Q: But you don’t know that but you would -- this was an
allegation that was brought to you by Mr. [A.L.]?
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A: Correct, yeah.
Q: What was the nature of the complaint?
A: Receiving threatening texts from Mr. Berggren.
Q: And what was the nature of why he was being threatened?
A: Threatened because he was a snitch because his boy is --
because this case is going to put him -- his boy away for --
Q: Don’t talk about that.
A: Sorry.
Q: That’s all right. But it was just a threatening message, is
that correct?
A: That’s how he took it, yep.
Q: Did you then follow up and investigate that matter?
A: Yes. I made numerous attempts over the next -- Mr.
Berggren has been elusive. I followed up to talk to him into
the month of January -- or February. And I haven't seen him
since.
During closing arguments, the prosecutor referred to the “threatening text
message” A.L. received to rebut the argument that A.L. never obtained the
synthetic acid from appellant. At trial, the prosecutor also made several references
to the “war on drugs” and its history and development over time. He described the
“just say no” campaign under the Reagan administration, increased
methamphetamine use in the 1990’s, and changes in the law in response to that
trend. He referenced “a new era” and a “new front” in the “war on drugs”
involving synthetic drugs like the substance involved in this case. During his
opening statement, the prosecutor stated:
Because the overarching public policy of our country, I
believe, and I think the majority of the public opinion, at least
as it survives today, remains consistent, and that’s that illegal
street drugs are dangerous. They’re harmful. And, overall, if
we’re going to all live together in a society that’s regulated by
laws and rules, then we need to have laws and rules and
regulations that put these drugs into check. . . .
5
I think a good example of this new front on this war on
drugs, if anybody remembers in the 1990’s, there was the
battle of this methamphetamine use, and there were these
people who would go into the pharmacies around the country
and they would get the allergy medications and they would be
able to extract a chemical out of the allergy medications that
were sold over the counter and make methamphetamine. . . .
The evidence in this case will show again that we’ve
kind of entered a new era. We’re in a new war on drugs.
And the fair characterization of what the evidence will be at
this trial is about this new war on drugs.
Concerning the use of informants in drug-sale cases, the prosecutor also began his
summation, stating:
I picked out a quote from a Brian Sallee, a police officer
who’s the president of Narcotics Enforcement Training and
Consulting, a firm that instructs officers around the country in
drug bust procedures. The quote from that article was
essentially Mr. Sallee, the police officer, said, “Foot soldiers
-- informants are the foot soldiers in the government’s war on
drugs. Without them, narcotics operations would practically
cease to function.”
And I guess, you know, that’s what this case boils
down to and that’s what the State’s position is here.
The prosecutor referred to the “war on drugs” nine times in his opening statement
and three times in summation. He mentioned the new “front” five times in his opening
statement.
Appellant’s trial counsel rebutted the prosecutor’s comments in his summation,
arguing:
You know, the State’s used the term “war on drugs” a few
times, talking about the war on drugs, foot soldiers and the
war on drugs. Now, I could probably go on for way too long
about differing opinions on the war on drugs, but I think we
6
can agree that it’s gone on for a long time, that it’s constantly
changing. What the State’s proposing here is that this is a
new front on the war on drugs. And maybe, when you’re
talking about what you term designer drugs, maybe that is a
new front. I don’t know. I’m neither smart enough or in tune
enough to be making those types of decisions.
We’re not talking about general public policy here in
this courtroom today. That’s a side show. We’re not talking
about the effectiveness of the war on drugs. That’s a side
show. What we’re talking about today again is, simply, did
Mr. Miller sell drugs? Did he do it? When you look at the
evidence, if this is being framed as a new front on the war on
drugs, then this has been a distraction.
The state dismissed the charge of sale of a noncontrolled substance before jury
deliberations. The jury found appellant guilty of the sale on August 3 and not guilty of
the sale on August 10. Appellant was sentenced to 90 months in prison. This appeal
followed.
DECISION
Appellant argues that (1) the plain and unambiguous language of the relevant
statues did not criminalize the sale of the substance he was found to have sold on August
3; (2) the prosecutor’s references to the “war on drugs” in his opening statement and in
his summation were prosecutorial misconduct; and (3) testimony about the threats A.L.
received were improperly admitted and prejudicial.
I.
Appellant argues that the 2012 amendments to Minnesota Statute chapter 152
unambiguously fail to define 25I-NBOMe as an “hallucinogen” for purposes of the
7
charge under Minn. Stat. § 152.022, subd. 1 (3).3 Respondent, for its part, candidly and
commendably concedes that the 2012 statute contains errors amounting to what it
characterizes as a “technical oversight” and a legislative “goof-up.” But respondent
argues that the legislature’s intention can be discerned and that appellant’s conviction for
the August 3 sale should be affirmed in spite of what it labels as the statutory ambiguity.
Appellant was charged with violating Minn. Stat. § 152.022, subd. 1(3), by selling
50 or more dosage units of an hallucinogen on August 3, 2012. As of August 1, 2012,
hallucinogen is effectively defined as “any hallucinogen listed in section 152.02,
subdivision 2, clause (3), or Minnesota Rules, part 6800.4210, item C, except marijuana
and Tetrahydrocannabinols.” Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd. 5a (2012).
“Statutory construction is a question of law and is reviewed de novo.” State v.
Wukawitz, 662 N.W.2d 517, 525 (Minn. 2003). “The primary objective in the
interpretation of a statute is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.”
Id. “If the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, the court does not engage in any
further construction and instead looks to the plain meaning of the statutory language.” Id.
“A statute is only ambiguous if its language is subject to more than one reasonable
interpretation.” Christianson v. Henke, 831 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Minn. 2013).
Before August 1, 2012, possession or sale of analogs of hallucinogens were not
prohibited by Minnesota law. See Minn. Stat. § 152.02, subd. 2(3) (2010) (defining
hallucinogen as a “material, compound, mixture or preparation which contains any
3
This issue was not raised before the district court, but the state makes no argument on
appeal that the issue has been waived.
8
quantity of the following hallucinogenic substances, their salts, isomers and salts of
isomers, unless specifically excepted” that contains an hallucinogenic substance); see
also Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd. 5a (2010) (defining hallucinogens as “any hallucinogen
listed in section 152.02, subdivision 2, clause (3), or Minnesota Rules, part 6800.410,
item C, except marijuana and Tetrahydrocannabinols”).
In an apparent attempt to criminalize analogs of hallucinogens, the Minnesota
legislature passed, and the governor signed, a revision to Minn. Stat. § 152.02, effective
August 1, 2012. 2012 Minn. Laws ch. 240, § 1, at 764-87. “Hallucinogen” was defined
as “any hallucinogen listed in section 152.02, subdivision 2, clause (3), or Minnesota
Rules, part 6800.4210, item C, except marijuana and Tetrahydrocannabinols.” Minn.
Stat. § 152.01, subd. 5a. The legislature added a new subdivision captioned as
“Hallucinogens.” 2012 Minn. Laws ch. 240, § 1, at 767-68. This subdivision included
analogs of 2C-I in the definition, but that new subdivision was numbered as section
152.02, subdivision 2(d), to which no reference is made by other parts of the statute.4 Id.
at 768.
4
The 2012 law failed to make any change to Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd. 5a. See 2012
Minn. Law ch. 240, § 1, at 764-87; see also Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd. 5(a) (2012)
(repeating reference to “section 152.02, subdivision 2, clause (3), or Minnesota Rules,
part 6800.4210, item C” as the lists defining hallucinogens).
9
After the 2012 amendment, hallucinogens were described as a substance listed
either in the Minnesota Rules or in “section 152.02, subdivision 2, clause (3),” a
subdivision and clause not then existing. Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd. 5a (2012).5
The charging statute, section 152.022, subdivision 1(3), as written, and as of
August 3, 2012, is confusing and impossible to fully execute. To determine what
substances are considered hallucinogens under subdivision 5a, there are two lists
referenced. But only one list, the Minnesota Rules list, existed as of August 3, 2012. The
Minnesota Rules list defines hallucinogens as “any material, compound, mixture, or
preparation which contains any quantity” of the substances included in the list. Minn. R.
6800.4210, subp. C (2011). But 25I-NBOMe, the substance involved in this case, is not
included on this list. Id. As discussed above, the other list, purportedly “in section
152.02, subdivision 2, clause (3)” did not then exist. Id.
While only one of the referenced lists exists in the statute as written, the statute is
not ambiguous. It has only one reasonable meaning: the substances defined as
hallucinogens are to be found where indicated by the statute. “When we conclude that a
statute is unambiguous, our role is to enforce the language of the statute and not explore
the spirit or purpose of the law.” Christianson, 831 N.W.2d at 537 (quotation omitted).
We must apply its plain meaning, refraining from further statutory construction. State by
Beaulieu v. RSJ, Inc., 552 N.W.2d 695, 701 (Minn. 1996); see also Leifur v. Leifur, 820
5
In 2013, the legislature changed the reference in this subdivision to “paragraph (d).”
2013 Minn. Laws ch. 113, art. 3, § 1. The law also added 25I-NBOMe to the list of
hallucinogens in Minn. Stat. § 152.02, subd. 2(d). 2013 Minn. Laws ch. 113, art. 3, § 2.
10
N.W.2d 40, 43 (Minn. App. 2012) (noting that “meritorious policy arguments” were
rejected because we “may not disregard unambiguous statutory language”).
When looking at section 152.02, subdivision 2, as it existed on August 3, 2012,
there is no clause (3), as referenced in Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd. 5a. There is, however,
a paragraph (d) to subdivision 2, containing the list of substances defined as
hallucinogens, and which includes analogs. Id., subd. 2(d) (2012). It appears that the
legislature intended, by the 2012 amendments, to criminalize analogs of hallucinogens.
But it failed to do so. The legislature’s evident drafting error does not permit us to
abandon our well-established rules of statutory interpretation. Appellant argues, and we
agree, that he cannot be punished for conduct that was not effectively defined as criminal.
Under the plain language of the statute as it existed on August 3, 2012, appellant cannot
be convicted of second-degree sale of an hallucinogen because the 25I-NBOMe was not
then effectively defined by statute or rule as an hallucinogen. See Bouie v. City of
Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 350, 84 S. Ct. 1697, 1701 (1964) (stating that the state cannot
punish conduct that was not criminal when committed).
In this unusual circumstance, the rules of criminal procedure require us to
“(1) direct a new trial; (2) vacate the conviction and enter a judgment of acquittal; or
(3) reduce the conviction to a lesser included offense or to an offense of lesser degree, as
the case may require. If the court reduces the conviction, it must remand for
resentencing.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02, subd. 12. Appellant concedes that the jury’s
verdict convicting him of count one necessarily includes the jury’s conclusion that he
committed a fourth-degree controlled substance sale in violation of Minn. Stat.
11
§ 152.024, subd. 1(1) (2012). Section 152.024, subdivision 1(1) defines sale of “schedule
I, II, or III” substances as a crime. Id. These schedules are defined in section 152.02 and
include hallucinogen “analogs,” and specifically including analogs to 2C-I. 25I-NBOMe
is an analog of 2C-I, according to expert testimony at trial. Minn. Stat. § 152.02, subd.
2(d). Because the jury’s verdict necessarily encompasses a conclusion that appellant
was guilty of a fourth-degree controlled substance sale, we “reduce the conviction to . . .
an offense of lesser degree” and remand to the district court for resentencing. Minn. R.
Crim. P. 28.02, subd. 12.
II.
Appellant also argues that evidence about threats allegedly made by Berggren to
A.L. was improperly admitted and that respondent committed prosecutorial misconduct
by repeatedly framing the case as the “new front” in the “war on drugs.” Appellant did
not object to these claimed errors at trial.
We review the admission of unobjected-to testimony under the plain-error
standard, requiring the appellant to show (1) error; (2) that was plain; and (3) that
affected appellant’s substantial rights. State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn.
1998). If all three prongs are met, we determine “whether [we] should address the error
to ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” Id.
When a defendant fails to object to prosecutorial misconduct at trial, we review
under a modified plain-error standard. State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn.
2006). This two-tiered test first requires appellant to establish that the prosecution
committed error that is plain in that the prosecutor’s conduct contravenes caselaw, a rule,
12
or a standard of conduct. Id. If appellant makes this showing, the burden shifts to the
state to demonstrate that the misconduct did not affect appellant’s substantial rights. Id.
Even where misconduct occurs, we reverse only when an appellant was denied a fair trial.
State v. Porter, 526 N.W.2d 359, 365 (Minn. 1995).
Even if the district court’s admission of testimony regarding the threats to A.L.
and the prosecutor’s references to the “war on drugs” were plain error, which we do not
decide, the testimony and references did not affect appellant’s substantial rights. In so
concluding, we consider “the strength of the evidence against the defendant, the
pervasiveness of the improper suggestions, and whether the defendant had an opportunity
to (or made efforts to) rebut the improper suggestions.” State v. Hohenwald, 815 N.W.2d
823, 835 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). Here, A.L. testified that appellant sold him
25I-NBOMe, and appellant admitted he was the person on the audio recording of the
controlled buy. The jury found appellant guilty of one count and not guilty of the second
count arising from a separate incident. This is a strong indication that the jury analyzed
each count separately and made decisions based on the evidence presented. If the jury
had been improperly influenced by the testimony of the threatening text messages or the
prosecutor’s references to the “war on drugs,” it surely would have found appellant guilty
of both counts. And while the prosecutor repeatedly referred to the “war on drugs” in his
opening statement and his summation, appellant had an opportunity to rebut the
prosecutor’s comments, and did so effectively. Appellant’s counsel obviously adopted a
defense strategy on using the prosecutor’s references to the “war on drugs” to indicate the
weaknesses of the state’s case. And the jury did acquit appellant of one count.
13
We also observe that the district court intervened of its own initiative at one point
during the trial, instructing both of counsel, outside the jury’s presence, to stop referring
to other cases and incidents of death caused by 25I-NBOMe. The district court’s
admonition appears to us to have greatly reduced or eliminated further improper
references.
Finally, the district court properly instructed the jury, including instructions to
“put aside any sympathy, prejudice or bias for or against either party in this case.
Sympathy, prejudice and bias lead to unfairness, and you must be absolutely fair.” And
we must assume in the absence of some contrary indication in the record that the jury
followed the instructions given it. State v. Ferguson, 581 N.W.2d 824, 833 (Minn. 1998).
Given the evidence in the record, the mixed verdict of the jury, the proper jury
instructions, and the district court’s appropriate admonition to counsel, together with
appellant’s effective rebuttal concerning the claims about the role of the “war on drugs,”
we conclude that appellant’s substantial rights were not affected by the admission of the
testimony regarding threatening text messages or by the prosecutor’s references to the
“war on drugs.” That evidence and argument, even if plainly erroneous, did not affect
appellant’s substantial rights.
In sum, we conclude that appellant’s conviction for second-degree controlled
substance sale of an hallucinogen must be reduced to a conviction for fourth-degree
controlled substance sale, and we reverse and remand for resentencing. We also
conclude that any plain error in admitting testimony regarding threats to A.L. or
14
references by the prosecutor to the “war on drugs” did not affect appellant’s substantial
rights.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
15