IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
STATE OF DELAWARE, )
)
v. ) Cr. ID No. 1206018361
)
HARRY ANDERSON, )
Defendant. )
Upon Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief:
DENIED
Submitted: October 10, 2014
Decided: January 6, 2015
Upon Defendant’s Motion for Appointment of Postconviction Counsel:
DENIED
Submitted: November 3, 2014
Decided: January 6, 2015
In 2012, Defendant Harry W. Anderson was arrested and indicted on
multiple counts of Felony Theft, Burglary Third Degree, and Criminal Mischief.
On January 24, 2013, Defendant pled guilty to two counts of Burglary Third
Degree. As part of the plea agreement, the State filed a motion to sentence
Defendant as a habitual offender pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4214(a) with respect to
one of the two counts of Burglary Third Degree.
After pleading guilty but before he was sentenced, Defendant filed a series
of unsuccessful motions and letters, as a self-represented litigant, requesting
dismissal of the Superior Court charges against him. 1 At Defendant’s sentencing
1
See Anderson v. State, 2014 WL 3511717, at n. 5 (Del. July 14, 2014) (detailing Defendant’s
allegations that Trial Counsel refused to file a motion to suppress and that Trial Counsel had a
conflict of interest, which, according to Defendant, resulted in a coerced guilty plea).
hearing on September 20, 2013, the Court heard oral argument on Defendant’s
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant stated that he entered the guilty plea
under duress on the grounds that Defendant’s Trial Counsel refused to file a
motion to suppress and because Defendant’s Trial Counsel had a conflict of
interest. The Superior Court denied Defendant’s motion, finding that Defendant
entered a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea. 2
The Court sentenced Defendant as a habitual offender on one of the two
counts of Burglary Third Degree, to six years at Level V. As to the second count
of Burglary Third Degree, the Court sentenced Defendant to three years at Level
V, suspended for 18 months at Level III. After sentencing, Defendant appealed to
the Delaware Supreme Court as a self-represented litigant. 3 The Supreme Court
affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed.4
Defendant filed this motion for postconviction relief on October 10, 2014.
Defendant asserts the following grounds for relief: (1) Defendant’s guilty plea was
coerced; (2) Defendant’s Trial Counsel had a conflict of interest representing
2
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s finding, stating “[the Supreme
Court] can discern no basis upon which to conclude that [Defendant’s] guilty plea was not
voluntarily entered or was entered because of [Defendant’s] misapprehension or mistake as to
[Defendant’s] legal rights.” Id. at *2.
3
State v. Anderson, 2014 WL 604680 (Del. Super. Feb. 10, 2014) (granting Defendant’s request
to proceed pro se on appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court).
4
Anderson, 2014 WL 3511717, at *3.
2
Defendant; and (3) ineffective assistance of counsel.5 Additionally, Defendant
filed this motion for appointment of postconviction counsel.
Upon consideration of Defendant’s motions, the Court finds as follows:
1. The recently amended Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 controls
Defendant’s motion for postconviction relief and Defendant’s motion for
appointment of postconviction counsel. 6
2. Before addressing the merits of a motion for postconviction relief, the Court
must consider the procedural requirements of Rule 61(i).7
3. A motion is procedurally sufficient for consideration on the merits if it is the
defendant’s first motion, 8 the motion is timely, 9 and the motion does not
assert grounds for relief already adjudicated. 10
4. If the motion is procedurally defect, the Court may nonetheless consider the
merits of the motion if the claims satisfy the pleading standards of Rule
61(d)(2)(i) and (ii).11 The pleading standard of Rule 61(d)(2)(i) requires that
a motion for postconviction relief “[p]leads with particularity that new
evidence exists that creates a strong inference that the movant is actually
innocent in fact of the acts underlying the charges of which he was
5
Def.’s Mot. for Postconviction Relief, 3-4.
6
Defendant filed the instant motions after the June 4, 2014 amendments took effect.
7
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
8
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2).
9
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).
10
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
11
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5).
3
convicted.” Alternatively, Rule 61(d)(2)(ii) requires that a motion for
postconviction relief “[p]leads with particularity a claim that a new rule of
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the . . .
Delaware Supreme Court, applies to the movant’s case and renders the
conviction . . . invalid.”
5. Defendant’s motion for postconviction relief asserts formerly adjudicated
grounds for relief and, therefore, Defendant’s motion is procedurally barred.
Pursuant to Rule 61(i)(4), “[a]ny ground for relief that was formerly
adjudicated, whether in the proceedings leading to the conviction, in an
appeal, in a postconviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus
proceeding, is thereafter barred.”
6. Defendant’s first ground for postconviction relief asserts that Trial Counsel
coerced Defendant into entering guilty plea. The Court previously addressed
this claim at Defendant’s sentencing. At sentencing, Defendant moved to
withdraw his guilty plea. In support of his motion, Defendant alleged that he
was coerced into entering a guilty plea because Trial Counsel did not follow
the originally agreed-upon case strategy because Trial Counsel would not
“do certain things” such as file a motion to suppress evidence obtained from
a defective search warrant.12 In response, the Court asked Defendant if he
12
Trial Counsel explained the issue to the Court as follows:
4
recalled entering a guilty plea on January 24, 2013, which Defendant
affirmed. 13 The Court continued:
At that time [the judge] asked you whether you were freely
and voluntarily pleading guilty to the two Burglary Third
charges. You responded yes. [The judge] asked you whether
anyone had threatened or forced you to enter into the plea.
You said no . . . . [y]ou said you understood that. [The
judge] went through a very thorough question and answer
period with you on the record in open court. You told [the
judge] that you wished to enter a plea rather than go forward
to trial. . . . the Court places great weight on that [plea
colloquy] because you said on the record in open court . . .
you wished to plea and you were doing so knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily. 14
When the Court asked Defendant why he previously stated that he was
satisfied with Trial Counsel’s representation during plea colloquy,
Defendant responded, “I was totally under duress at the time . . . . [w]hen I
went for my final case review . . . I informed [the judge] of these issues,
[including] that suppression issue.” 15 At that time, Trial Counsel interjected
and explained “[Defendant] seems to not have understood the idea that
[Defendant] has certain decisions to make. In terms of other decisions
There was a search warrant for a car that was believed to be [Defendant’s], in
which the police recovered [evidence]. . . . I had conversations with . . . the
prosecutor on the case about the propriety of the search warrant, [and the]
sufficiency of it . . . . I prepared a draft motion [to suppress] to [the prosecutor].
[The prosecutor] reviewed it, agreed there was – the search warrant was defective,
agreed not to introduce the item. Sentencing Tr. 5.
13
Id. at 5.
14
Id. at 5-6.
15
Id. at 7.
5
involving legal issues, those are mine to make. I disagree with [Defendant]
there was any basis for any further suppression motions other than the one I
drafted and showed [the prosecutor].” 16 Accordingly, the Court determined
that Defendant entered a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea agreement.
7. On appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court, Defendant again asserted that
Trial Counsel’s refusal to move for suppression of illegally obtained
evidence essentially coerced Defendant into entering a guilty plea. The
Supreme Court reviewed the record and stated it could “discern no basis
upon which to conclude that [Defendant’s] guilty plea was not voluntary,”
noting that Defendant expressly stated “no one had threatened or coerced
[Defendant] to accept the plea” and that Defendant was satisfied with Trial
Counsel’s representation. 17 Accordingly, Defendant’s claim that he entered
a coerced guilty plea is a formerly adjudicated matter and is barred from
postconviction relief. Moreover, because Defendant entered a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea, Defendant waived “any alleged errors
or defects occurring prior to the entry of the plea.” 18 Therefore, Defendant
has waived the claim that he entered a coerced plea.
16
Id. at. 6-9.
17
Anderson, 2014 WL 3511717, at *2.
18
West v. State, 2004 WL 4264922, at *2 (Del. Aug. 28, 2014); Anderson, 2014 WL 3511717, at
*2.
6
8. Defendant’s second ground for postconviction relief is that Trial Counsel
provided ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a motion to
suppress evidence illegally obtained evidence. However, this claim is an
attempt to reargue Defendant’s claim that he entered a coerced guilty plea.
Defendant’s argument has been duly reviewed and considered. This Court
will not revisit Defendant’s duplicative argument merely cloaked as a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel.
9. Defendant’s third and final ground for postconviction relief is that Trial
Counsel had a conflict of interest in representing Defendant. Defendant
previously asserted this claim on direct appeal and the Delaware Supreme
Court concluded that the claim lacked merit. 19
10.Therefore, Defendant’s postconviction claims are procedurally barred
pursuant to Rule 61(i)(4) and fail to demonstrate exemption from the
procedural bars under Rule 61(i)(5). Specifically, Defendant’s motion does
not meet the pleading standards of Rule 61(d)(2)(i) or (ii) because
Defendant’s motion does not present any new evidence that creates a strong
inference of innocence and does not rely on a new, retroactive rule of
19
Anderson, 2014 WL 3511717, at *3.
7
constitutional law. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for postconviction
relief is hereby dismissed.20
11.Consequentially, Defendant’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied.
Even if Defendant’s motion for postconviction relief qualified for review on
the merits, Defendant is not entitled to appointment of postconviction
counsel because Defendant entered a plea of guilty.
12.Appointment of postconviction counsel, in the context of a guilty plea, is
governed by Rule 61(e)(2). The Court may appoint postconviction counsel
for a Defendant’s first motion for postconviction relief if, among other
things “the motion sets forth a substantial claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel in relation to the plea of guilty . . . and specific exceptional
circumstances warrant the appointment of counsel.” 21
13.As stated above, Defendant’s motion sets forth a meritless claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Furthermore, the Court is unaware of any
exceptional circumstances that warrant the appointment of counsel. For
instance, Defendant’s motion requests appointment of counsel because
motions for postconviction relief are complex and require significant
research and Defendant has a “limited knowledge of the law.” 22 The Court
20
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(5).
21
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(2).
22
Def’s. Mot. for Counsel, ¶ 8.
8
recognizes the complexities of postconviction motions; however, the Court
is aware of over forty separate court filings Defendant has submitted to
Delaware courts over the last decade.23 Indeed, Defendant previously
represented himself pro se on an appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court. 24
During the evidentiary hearing on Defendant’s ability to handle the pro se
appeal, Defendant explained that he “has pursued other appeals in the past
and has successfully obtained remands to the trial court as a result of his
advocacy.” 25
NOW, THEREFORE, on this 6th day of January 2015, Defendant’s
Motion for Postconviction Relief is hereby DENIED and Defendant’s Motion
for Appointment of Postconviction Counsel is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Andrea L. Rocanelli
____________________________________
The Honorable Andrea L. Rocanelli
23
See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 2014 WL 5169321, at *1 (Del. Super. Oct. 10, 2014).
24
State v. Anderson, 2014 WL 604680, at *1-2 (Del. Super. Feb. 10, 2014).
25
Id.
9