IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
STATE OF DELAWARE )
)
v. ) Cr. I.D. No. 1206018361
)
HARRY W. ANDERSON, )
)
Defendant. )
Date Submitted: June 18, 2015
Date Decided: June 24, 2015
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION
FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
This 24th day of June 2015, upon consideration of the Motion for Relief from
Judgment pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 60(b) (“Motion”) filed by
Defendant, Harry Anderson; the applicable law; and the record in this case:
1. In 2012, Defendant Harry W. Anderson was arrested and indicted on
multiple counts of Felony Theft, Burglary Third Degree, and Criminal
Mischief. On January 24, 2013, Defendant pled guilty to two counts of
Burglary Third Degree. As part of the plea agreement, the State filed a
motion to sentence Defendant as a habitual offender pursuant to 11 Del. C. §
4214(a) with respect to one of the two counts of Burglary Third Degree.
2. After pleading guilty but before he was sentenced, Defendant filed a series
of unsuccessful motions and letters, as a self-represented litigant, requesting
dismissal of the Superior Court charges against him. 1 At Defendant’s
sentencing hearing on September 20, 2013, the Court heard oral argument on
Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant stated that he
entered the guilty plea under duress on the grounds that Defendant’s Trial
Counsel refused to file a motion to suppress and because Defendant’s Trial
Counsel had a conflict of interest. The Superior Court denied Defendant’s
motion, finding that Defendant entered a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
guilty plea.2
3. The Court sentenced Defendant as a habitual offender on one of the two
counts of Burglary Third Degree, to six years at Level V. As to the second
count of Burglary Third Degree, the Court sentenced Defendant to three
years at Level V, suspended for 18 months at Level III. After sentencing,
Defendant appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court as a self-represented
litigant.3 The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment of
conviction and the sentence imposed.4
1
See Anderson v. State, 2014 WL 3511717, at n. 5 (Del. July 14, 2014) (detailing Defendant’s
allegations that Trial Counsel refused to file a motion to suppress and that Trial Counsel had a
conflict of interest, which, according to Defendant, resulted in a coerced guilty plea).
2
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s finding, stating “[the Supreme
Court] can discern no basis upon which to conclude that [Defendant’s] guilty plea was not
voluntarily entered or was entered because of [Defendant’s] misapprehension or mistake as to
[Defendant’s] legal rights.” Id. at *2.
3
State v. Anderson, 2014 WL 604680 (Del. Super. Feb. 10, 2014) (granting Defendant’s request
to proceed pro se on appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court).
4
Anderson, 2014 WL 3511717, at *3. See also Anderson v. State, 2015 WL 1396360, at *1–2
2
4. On October 10, 2014, Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief on
grounds that: (1) Defendant’s guilty plea was coerced; (2) Defendant’s Trial
Counsel had a conflict of interest representing Defendant; and (3) ineffective
assistance of counsel. 5 Defendant also sought appointment of counsel. On
January 6, 2015, the Court denied Defendant’s motion for postconviction
relief as procedurally barred pursuant to Rule 61(i)(4) and the Court denied
Defendant’s motion for counsel.6
5. On June 18, 2015, Defendant filed the pending Motion seeking relief from
the Court’s Order dated January 6, 2015, on ground that the Court
overlooked the principles of the Sixth Amendment and the right to effective
counsel. 7
6. As the Court explained in State v. Newton, “This is a criminal matter. It is
governed by the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. Only cases
not provided for in the criminal rules are covered by the civil rules.
Criminal Rule 61 clearly covers the claims made by Defendant now.”8
Defendant cannot use Civil Rule 60 to overcome the procedural bars of
(Del. Mar. 24, 2015) (affirming the Superior Court’s sentence imposed on September 20, 2013).
5
Def.’s Mot. for Postconviction Relief, 3-4.
6
State v. Anderson, 2015 WL 121879, at *1–4 (Del. Super. Jan. 6, 2015) (denying Defendant’s
motion for postconviction relief).
7
Anderson v. State, 2015 WL 1396360, at *1–2 (Del. Mar. 24, 2015) (affirming the Superior
Court’s denial of Defendant’s first motion for postconviction relief).
8
2013 WL 7084798, at *1 (Del. Super. Oct. 14, 2013).
3
Criminal Rule 61. 9
7. Even if the Court considers the pending Motion as Defendant’s SECOND
motion for postconviction relief, Defendant is unsuccessful.
8. Pursuant to Rule 61(d)(2), the Court shall summarily dismiss second
motions for postconviction relief unless the movant was convicted after a
trial and the postconviction motion pleads with particularity either new
evidence or a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive and applicable
to the movant’s case. 10 Here, Defendant was not convicted after a trial.
Rather, Defendant entered a guilty plea in open court and on the record.
Therefore, Defendant’s Motion, considered as a SECOND motion for
postconviction relief, must be summarily dismissed.
NOW, THEREFORE, on this 24th day of June 2015, Harry W.
Anderson’s Motion for Relief from Judgment is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Andrea L. Rocanelli
____________________________________
The Honorable Andrea L. Rocanelli
9
Id.
10
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i), (ii).
4