IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 01-50266
_____________________
ADISA R A M AR-RA’ID
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
OMAR SHAKIR, Chaplain; AKBAR SHABAZZ; EUGENE FAROOQ
Defendants - Appellees
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
No. SA-00-CV-78-FB
_________________________________________________________________
May 31, 2002
Before KING, Chief Judge, and PARKER and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
In federal district court, Plaintiff–Appellant Adisa R.A.M.
Ar-Ra’id asserted equal protection claims against
Defendants–Appellees Omar Shakir, Akbar Shabazz, and Eugene
Farooq pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). The district court
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees Shakir,
Shabazz, and Farooq. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the
district court’s summary judgment with respect to Shabazz and
Farooq, REVERSE summary judgment with respect to Shakir, and
REMAND the case to the district court.
I. Factual and Procedural History
Plaintiff–Appellant Adisa R.A.M. Ar-Ra’id, a Shi’ite Muslim,
is a Texas prisoner assigned to the John B. Connally Unit (the
“Connally Unit”) of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice –
Institutional Division (“TDCJ”). The religion of Islam requires
all believers to fast during the daylight hours of the holy month
of Ramadan and to eat a special meal after sunset. According to
TDCJ policy, “any ceremony that is prescribed by a faith group as
a requirement for adherents and approved for observance by
appropriate TDCJ authorities shall be coordinated by the
Chaplain.” Accordingly, Defendants–Appellees Omar Shakir, Akbar
Shabazz, and Eugene Farooq (collectively, the “Defendants”),
Muslim chaplains for the Connally Unit, the Wynne Unit, and the
Ramsey III Unit, respectively, approved written procedures for
Muslim prisoners to participate in religious services and
holidays required by the Islamic faith. These procedures allow
for the provision of a special Ramadan meal for eligible Muslim
prisoners and dictate that “[t]he assigned Muslim Chaplain is
responsible for determining who is eligible” for the meal.
2
Shakir asserts that the Muslim chaplains decide eligibility
for the Ramadan meal based on a prisoner’s recorded faith
preference and on the prisoner’s weekly attendance at Friday
Jumah services. According to Shakir, only prisoners who have
specified a Muslim faith preference and who regularly attend the
Jumah services are eligible to partake in the special Ramadan
meal. Ar-Ra’id has specified a Muslim faith preference, but he
chooses not to attend the Jumah services. Ar-Ra’id contends that
he does not attend the Jumah services because the services
conform to the Sunni school of thought, a school of thought
within Islam with which Ar-Ra’id disagrees. Ar-Ra’id further
alleges that the Defendants ridicule the Shi’ite school of
thought during the Jumah services and are generally hostile
towards him and other Shi’ite Muslims.
When Ramadan began on December 9, 1999, the Defendants
allegedly excluded Ar-Ra’id from the list of prisoners eligible
for the special meal after sunset because Ar-Ra’id did not
regularly attend the Friday Jumah services. Ar-Ra’id filed suit
in Texas state court against Shakir, seeking relief pursuant to
42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, the Texas Constitution, and
state tort law. With respect to the § 1983 claims, Ar-Ra’id
alleged violations under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Ar-Ra’id argued that Shakir violated his First Amendment rights
by requiring him to attend the Jumah services to gain access to
the Ramadan meal. Ar-Ra’id further alleged that Shakir violated
3
his equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment
because Shakir allowed other Muslim prisoners to participate in
the Ramadan meal even though they did not regularly attend the
Jumah services. Shakir removed the suit to federal district
court on the ground that it presented a federal question, and Ar-
Ra’id then added Shabazz and Farooq as defendants.
The Defendants moved to dismiss Ar-Ra’id’s § 1983 claims
made against them in their official capacities, all claims under
§ 1985 and § 1986, all state tort law claims, and claims under
the Texas Constitution seeking damages, rather than injunctive
relief. In his response, Ar-Ra’id conceded to dismissal of the
official capacity claims and the state constitutional claims to
the extent that he sought damages, rather than injunctive relief,
and conceded to dismissal of all tort claims and all claims
asserted under § 1985 and § 1986. Ar-Ra’id maintained claims
against the Defendants in their official capacities for
injunctive relief under § 1983 and the Texas Constitution, and in
their individual capacities for damages and injunctive relief
under § 1983 and for injunctive relief under the Texas
Constitution.
In addition to moving for dismissal of Ar-Ra’id’s claims,
the Defendants also moved for summary judgment with respect to
Ar-Ra’id’s remaining claims. With respect to Ar-Ra’id’s § 1983
claims, the Defendants argued that their policy of limiting
attendance at the Ramadan meals to prisoners who regularly attend
4
the Jumah services is rationally connected to a legitimate
penological interest. The Defendants further argued that Ar-
Ra’id’s equal protection claim fails because all Muslim prisoners
are required to attend Jumah services to be eligible for the
Ramadan meal and because Ar-Ra’id cannot demonstrate purposeful
discrimination.
In opposition to summary judgment, Ar-Ra’id produced
evidence showing Shakir’s hostility towards Shi’ite Muslims. Ar-
Ra’id also produced evidence demonstrating that some Muslim
prisoners were allowed to participate in the Ramadan meals
without attending Jumah services. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the Defendants, ruling that “[t]he
record shows no basis for concluding Plaintiff was prevented from
engaging in conduct required by his faith” and that “Plaintiff
also failed to present competent evidence of purposeful
discrimination as a basis for an equal protection claim.” Ar-
Ra’id timely appealed that judgment.
The district court denied Ar-Ra’id in forma pauperis (“IFP”)
status on appeal, but this court granted IFP status to Ar-Ra’id
with respect to his equal protection claim.1 In an unpublished
order, this court explained:
[T]he record indicates that Ar-Ra’id
presented competent evidence, including
1
This court concluded that Ar-Ra’id abandoned his First
Amendment claim due to inadequate briefing, however, so Ar-Ra’id
was not granted IFP status with respect to that claim.
5
affidavits, in opposition to summary judgment
suggesting that there is a disputed question
as to the defendants’ treatment of Shi’ite
Muslims and whether they allowed other
inmates to have access to the Ramadan meals
without similarly requiring them to attend
the Friday Islamic services. The evidence
arguably contradicts the defendants’ evidence
that prison regulations were applied equally
to all Muslim offenders for the observance of
Ramadan.
On appeal, Ar-Ra’id argues that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on his equal
protection claim.
II. Standard of Review
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the
same standards as the district court. Chaney v. New Orleans Pub.
Facility Mgmt., Inc., 179 F.3d 164, 167 (5th Cir. 1999). Summary
judgment is proper when “there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and [] the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). We view the evidence
in a light most favorable to the non-movant. Coleman v. Houston
Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1997). However,
if the moving party presents sufficient evidence to support
summary judgment, the non-movant must go beyond the pleadings and
come forward with specific facts indicating a genuine issue for
trial in order to avoid summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
III. Ar-Ra’id’s Claims Against Shabazz and Farooq
6
Ar-Ra’id asserts his equal protection claims against the
Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 This provision does
not create substantive rights but merely furnishes a remedy for
the violation of rights provided by the Constitution or other
federal statutes. To establish a § 1983 claim, Ar-Ra’id must
prove: (1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a
person or entity acting under color of state law; and (2) that
the conduct violated rights secured by the Constitution or a
federal statute. Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d
521, 525 (5th Cir. 1994).
Shabazz and Farooq argue that because Ar-Ra’id’s summary
judgment evidence fails to show that Shabazz or Farooq had any
personal involvement in the events occurring at the Connally
Unit, where Ar-Ra’id was confined, his claims against them fail
as a matter of law. We agree. To state a cause of action under
§ 1983, a plaintiff must “identify defendants who were either
personally involved in the constitutional violation or whose acts
2
Section 1983 provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any state or territory, or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the
constitutional laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
7
are causally connected to the constitutional violation alleged.”
Anderson v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 439, 443 (5th
Cir. 1999).
The evidence in this case shows that Shabazz is the Muslim
chaplain at the Wynne Unit and that Farooq is the Muslim chaplain
at the Ramsey III Unit. Ar-Ra’id is confined at the Connally
Unit where Shakir is the Muslim chaplain. According to written
procedures, “[t]he assigned Muslim Chaplain is responsible for
determining who is eligible” for the Ramadan meals. Although
Shabazz and Farooq collaborated with Shakir to create these
procedures, none of the evidence submitted by Ar-Ra’id in
opposition to summary judgment suggests that Shabazz or Farooq
were personally involved in the application of the procedures at
the Connally Unit. Thus, Ar-Ra’id’s claims that Shabazz and
Farooq violated his equal protection rights fail as a matter of
law. Accordingly, the district court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of Shabazz and Farooq was proper.
IV. Ar-Ra’id’s Claim Against Shakir
In his equal protection claim, Ar-Ra’id does not appear to
challenge the policy linking eligibility for the Ramadan meals to
attendance at the Jumah services. Rather, Ar-Ra’id asserts that
the inconsistent application of that policy violates his equal
protection rights. Specifically, Ar-Ra’id argues that his
summary judgment evidence demonstrates that Shakir “intentionally
8
and willfully instituted a hate campaign against [Shi’ite
Muslims]” which effectively barred Ar-Ra’id’s attendance at the
Jumah services and thus barred his access to the Ramadan meals.
Further, Ar-Ra’id asserts that Shakir allowed other Muslims to
have access to the Ramadan meals even though those Muslims did
not attend the Friday Jumah services.
To establish an equal protection violation a plaintiff must
demonstrate that “he received treatment different from that
received by similarly situated individuals and that the unequal
treatment stemmed from a discriminatory intent.” Taylor v.
Johnson, 257 F.3d 470, 473 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1985)).
To rise to the level of an equal protection violation, the
alleged unequal treatment must not be “reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S.
78, 89 (1987).3 Discriminatory intent is present when “the
decisionmaker singled out a particular group for disparate
treatment and selected his course of action at least in part for
the purpose of causing its adverse effect on an identifiable
3
We need not determine whether Ar-Ra’id’s equal protection
claim implicates a suspect class or a fundamental right.
Although strict scrutiny is generally appropriate where a
government classification implicates a suspect class or a
fundamental right, Rublee v. Fleming, 160 F.3d 213, 217 (5th Cir.
1998), we apply the “legitimate penological interest” standard in
the prison context even if “under other circumstances [we] would
have been required to [apply] a more rigorous standard of
review.” Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223 (1990).
9
group.” Taylor, 257 F.3d at 473 (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
Ar-Ra’id presented summary judgment evidence to the district
court suggesting that Shakir intentionally discriminated against
Shi’ite Muslims and treated other similarly situated Muslim
prisoners differently from Ar-Ra’id. Shakir does not indicate,
and we cannot imagine, any legitimate penological interest
supporting this alleged inconsistent treatment of Muslim
prisoners. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Ar-
Ra’id, as we must do, we conclude that Ar-Ra’id raises genuine
issues of material fact.
A. Unequal Treatment
Ar-Ra’id presented to the district court substantial
evidence that Shakir treated him differently than other similarly
situated individuals during the Ramadan month extending from
December 1999 through January 2000. In addition to Ar-Ra’id’s
own affidavit alleging unequal treatment, Ar-Ra’id offered
affidavits from three other prisoners confined in the McConnell
Unit. Prisoner James Brown avers that he participates in Ramadan
activities (presumably including Ramadan meals) but does not
attend the Jumah services. Prisoner Jimmy Henderson states that
he was confined in the McConnell Unit during Ramadan from
December 1999 to January 2000 and that there were “numerous
individuals” who participated in the Ramadan meals even though
they “had never been to any Friday services or attended them very
10
infrequently.” Prisoner Earthel Hill states in his affidavit
that he “participated in the festivities and the partaking of the
meal” without attending the Jumah services.
Shakir argues that these affidavits are unpersuasive because
the affiants are confined in the McConnell Unit rather than in
the Connally Unit with Ar-Ra’id. However, viewed in a light most
favorable to Ar-Ra’id, the evidence suggests that Muslim
prisoners at the McConnell and the Connally Units are similarly
situated. Although Shakir’s office is located in the Connally
Unit, he is assigned as the Islamic chaplain to a region that
includes both the Connally and the McConnell Units. Thus, Shakir
is responsible for the Ramadan meal process at both the Connally
and the McConnell Units. Furthermore, although the evidence does
not clearly reflect what Shakir’s specific duties are with
respect to the Ramadan meal process, viewed in a light most
favorable to Ar-Ra’id, the evidence suggests that Shakir was
directly responsible for determining who could attend the Ramadan
meal at both the Connally and the McConnell Units. Thus, the
Brown, Henderson, and Hill affidavits demonstrate the existence
of a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Shakir
treated other similarly situated Muslim prisoners differently
from Ar-Ra’id.
Ar-Ra’id also produced attendance lists from some of the
Ramadan services and a list of prisoners eligible for the Ramadan
meals. Neither the lists themselves nor Ar-Ra’id’s brief in
11
opposition to summary judgment specify from which unit the lists
originate. The lists show that some prisoners who did not attend
the Ramadan services were nevertheless eligible to participate in
the Ramadan meals. Although we cannot be certain about the
origins of these lists, viewed in a light most favorable to Ar-
Ra’id, these lists also raise a genuine issue of material fact
regarding the unequal treatment of similarly situated Muslim
prisoners.
B. Discriminatory Intent
In addition to showing that he was treated differently from
other similarly situated individuals, Ar-Ra’id must demonstrate
discriminatory intent in order to establish an equal protection
claim. Taylor, 257 F.3d at 473. Ar-Ra’id presented to the
district court substantial evidence of Shakir’s hostility towards
Shi’ite Muslims. In their affidavits, prisoners Ahmad Ali and
Trevor Haughton describe Shakir’s statements made during the
Ramadan service at the Connally Unit on December 22, 1999.
According to Ali, Shakir labeled Shi’ite Muslims “controversial”
and then stated that “[n]o one who is controversial will have a
position in the Islamic community. They are not allowed to lead
prayer, make the call to prayer, be a sheriff or teach any
classes.” According to Haughton, Shakir became “hostile and
arrogant, directing his bitterness and hatred towards the
Shia’s.” Shakir then stated that the Shi’ite Muslims were not to
hold any position in the Islamic community. Haughton further
12
avers that Shakir told him that “[he] can’t pray as [he’d] been
taught or learned as a Shia.” Haughton alleges that “Shakir has
a history of attacking the Shia Muslim all over this region.”
Ar-Ra’id also presented the affidavit of Jimmy Henderson,
the Islamic coordinator at the Connally Unit from approximately
1996 to 1998. In his affidavit, Henderson states that he “was
instructed by [Shakir] not to teach Islam according to the Shia
School of Thought and not to allow anyone else to teach the Shia
School of Thought.” Henderson further states that, during his
term as the Islamic coordinator at the Connally Unit, Shakir “did
not want anyone practicing the Shia School of Thought to lead the
prayers.”
Shakir argues that this evidence shows only a belief as to
who should lead religious activities and does not indicate an
intent to discriminate in the context of access to the Ramadan
meals. We find this argument unpersuasive. Viewing the evidence
in a light most favorable to Ar-Ra’id, we can infer
discriminatory intent from Shakir’s general hostility towards
Shi’ite Muslims. Thus, Ar-Ra’id’s evidence raises a genuine
issue of material fact regarding whether intentional
discrimination against Shi’ite Muslims was the cause of Shakir’s
inconsistent application of the Ramadan meal policy.
V. The Prison Litigation Reform Act
13
The Defendants asserted in their summary judgment motion
that they were entitled to summary judgment on all damages claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Ar-Ra’id failed to show that he
suffered any physical injury, as is required by the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (the “PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (Supp.
2001). The district court did not address this issue. The PLRA
states that “[n]o federal civil action may be brought by a
prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional
facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in
custody without a prior showing of physical injury.” Id.
§ 1997e(e). In Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736 (5th Cir. 2002), we
noted that we have “applied the PLRA’s damage limits only to
prisoners’ claims of cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment . . . . We have not considered the application
of the PLRA to constitutional violations usually unaccompanied by
physical injury, such as First Amendment retaliation claims,
privacy claims, and equal protection claims.” Id. at 747 n.20.
Applying the PLRA to limit Ar-Ra’id’s relief “would raise
difficult constitutional questions not previously addressed in
this circuit.” Id. For this reason, we choose not to reach the
issue at this early stage of the proceedings.
VI. Conclusion
Because Ar-Ra’id’s summary judgment evidence fails to show
that Shabazz or Farooq had any personal involvement in the events
14
occurring at the Connally Unit, the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of Shabazz and Farooq was proper.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM summary judgment with respect to Shabazz
and Farooq. However, we conclude that Ar-Ra’id raises genuine
issues of material fact regarding whether Shakir, acting with
discriminatory intent, treated other similarly situated Muslim
prisoners differently from Ar-Ra’id with respect to the
prisoners’ eligibility for special Ramadan meals. Thus, the
district court improperly granted summary judgment to Shakir on
Ar-Ra’id’s equal protection claim. Accordingly, we REVERSE
summary judgment with respect to Shakir and REMAND the case to
the district court.
15