This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-0068
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Michael John Mahle,
Appellant.
Filed January 12, 2015
Affirmed in part and remanded
Schellhas, Judge
Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CR-12-5912
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Anthony C. Palumbo, Anoka County Attorney, Lisa B. Jones, Brianne Jo Buccicone,
Assistant County Attorneys, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Sharon E. Jacks,
Assistant Public Defenders, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and
Stoneburner, Judge.*
*
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court erred by imposing a gross misdemeanor
sentence consecutive to a felony sentence and by not announcing jail credit at the time of
sentencing. We affirm in part and remand.
FACTS
On August 10, 2012, respondent State of Minnesota filed a criminal complaint
against appellant Michael Mahle, who was then in custody in Anoka County, alleging
one count of felony stalking (second or subsequent violations) and one count of felony
stalking (pattern of conduct). On August 12 or 13, 2012, Mahle was released on bond. On
July 30, 2013, while serving an unrelated prison sentence for fourth-degree assault (peace
officer), Mahle filed a detainer regarding the Anoka County charges and subsequently
reached an agreement with the state to resolve the charges.1 The parties agreed to the
following terms: Mahle would plead guilty to an amended count of gross-misdemeanor
stalking; the remaining felony count would be dismissed; and the district court would
sentence Mahle consecutively to the felony sentence he already was serving and would
order two years of probation.
1
Mahle was serving a 17-month prison sentence imposed on July 15, 2013, in Ramsey
County District Court, as a result of Mahle’s guilty plea to fourth-degree assault of a
peace officer on March 13, 2013. Mahle’s supervised release date was June 9, 2014, and
the expiration date of his sentence was November 28, 2014. At the time of sentencing for
the fourth-degree assault conviction, the district court granted Mahle 16 days of jail
credit.
2
On September 16, 2013, Mahle pleaded guilty to an amended charge of gross-
misdemeanor stalking, and on October 15, the district court imposed a stayed, one-year
sentence, plus “probation for a period of two years.” The court stated that “[b]oth the
sentence and the probation are to run consecutive to the time that . . . Mahle is currently
serving” and that the sentence and probation would commence on November 29, 2014,
the day following the expiration of Mahle’s felony sentence. Noting that it was staying
“all of [Mahle’s] sentence,” the court declined to announce Mahle’s jail credit and stated
that it would address jail credit if Mahle’s sentence was executed.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Consecutive sentencing
Mahle argues that the district court erred by imposing his gross-misdemeanor
stalking sentence consecutive to his felony assault sentence. He argues that if he had been
convicted of felony stalking, rather than gross-misdemeanor stalking, “his sentence
would have been concurrent with the sentence he was already serving for assault.”
This court has “express statutory authority to ‘review [a] sentence . . . to determine
whether the sentence is inconsistent with statutory requirements, unreasonable,
inappropriate, excessive, unjustifiably disparate, or not warranted by the findings of fact
issued by the district court.’” State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 312 (Minn. 2014) (quoting
Minn. Stat. § 244.11, subd. 2(b) (2012)). “When reviewing a sentence imposed or stayed
by a district court, [appellate courts] do so under an abuse of discretion standard.” State v.
Franklin, 604 N.W.2d 79, 82 (Minn. 2000). A district court abuses its discretion by
3
imposing a sentence that “is disproportionate to the offense or unfairly exaggerates the
criminality of the defendant’s conduct.” State v. McLaughlin, 725 N.W.2d 703, 715
(Minn. 2007) (quotations omitted). When a sentencing challenge is based on a legal issue,
an appellate court’s review is de novo. State v. DeRosier, 719 N.W.2d 900, 903 (Minn.
2006).
“The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines state at the outset that they apply only to
felonies.” State v. Campbell, 814 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2012). “[G]ross misdemeanor
sentences are indeterminate with limits set by statute.” Id. at 6 (citing Minn. Stat.
§ 609.02, subds. 3–4 (2010)). “A district court sentencing . . . gross misdemeanor
offenses may impose a sentence anywhere within the statutory range.” Id. Additionally,
[w]hen a court imposes sentence for a misdemeanor or gross
misdemeanor offense and specifies that the sentence shall run
consecutively to any other sentence, the court may order the
defendant to serve time in custody for the consecutive
sentence in addition to any time in custody the defendant may
be serving for any other offense.
Minn. Stat. § 609.15, subd. 1(b) (2012).
Mahle argues that “a long line of cases from Minnesota’s appellate courts have
indicated that a defendant cannot receive a consecutive non-felony sentence when he
could not have received a consecutive felony sentence, as this exaggerates the criminality
of the offense.” Mahle cites State v. Dulski, a jail-credit case in which the supreme court
stated:
We believe that it would be unfair to hold, in effect, that a
defendant who is convicted of a gross misdemeanor may, by
virtue of the technical nonapplicability of the Sentencing
Guidelines, have to serve more total time in confinement in a
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case such as this than he would have to serve if he were
convicted of a felony.
363 N.W.2d 307, 310 (Minn. 1985) (emphasis added); see also Dockin v. State, 399
N.W.2d 104, 106–07 (Minn. App. 1987) (determining that when defendant was “subject
to and under” felony sentence at the time she was sentenced for multiple misdemeanor
offenses that could have been aggregated into fewer felony offenses, resulting in no
additional time served, consecutive sentencing for misdemeanor offenses unfairly
exaggerated the criminality of defendant’s conduct and was unfair).
Mahle also cites State v. Perkins, in which the supreme court cited Dulski and
reversed a 30-month total sentence, which consisted of concurrent 13- and 18-month
felony sentences plus a consecutive 12-month gross-misdemeanor sentence. 554 N.W.2d
80, 80 (Minn. 1996). The supreme court noted that had the defendant been sentenced for
three felonies, his sentence would have been 21 months, and concluded that “it [wa]s
unfair to require [the defendant] to spend more time in custody than he would have to
spend in custody if he had been convicted of a felony rather than a gross misdemeanor.”
Id. But in Perkins, the defendant apparently pleaded guilty to two felonies and one gross
misdemeanor simultaneously without agreeing to consecutive sentencing. The
circumstances surrounding Perkins’s sentences are distinguishable from those
surrounding Mahle’s sentences.
Mahle also cites State v. Weber, another jail-credit case in which the supreme
court recognized that a defendant whose second offense is less serious than his first
offense, e.g., a gross misdemeanor following a felony, “will often serve more total time
5
than the defendant whose second offense is more serious.” 470 N.W.2d 112, 115 (Minn.
1991). The supreme court stated in dicta, “Imposition of a shorter sentence for the second
offense, then, may result, illogically it seems to us, in the defendant serving more total
time than he would have served had his second offense been more serious and the
sentence for that offense longer.” Id. at 115–16. But the supreme court did not hold that a
district court is not permitted to impose a gross-misdemeanor sentence consecutive to a
felony sentence.
Despite Mahle’s lack of authority to support his consecutive-sentencing argument,
we address whether the district court’s imposition of a consecutive gross-misdemeanor
sentence to Mahle’s previously imposed felony sentence unfairly exaggerates the
criminality of his offense of stalking J.E.K. We do so by asking whether Mahle would
have been subject to less incarceration if he had been sentenced for felony stalking
instead of gross-misdemeanor stalking. Based on our analysis below, we conclude that, if
Mahle had been sentenced for felony stalking, he would have been subject to a longer
period of incarceration.
A district court may order permissive consecutive sentences when “the
presumptive disposition for the current offense(s) is commitment,” the “prior felony
sentence . . . has not expired or been discharged,” and both felony convictions are for
crimes listed in Minn. Sent. Guidelines 6 (2012). Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.F.2.a.(1)
(2012). Stalking (second or subsequent violations), stalking (pattern of conduct), and
fourth-degree assault are listed in Minn. Sent. Guidelines 6. Mahle argues that both
counts of felony stalking “call for a presumptive stayed sentence under the Guidelines
6
when using a criminal history score . . . of zero.” Mahle’s argument is based on the
incorrect premise that we apply a criminal-history score of zero to determine the
presumptive disposition of his sentence. “[A] criminal history score should be reduced
only for purposes of determining the presumptive duration of the consecutive sentence.”
State v. Holmes, 719 N.W.2d 904, 908 n.8 (Minn. 2006). Mahle’s criminal-history score
should be used to determine the presumptive disposition of the sentence. See State v.
Rannow, 703 N.W.2d 575, 578–79 & n.3 (Minn. App. 2005) (applying defendant’s
criminal-history score to determine presumptive disposition of sentences and whether
consecutive sentencing was permissive).
Based on a footnote in Mahle’s reply brief, we assume that Mahle’s criminal-
history score was five at the time he committed the stalking offense. Felony stalking in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subdivision 4(a) (2012) (second or subsequent
violations) is a severity-level-four offense. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 5.B (2012). With a
criminal-history score of five and a severity level of four, the presumptive disposition for
Mahle’s hypothetical felony stalking sentence is commitment. See Minn. Sent.
Guidelines 4.A (2012). Accordingly, Mahle’s sentence, had he pleaded guilty to felony
stalking, would have been permissively consecutive. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines
2.F.2.a.(1). If Mahle had been sentenced for felony stalking consecutive to his felony
assault sentence, the sentencing court would have been required to use a criminal-history
score of zero, resulting in a presumptive sentence of 12 months and 1 day executed. See
Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.F.2.a (2012) (“For each felony offense sentenced consecutively
to another felony offense(s), the court must use a Criminal History Score of 0 . . . .”),
7
4.A; see also State v. Watkins, 650 N.W.2d 738, 742 (Minn. App. 2002) (“[T]he
presumptive disposition for a permissive consecutive sentence is always an executed
sentence.”). Adding a 12-month-and-1-day felony stalking sentence to Mahle’s 17-month
felony assault sentence would result in a total sentence of 29 months and 1 day. Mahle’s
sentence therefore would have been one day longer had he been sentenced for felony
stalking instead of gross-misdemeanor stalking.
And had the district court chosen to sentence Mahle concurrently for felony
stalking, using a criminal-history score of five and a severity level of four, his
presumptive guidelines sentence would have been commitment for 23 to 32 months.2 See
Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.A. A concurrent sentence for felony stalking therefore could
have extended beyond the combined 29 months of his current sentence. See State v.
Petersen, 305 Minn. 478, 481, 235 N.W.2d 801, 803 (Minn. 1975) (“Under two or more
concurrent sentences, the terms are served simultaneously and a prisoner is entitled to
discharge at the expiration of the longest term specified.” (emphasis added)). We
conclude that the district court did not err by sentencing Mahle under the plea agreement
to a term of one year for gross-misdemeanor stalking consecutive to his felony sentence.
2
We note that our hypothetical consecutive and concurrent sentencing scenarios for
felony stalking only assume a sentence under section 609.749, subdivision 4(a), which is
a severity-level-four offense. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 5.B. But Mahle was also charged
under Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subdivision 5(a) (2012) (pattern of conduct), which is a
severity-level-five offense. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 5.B. If Mahle were sentenced under
that subdivision, our hypotheticals would be all the more consistent with our conclusion.
8
Delayed commencement of consecutive gross-misdemeanor sentence
The district court specifically delayed the commencement of Mahle’s gross-
misdemeanor sentence to November 29, 2014, the day after the expiration of Mahle’s
felony assault sentence. Citing Minn. Sent. Guidelines cmt. 2.F.02 for the proposition that
a defendant will begin to serve his second sentence at the end of the “incarceration
period” of his first sentence, Mahle argues that the “district court should not be able to
delay the start date of [his] gross misdemeanor sentence when it would have been unable
to do so if both sentences had been felonies.” He argues that this is “a[n] additional and
logical extension of the Dulski and Perkins line of cases” and maintains that “[his] gross
misdemeanor sentence must start running no later than the date he was released from
prison [on his felony assault sentence], on June 9, 2014.” We disagree.
The sentencing guidelines do not apply to gross misdemeanors. See Campbell, 814
N.W.2d at 5. Moreover, comments to the sentencing guidelines, to which Mahle cites,
“are advisory and are not binding on the courts.” State v. Jones, 848 N.W.2d 528, 537
(Minn. 2014). And even if the sentencing guidelines were applicable to gross-
misdemeanor sentences, the guidelines provide, “When the court orders sentences to be
‘consecutive,’ the court is ordering that multiple sentences be served one after the other.”
Minn. Sent. Guidelines 1.B.3 (2012) (emphasis added). “A consecutive sentence is one
which does not begin to run until the expiration of the term of the prior sentence.” Jones,
848 N.W.2d at 537 n.5 (quotation omitted). An “‘[e]xecuted sentence’ means the total
period of time for which an inmate is committed to the custody of the commissioner of
corrections.” Minn. Stat. § 244.01, subd. 9 (2012). The sentence “includes both the term
9
of imprisonment and the term of supervised release.” State ex. rel. Peterson v. Fabian,
784 N.W.2d 843, 846 (Minn. App. 2010); see also Minn. Stat. § 244.101, subd. 1 (2012)
(describing components of executed sentence).
We reject Mahle’s assertion that his argument is supported by a “logical extension
of the Dulski and Perkins line of cases.” Dulski and Perkins only support the proposition
that Mahle’s consecutive gross-misdemeanor sentence would have been unfair if it had
subjected him to a longer period of confinement than a felony sentence. See Perkins, 554
N.W.2d at 80; Dulski, 363 N.W.2d at 310. Here, the commencement date for Mahle’s
consecutive gross-misdemeanor sentence did not subject Mahle to a longer period of
confinement than he could have served had the court sentenced him for felony stalking.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing Mahle’s
gross-misdemeanor stalking sentence consecutive to his felony assault sentence and
ordering that it commence at the expiration of his felony sentence.
Jail credit
In connection with his jail credit, Mahle asked the district court during his
sentencing hearing, “What if I want to execute that sentence . . . ? I mean, I don’t know
what I’m executing.” The district court declined to announce Mahle’s jail credit, stating
that it would address jail credit if Mahle’s sentence was executed. Mahle seeks a remand
to the district court with an order that the court announce his jail credit so that he can
make a decision about whether to execute his stayed gross-misdemeanor sentence.
“The [district] court does not have discretion in awarding jail credit.” State v.
Clarkin, 817 N.W.2d 678, 687 (Minn. 2012). “A district court’s decision whether to
10
award credit is a mixed question of fact and law; the court must determine the
circumstances of the custody the defendant seeks credit for, and then apply the rules to
those circumstances.” State v. Johnson, 744 N.W.2d 376, 379 (Minn. 2008). “We review
the factual findings underlying jail-credit determinations for clear error, but we review
questions of law de novo.” Clarkin, 817 N.W.2d at 687. “The interpretation of a
procedural rule is subject to de novo review.” Johnson v. State, 801 N.W.2d 173, 176
(Minn. 2011).
“[A] defendant is entitled to a credit from his term of imprisonment for the number
of days spent in custody in connection with the offense or behavioral incident being
sentenced.” Townsend v. State, 834 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted).
Furthermore,
[w]hen pronouncing sentence the court must . . . [s]tate the
number of days spent in custody in connection with the
offense or behavioral incident being sentenced. That credit
must be deducted from the sentence and term of
imprisonment and must include time spent in custody from a
prior stay of imposition or execution of sentence.
Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 4. “‘Must’ is mandatory.” Greene v. Comm’r of Minn.
Dep’t of Human Servs., 755 N.W.2d 713, 721 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted); see also
Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 15a (2014). The district court therefore was required to
announce Mahle’s jail credit and deduct that time from his sentence and erred by
declining to do so.
Citing Minn. Stat. § 609.145, subd. 3, the state argues that the district court was
not required to announce jail credit because the court did not commit Mahle to the
11
commissioner and that “[d]istrict courts only need to announce jail credit when they are
imposing a term of imprisonment.” Minnesota Statutes section 609.145, subdivision 3
(2012), provides:
When a person is to be committed to the commissioner, the
person’s probation officer must provide to the court, prior to
the sentencing hearing, the amount of time the person has in
credit for prior imprisonment. The court must pronounce
credit for prior imprisonment at the time of sentencing.
Although the mandate of section 609.145, subdivision 3, may be limited, the state’s
argument is unpersuasive. The mandate of rule 27.03, subdivision 4, is clear and broad.
The rule requires that the court announce jail credit “[w]hen pronouncing sentence” in all
cases. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 4.
We agree that Mahle has the right to know the jail credit that he will be given to
enable him to decide whether to execute his sentence. The state makes arguments, as does
Mahle, regarding the amount of jail credit to which Mahle may be entitled. We decline to
address those arguments, leaving the matter to be determined by the district court.
Affirmed in part and remanded.
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