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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
STEVEN MORTLAND, :
:
Appellant : No. 739 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 2, 2014
in the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County,
Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-43-CR-0001569-2013,
CP-43-CR-0001590-2013, CP-43-CR-0001599-2013,
CP-43-CR-0001775-2013
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E, SHOGAN, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED: JANUARY 13, 2015
Steven Mortland (Appellant) appeals from the aggregate judgment of
sentence of 72 to 180 months of incarceration following his guilty pleas to
three counts of burglary and one count of retail theft. We affirm.
From the briefs and record before us, it is unclear what facts Appellant
admitted in entering his pleas. The trial court offers the following
description of the criminal conduct at issue: “[Appellant] went on a crime
spree resulting in multiple charges and multiple cases; those cases were
informally consolidated into one global plea deal.” Trial Court Opinion,
6/12/2014, at 2. Of the more than 50 counts Appellant faced, he pled guilty
to the four indicated above, and the Commonwealth nolle prossed the
remainder. In addition to being ordered to pay restitution, Appellant was
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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given sentences on the burglary convictions in the standard and aggravated
range, and a sentence on the retail theft conviction which was in excess of
the aggravated range, but below the statutory maximum.
At sentencing, Appellant asked the trial court to consider that his
crimes were motivated by drug addiction and that he had been cooperative
with the police, including riding around with them and pointing out the
places he had burglarized. N.T., 4/2/2014, at 10-12. The trial court
sentenced Appellant to 72 to 180 months of incarceration, having been
informed of: Appellant’s cooperation and statement of remorse; the
presentence investigation report; the considerable benefit Appellant received
from the Commonwealth’s dismissal of the bulk of the charges; Appellant’s
poor track record of prior court-mandated attempts at rehabilitation; and the
victim impact statements. Id. at 12-18.
Appellant timely filed a motion to modify sentence, 1 claiming that all of
the sentences are excessive in that they do not reflect consideration of
Appellant’s rehabilitative needs, and that the standard-range sentence for
one particular burglary conviction was excessive “because [Appellant] would
never have been charged with the offenses [at the relevant docket number]
had he not cooperated with the Pennsylvania State Police.” Motion to Modify
Sentence, 4/14/2014, at 2 (pages unnumbered). The trial court denied
1
The tenth day after Appellant’s sentence was imposed was Saturday, April
12, 2014. Accordingly, Appellant’s motion, filed on Monday, April 14, 2014,
was timely filed. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908.
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Appellant’s motion by order of April 14, 2014. Appellant timely filed a notice
of appeal.
Appellant presents one question for this Court’s review: “Whether the
[t]rial [c]ourt abused its discretion in giving the Appellant consecutive
sentences?” Appellant’s Brief at 7.
Appellant’s question challenges the discretionary aspects of his
sentence. Accordingly, we bear in mind the following.
A challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence must be
considered a petition for permission to appeal, as the right to
pursue such a claim is not absolute. Two requirements must be
met before we will review this challenge on its merits. First, an
appellant must set forth in his brief a concise statement of the
reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the
discretionary aspects of a sentence. Second, the appellant must
show that there is a substantial question that the sentence
imposed is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code. The
determination of whether a particular issue raises a substantial
question is to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. In order to
establish a substantial question, the appellant must show actions
by the trial court inconsistent with the Sentencing Code or
contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing
process.
Commonwealth v. Bowen, 55 A.3d 1254, 1262-63 (Pa. Super. 2012),
appeal denied, 64 A.3d 630 (Pa. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v.
McAfee, 849 A.2d 270, 274 (Pa. Super. 2004)).
Appellant’s brief contains the following statement of the reasons upon
which he relies for allowance of appeal as to the discretionary aspects of his
sentence.
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The Appellant respectfully submits that his sentence was
contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the
sentencing process because the Appellant received consecutive
sentences. The Appellant concedes that consecutive sentences
are within the sound discretion of the sentenc[ing] court but in
the instant case the consecutive sentences were unfair to the
Appellant because it was the Appellant’s cooperation that led to
additional charges being filed against him and ultimately led to
the consecutive sentences.
Appellant’s Brief at 6.
As Appellant acknowledged, “Pennsylvania law affords the sentencing
court discretion to impose its sentence concurrently or consecutively to other
sentences being imposed at the same time or to sentences already imposed.
Any challenge to the exercise of this discretion ordinarily does not raise a
substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Prisk, 13 A.3d 526, 533 (Pa.
Super. 2011) (internal quotation omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Pass, 914 A.2d 442, 446–47 (Pa. Super. 2006)). “[T]he key to resolving
the preliminary substantial question inquiry is whether the decision to
sentence consecutively raises the aggregate sentence to, what appears upon
its face to be, an excessive level in light of the criminal conduct at issue in
the case.” Commonwealth v. Mastromarino, 2 A.3d 581, 587 (Pa. Super.
2010).
Given the scant information in the record or briefs about the criminal
conduct at issue in this case, we are unable to conclude that Appellant’s
aggregate sentence is manifestly excessive. Nor are we persuaded that
there was a violation of sentencing norms when Appellant’s was not given a
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“volume discount” because he cooperated with the police. Commonwealth
v. Hoag, 665 A.2d 1212, 1214 (Pa. Super. 1995) (“We see no reason why
Hoag should be afforded a ‘volume discount’ for his crimes by having all
sentences run concurrently.”). Accordingly, we hold that Appellant does not
raise a substantial question that his sentence of 72 to 180 months of
imprisonment is inappropriate under the Sentencing Code.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/13/2015
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