COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-13-00537-CR
ERIC DWAYNE STEVENSON APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
----------
FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 3 OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 1272720D
----------
MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
----------
A jury convicted Appellant Eric Dwayne Stevenson of three counts of
violating civil commitment requirements for sexually violent predators 2 and, after
finding the allegations in the repeat offender notice true, assessed his
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2
See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.085(a)–(b) (West 2010).
punishment for each count at seventeen years’ confinement and a $5,000 fine.
The trial court sentenced him accordingly.
Appellant brings five issues on appeal, contending that the trial court had
no jurisdiction because his appeal of the commitment order was pending, that the
three convictions violate double jeopardy protections, that the trial court erred by
denying his motion to quash the indictment and his motion for a directed verdict,
and that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding his evidence that the
commitment order was not final. Because the trial court had jurisdiction, double
jeopardy was not implicated, and the trial court did not reversibly err, we affirm
the trial court’s judgment.
Double Jeopardy
In his first issue, Appellant argues that the convictions and sentences on
three counts of the indictment are repeated convictions and punishments for the
same offense for double jeopardy purposes. Section 841.085(a) of the health
and safety code provides that a person commits an offense if, after having been
adjudicated and civilly committed as a sexually violent predator, he violates a civil
commitment requirement imposed under Section 841.082(a). 3 Applying the test
and logic of Jones v. State, 4 the gravamen of the offense of violating civil
3
Id. § 841.085(a).
4
323 S.W.3d 885, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
2
commitment requirements for sexually violent predators appears to be breaking a
rule imposed not only by the committing court but also by the treatment provider. 5
The Texas Supreme Court has held that the sexually violent predator
commitment statute is civil because the legislature intended it to be civil. 6 Yet
violations of the commitment obligations carry criminal sanctions. 7 Applying the
rule of Jones v. State, it appears that we are required to hold that each violation
of a rule, whether by a single or multiple acts, is a separate violation of Section
841.085(a), carrying criminal penalties for violation of the rules of the civil
commitment. 8 We are therefore compelled to overrule Appellant’s first issue.
Finality of Commitment Order
In his second issue, Appellant contends that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the criminal case because his appeal of the commitment order
was pending at the time of trial. In his third issue, he contends that the trial court
therefore erred by denying his motion to quash the indictment. In his fourth
issue, he challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion for directed verdict for
5
See id.; see also Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.082(a) (West
Supp. 2014), § .085(a).
6
In re Commitment of Fisher, 164 S.W.3d 637, 639–40, 654 (Tex.), cert.
denied, 546 U.S. 938 (2005).
7
See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.085(a).
8
See id.; Jones, 323 S.W.3d at 889.
3
the same reason. Appellant raises no other challenge in these issues to the
convicting court’s jurisdiction or to the indictment’s validity.
The statute criminalizing violations of civil commitment requirements for
sexually violent predators does not require that the commitment order first be
final for appellate purposes before violations are criminal. 9 A “commitment order
is effective immediately on entry of the order.” 10 Further, in civil cases, the filing
of a notice of appeal does not automatically suspend enforcement of the
judgment. 11 Enforcement of the judgment proceeds unless the judgment is
superseded in accordance with Rule 24. 12 Consequently, Appellant was bound
by the requirements of the order of commitment regardless of the status of his
appeal of that order. 13 The convicting court had jurisdiction over the criminal
case. Additionally, for the reasons set out above, and because the indictment
was valid on its face, the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to
quash. We overrule Appellant’s second and third issues.
9
See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.085(a).
10
See id. § 841.081(a) (West 2010).
11
See Tex. R. App. P. 25.1(h).
12
See Tex. R. App. P. 24, 25.1(h).
13
See United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 294, 67
S. Ct. 677, 696 (1947) (“Violations of an order are punishable as criminal
contempt even though the order is set aside on appeal . . . .”); In re Sheshtawy,
154 S.W.3d 114, 126 (Tex. 2004) (citing same and noting that relator remained
subject to further contempt proceedings for violating an order before its reversal).
4
In his fourth issue, Appellant challenges the denial of his directed verdict.
He moved for a directed verdict on the basis that there was no final order of
commitment because he had filed a notice of appeal and the appeal was still
pending. He does not otherwise challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to
support his convictions. The trial court admitted State’s Exhibits 1 and 2, certified
copies of the final judgment finding Appellant to be a sexually violent predator
and the commitment order. Again, the commitment order was effective when
issued, and the issuance of mandate of that order was not a necessary
precondition for imposing criminal sanctions for its disobedience. 14 The trial
court therefore did not err by denying Appellant’s motion. We overrule his fourth
issue.
Exclusion of Evidence
In his fifth issue, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by excluding on relevance grounds his proffered evidence that the commitment
order was not final because his appeal thereof was pending. Even if the trial
court abused its discretion by excluding the evidence, an issue we do not reach,
any such error would be harmless because the filing of a notice of appeal does
not affect the finality of judgment in a civil case and did not stay the
14
See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.085(a).
5
enforcement of the commitment order in this case. 15 We overrule Appellant’s
fifth issue.
Conclusion
Having overruled Appellant’s five issues on appeal, we affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
/s/ Lee Ann Dauphinot
LEE ANN DAUPHINOT
JUSTICE
PANEL: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and WALKER, JJ.
WALKER, J., concurs without opinion.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: January 15, 2015
15
See id. § 841.081(a); Tex. R. App. P. 24, 25.1(h), 44.2(b).
6