AFFIRMED; and Opinion Filed January 22, 2015.
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-14-00072-CR
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant
V.
LAWRENCE CLARK SANDLIN, Appellee
On Appeal from the 416th Judicial District Court
Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 416-82012-2012
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Bridges, Lang, and Evans
Opinion by Justice Evans
The State of Texas appeals the trial court’s decision to grant appellee Lawrence Clark
Sandlin’s motion to suppress. In a single issue, the State contends that the mandatory blood
draw provision of Section 724.012(b) of the Texas Transportation Code is lawful because it
authorizes irrevocable consent in narrow circumstances. Finding no merit in the State’s
argument, we affirm the trial court’s order granting the motion to suppress.
BACKGROUND
On the evening of June 30, 2012, police officer Roger Smith noticed that a white Mini
Cooper began drifting out its lane and making unsafe lane changes. Officer Smith stopped the
car and noticed that Sandlin, the driver, had his eight-year old daughter in the car with him.
Sandlin admitted he had been consuming alcohol. Officer Smith conducted a breath test which
indicated the presence of alcohol in Sandlin’s system. Officer Smith also performed the field
sobriety tests on Sandlin which also indicated that he had been driving while intoxicated.
Sandlin was then arrested for driving while intoxicated with a passenger under fifteen years of
age. After taking him to the jail, Officer Smith requested that Sandlin provide a breath and blood
specimen and Sandlin refused. Officer Smith then informed Sandlin that pursuant to the Texas
Transportation Code, it was mandatory that Sandlin provide a sample. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE
ANN. § 724.012(b) (West 2011). A nurse then took a blood specimen from Sandlin at the jail.
Sandlin was indicted for the felony offense of DWI with a child passenger. Sandlin filed
a motion to suppress alleging that the warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw was a violation of
his Fourth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. The trial court granted the
motion to suppress and the State filed this appeal. While this appeal was pending, the court of
criminal appeals issued its opinion in State v. Villarreal, No. PD-0306-14, 2014 WL 6734178
(Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 26, 2014), addressing involuntary blood draws taken under the authority
of the Texas Transportation Code.
ANALYSIS
In a single issue, the State claims that the trial court erred by granting Sandlin’s motion to
suppress. The State argues that the blood draw was lawful because the statutory scheme
establishes prospective, but irrevocable, consent in certain narrow circumstances. We disagree.
We apply a bifurcated standard of review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress
by giving almost total deference to the trial court’s determinations of fact and reviewing de novo
the trial court’s application of law. State v. McLain, 337 S.W.3d 268, 271 (Tex. Crim. App.
2011).
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recently addressed whether a warrantless,
nonconsensual testing of a DWI suspect’s blood violates the suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights.
Villarreal, 2014 WL 6734178. In Villarreal, the suspect was stopped for a traffic violation. Id.
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at *1. As the suspect exhibited signs of intoxication, a DWI investigation was conducted. Id.
The suspect refused to perform standardized field sobriety tests and refused to provide a blood
specimen. Id. After the officer discovered that the suspect had been convicted of DWI on
several occasions, the suspect’s blood was drawn over his objection based on section 724.012(b)
of the Texas Transportation Code. Id. at *2. The suspect then moved to suppress the blood test
results and the trial court granted the motion. Id. On review to the court of criminal appeals, the
State argued that the court of appeals erred in holding that a warrantless blood draw conducted
pursuant to the provisions of the transportation code violates the Fourth Amendment. Id. at *6.
The court of criminal appeals rejected the State’s contention that the implied-consent and
mandatory blood draw provisions established a constitutionally valid basis for conducting a
nonconsensual search in the absence of a search warrant. Id.
In this case, the State argues that Sandlin gave implied consent to provide a breath or
blood specimen which was irrevocable under section 724.012(b) of Texas Transportation Code
because he had a child passenger in the vehicle with him. In Villarreal, however, the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals specifically rejected this argument:
To the extent the State suggests that the implied-consent and mandatory-blood-
draw provisions in the Transportation Code categorically extinguish a DWI
suspect’s right to withdraw consent when some aggravating circumstance is
present, that suggestion cannot be squared with the requirement that, to be valid
for Fourth Amendment purposes, consent must be freely and voluntarily given
based on the totality of the circumstances, and must not have been revoked or
withdrawn at the time of the search. In other words, implied consent that has
been withdrawn or revoked by a suspect cannot serve as a substitute for the free
and voluntary consent that the Fourth Amendment requires.
Id. at *11 (internal citations omitted); Lloyd v. State, No. 05-13-01004-CV, 2014 WL 7249747,
at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 22, 2014, no pet. h.). The record in this instance clearly
demonstrates that the appellee refused consent. Accordingly, we reject this argument.
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CONCLUSION
We resolve the State’s issue against it and affirm the trial court’s order granting the
motion to suppress.
/ David Evans/
DAVID EVANS
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47
140072F.U05
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant On Appeal from the 416th Judicial District
Court, Collin County, Texas
No. 05-14-00072-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. 416-82012-2012.
Opinion delivered by Justice Evans.
LAWRENCE CLARK SANDLIN, Appellee Justices Bridges and Lang participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the order of the trial court granting the motion
to suppress is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 22nd day of January, 2015.
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