J-S01039-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
ROBERT DAVID DODSON
Appellant No. 1214 WDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order July 10, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-26-CR-0002198-2011
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., JENKINS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED JANUARY 23, 2015
Appellant, Robert David Dodson, appeals from the order entered in the
Fayette County Court of Common Pleas, dismissing his first petition brought
pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows.
[Appellant] was charged with Homicide and Endangering
the Welfare of Children stemming from the death of his
fifteen (15) month-old daughter…. The case was
consolidated with [the case against the child’s mother,
Tammy Bohon]. Before the child passed away, she had
been suffering from severe vomiting and diarrhea, and the
feeding tube that she needed to eat had fallen out.
Neither [Appellant] nor Bohon fixed the feeding tube, and
neither parent took the child to the hospital for the
immediate medical care she needed. The child was left
____________________________________________
1
42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
J-S01039-15
with [Appellant] and their older children while Bohon went
out with a male friend and smoked crack cocaine.
When the police arrived at the home, they observed it
being in terrible shape and poorly maintained, and there
were animal feces on the floor throughout the home,
including locations near where the child had been laying.
Dr. Cyril Wecht, who performed the autopsy, determined
the child’s cause of death to be dehydration and double
pneumonia.
* * *
Under the advice of [plea counsel], [Appellant] entered a
guilty plea to Involuntary Manslaughter and Endangering
the Welfare of Children on August 31, 2012. He was
sentenced on October 25, 2012 in accordance with the
plea agreement to a term of four and one-half (4.5) to
nine (9) years of incarceration on the Involuntary
Manslaughter charge. He received no additional penalty
on the Endangering the Welfare of Children charge.
(PCRA Court Opinion, filed July 10, 2014, at 2-4). Appellant did not file
post-sentence motions or a notice of appeal.
Appellant timely filed a counseled PCRA petition on October 24, 2013.
In it, Appellant raised multiple allegations of counsel’s ineffectiveness in
conjunction with the entry of the guilty plea. On January 29, 2014, the
court conducted an evidentiary hearing. The court denied PCRA relief on
July 10, 2014. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on July 24, 2014.
That same day, Appellant voluntarily filed a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
Appellant raises one issue for our review:
WHETHER [THE] PCRA COURT DID ERR IN NOT FINDING
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT THE
-2-
J-S01039-15
FOLLOWING STAGES: (1) THE FAILURE OF COUNSEL TO
ADEQUATELY REPRESENT THE CLIENT THROUGH THE
PLEA PROCEDURES AS SET FORTH IN THE RECORD?
(Appellant’s Brief at 5).
Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to
examining whether the evidence of record supports the court’s
determination and whether its decision is free of legal error.
Commonwealth v. Conway, 14 A.3d 101 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied,
612 Pa. 687, 29 A.3d 795 (2011). This Court grants great deference to the
findings of the PCRA court if the record contains any support for those
findings. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 923 A.2d 513 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal
denied, 593 Pa. 754, 932 A.2d 74 (2007). We give no such deference,
however, to the court’s legal conclusions. Commonwealth v. Ford, 44
A.3d 1190 (Pa.Super. 2012).
On appeal, Appellant asserts plea counsel’s PCRA hearing testimony
did not establish that counsel prepared for a trial; therefore, Appellant had
no choice but to enter a guilty plea. Specifically, Appellant contends plea
counsel failed to research witnesses or retain a medical expert. Appellant
insists plea counsel did not have reasonable basis for failing to prepare.
Appellant concludes plea counsel was ineffective, and his ineffectiveness
caused Appellant to enter an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea. We
disagree.
As a prefatory matter, we note: “[T]o succeed on an allegation
-3-
J-S01039-15
of…counsel’s ineffectiveness…a post-conviction petitioner must, at a
minimum, present argumentation relative to each layer of ineffective
assistance, on all three prongs of the ineffectiveness standard….”
Commonwealth v. D’Amato, 579 Pa. 490, 500, 856 A.2d 806, 812 (2004)
(internal citations omitted). “[A] petitioner does not preserve a…claim of
ineffectiveness merely by focusing his attention on whether…counsel was
ineffective. Rather, the petitioner must also present argument as to how the
second and third prongs of the Pierce[2] test are met with regard to
the…claim.” Commonwealth v. Santiago, 579 Pa. 46, 69, 855 A.2d 682,
696 (2004). “[A]n undeveloped argument, which fails to meaningfully
discuss and apply the standard governing the review of ineffectiveness
claims, simply does not satisfy [the petitioner’s] burden of establishing that
he is entitled to any relief.” Commonwealth v. Bracey, 568 Pa. 264, 273
n.4, 795 A.2d 935, 940 n.4 (2001). See also Commonwealth v. Chmiel,
612 Pa. 333, 362, 30 A.3d 1111, 1128 (2011) (explaining boilerplate
allegations and bald assertions of no reasonable basis and/or ensuing
prejudice cannot satisfy petitioner’s burden of proving ineffectiveness).
Additionally, “[A]llegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the
entry of a guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness
caused the defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea.”
____________________________________________
2
Commonwealth v. Pierce, 537 Pa. 514, 645 A.2d 189 (1994).
-4-
J-S01039-15
Commonwealth v. Wah, 42 A.3d 335, 338 (quoting Commonwealth v.
Allen, 833 A.2d 800, 802 (Pa.Super. 2003), appeal denied, 580 Pa. 703,
860 A.2d 488 (2004)).
This is similar to the manifest injustice standard applicable
to all post-sentence attempts to withdraw a guilty plea.
The law does not require that appellant be pleased with
the outcome of his decision to enter a plea of guilty: All
that is required is that [the appellant’s] decision to plead
guilty be knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made.
Commonwealth v. Lewis, 708 A.2d 497, 500-01 (Pa.Super. 1998), appeal
denied, 555 Pa. 741, 725 A.2d 1219 (1998) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Yager, 685 A.2d 1000, 1004 (Pa.Super. 1996) (en banc)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure mandate that pleas be
taken in open court, and require the court to conduct an on-the-record
colloquy to ascertain whether a defendant is aware of his rights and the
consequences of his plea. Commonwealth v. Hodges, 789 A.2d 764
(Pa.Super. 2002). Specifically, the court must affirmatively demonstrate the
defendant understands: (1) the nature of the charges to which he is
pleading guilty; (2) the factual basis for the plea; (3) his right to trial by
jury; (4) the presumption of innocence; (5) the permissible ranges of
sentences and fines possible; and (6) that the judge is not bound by the
terms of the agreement unless he accepts the agreement. Commonwealth
v. Watson, 835 A.2d 786 (Pa.Super. 2003).
Our Court will evaluate the adequacy of the plea colloquy and the
-5-
J-S01039-15
voluntariness of the resulting plea by examining the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the entry of that plea. Commonwealth v.
Muhammad, 794 A.2d 378 (Pa.Super. 2002). A defendant who decides to
plead guilty is bound by the statements he makes while under oath, “and he
may not later assert grounds for withdrawing the plea which contradict the
statements he made at his plea colloquy.” Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832
A.2d 517, 523 (Pa.Super. 2003).
Instantly, Appellant’s brief contains no discussion of the prejudice
prong of the ineffectiveness test. Additionally, Appellant baldy asserts that
plea counsel lacked a reasonable basis for his actions, and Appellant fails to
explain how counsel’s alleged deficiencies caused him to enter an unknowing
and involuntary plea. Absent more, the cursory analysis set forth in
Appellant’s brief does not adequately analyze his ineffectiveness claim. See
Santiago, supra; D’Amato, supra. Thus, Appellant’s issue concerning
plea counsel’s ineffectiveness is waived.
Moreover, even if Appellant had presented an adequate argument, no
relief would be due, based on a thorough review of the record, the briefs of
the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the
Honorable Steve P. Leskinen. The PCRA court opinion discussed and
properly disposed of the question presented. (See PCRA Court Opinion at 4-
10) (finding: plea counsel provided credible testimony at PCRA hearing; plea
counsel testified regarding ongoing nature of plea negotiations; plea counsel
-6-
J-S01039-15
met with Appellant before each court proceeding and several times at county
prison; immediately after plea counsel secured deal for Appellant to plead
guilty to involuntary manslaughter, counsel met with Appellant to discuss
Commonwealth’s offer; nevertheless, plea counsel also commenced
preliminary preparations for trial by obtaining discovery and interviewing
potential witnesses; plea counsel did not retain medical expert, because plea
counsel could not find expert who would offer favorable opinion; plea
counsel reviewed discovery and degrees of homicide with Appellant;
Appellant’s responses during oral plea colloquy indicated satisfaction with
plea agreement and plea counsel’s representation). Accordingly, we affirm.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/23/2015
-7-