J-A32023-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: S.O.C.B., A IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: V.B., MOTHER No. 1595 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Order entered April 28, 2014,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Family
Court, at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000022-2014; CP-51-DP-0002145-2011,
FID: 51-FN-004059-2011
IN THE INTEREST OF: S.O.B., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: V.B., MOTHER No. 1596 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Decree entered April 28, 2014,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Family
Court, at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000023-2014; CP-51-DP-0002144-2011,
FID: 51-FN-004059-2011
BEFORE: PANELLA, OLSON, and FITZGERALD*, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED JANUARY 26, 2015
V.B., (hereinafter “Mother”), appeals from the decrees entered on April
28, 2014, that granted the petition filed by the Philadelphia County
Department of Human Services (hereinafter “DHS”) to involuntarily
terminate her parental rights to her minor, female children, S.O.C.B., and
S.O.B., who were both born in August 2011 (hereinafter “the Children”),
pursuant to section 2511(a)(8) and (b) of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a)(8) and (b), and from the orders changing the permanency goal
* Former Justice specially assigned to Superior Court.
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for the Children to adoption, pursuant to section 6351 of the Juvenile Act, 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 6351.1 We affirm.
As the trial court has ably explained, the underlying facts in this case
are as follows:
On October 24, 2011, DHS received a General Protective
Service [(hereinafter “GPS”)] report, alleging that Mother
had given birth to triplets at Albert Einstein Medical Center.
. . . [The GPS report further alleged that S.O.C.B.,]
S.O.B.[,] and a third sibling were born at 33 weeks
gestation[] and that the third sibling was transferred to St.
1
At the hearing, DHS moved to terminate Mother’s parental rights with
regard to section 2511(a)(8) and (b). N.T. Hearing, 4/28/14, at 85.
Although the trial court’s decree provides that Mother’s parental rights to the
Children were terminated under section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), in
its opinion entered on July 23, 2014, the trial court stated that Mother’s
parental rights were terminated under section 2511(a)(8) and (b), only.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/23/14, at 5, 8, and 10. The trial court also stated that
the Children’s father, B.G. (hereinafter “Father”), lives in Africa, and his
whereabouts had been unknown to DHS. Id. at 1-2 and 4. At the
commencement of the hearing on the petition to involuntarily terminate
Mother’s parental rights, the trial court excused the counsel who had been
appointed to represent Father, as he had not been served with notice of the
petition, and the trial court established a new hearing date as to the
termination of Father’s parental rights. See N.T. Hearing, 4/28/14, at 9-16.
Mother’s counsel stated that she had discovered a week before the hearing
on the termination of Mother’s parental rights that Father had moved from
Benin to Nigeria, and that counsel had obtained Father’s address. Id. at 9.
At the termination hearing regarding Mother’s parental rights, Mother
indicated she lived in Benin, Africa when she became pregnant, and that
Father currently resides in Nigeria, Africa. Id. at 64. On April 28, 2014, the
trial court entered an order bifurcating the termination of parental rights
petition as to Father, and continuing the hearing on the termination of
Father’s parental rights to July 21, 2014. Father is not a party to this
appeal. See also In re Burns, 379 A.2d 535, 541 (Pa. 1977) (“[n]othing in
the Adoption Act requires that an agency, which has assumed custody of a
child, must establish grounds for the involuntary termination of both
parents, before it can obtain such a decree as to either. When an agency
having custody of a child petitions for termination of parental rights, the
rights of the respective natural parents must be determined independently”).
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Christopher’s Hospital Neonatal Intensive Care Unit
[(hereinafter “NICU”)] for further medical treatment. The
report also alleged[:] that Mother would be receiving
nursing assistance at home until the Children were two
years old; that Mother [had] been leaving the Children in
the care of various family friends; that [the] Children were
presently with a family friend [named] K.S.; that Mother
was not going to her Women, Infants[,] and Children
[(hereinafter “WIC”)] appointments; that Mother was not
providing K.S. with financial support and the Children’s
medical cards through the Department of Public Welfare [];
and[,] that Mother was not visiting the third sibling at [the]
St. Christopher’s Hospital [NICU]. The report further
alleged that [the] Children’s father resided in an unknown
location in Africa. It was alleged that Mother ha[d] not
taken [the] Children for medical treatment and that both
Children were suffering from colds. This report was
substantiated.
On October 25, 2011, DHS visited K.S. at her home. K.S.
[informed DHS:] that the Children had been in her care
since the beginning of October[] 2011; that she allowed
Mother and [the] Children to reside in her home because
they were homeless; that Mother was not financially
supporting the Children; that Mother was not involved with
the Children’s care; that Mother left the home for hours or
days at a time; and[,] that Mother had missed a WIC
appointment and the Children had not received WIC
formula. DHS left a message with K.S. requesting that
Mother contact DHS.
On October 26, 2011, DHS learned that Mother had visited
the third child on October 25, 2011. . . . On October 26,
2011, Mother admitted to DHS[:] that she had not been
providing proper care to [the] Children; that she was
homeless; and[,] that she did not have a plan for the
Children’s care. Mother stated that she did not have any
family members to care for [the] Children. On October 26,
2011, DHS obtained an order of protective custody [] for
the Children[] and they remained in the care of K.S. On
October 26, 2011, DHS visited Mother. Mother stated to
DHS that she did not want K.S. to continue to care for the
[C]hildren. [As a result,] DHS placed the Children in foster
care through Children’s Choice, Inc. The third child
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remained hospitalized. The identity of and whereabouts of
[the] Children’s father was unknown to DHS at that time.
Mother refused to disclose Father’s name or contact
information to DHS and stated that Father resided in Africa.
At the shelter care hearing held on October 28, 2011, the
[order of protective custody] was lifted and [the] Children’s
temporary commitment to DHS was ordered to stand.
Mother was referred to the Clinical Evaluation Unit [] for a
drug screen and dual diagnosis assessment. On October
31, 2011, Mother tested positive for marijuana at the
[Clinical Evaluation Unit]. On November 4, 2011, the [trial]
court found the Children to be dependent and fully
committed them to DHS. [The c]ourt ordered the Children
to be placed in the care of a family friend, [named] D.B.,
and [the court ordered] that Mother [was permitted to]
have weekly supervised visitation with the Children. . . .
On January 24, 2012, the [trial] court took notice that
Mother was compliant with the permanency plan. Mother
was awarded weekly[] supervised visits at the agency and
liberal supervised visits in the home of D.B. The [trial]
court ordered Mother to attend the Achievement
Reunification Center [(hereinafter “ARC”) and to continue
her] parenting classes, GED classes, employment, and
visit[ation]. DHS was ordered to assist Mother with
housing. . . .
On April 20, 2012, the third child died as a result of birth
defects.
On April 23, 2012, a Family Service Plan [(hereinafter
“FSP”)] meeting was held. The Children’s permanency
objectives were to return to [Mother]. The FSP parental
objectives were: to provide adequate and safe living
conditions; to provide [the] Children with supervision at all
times; to meet [the] Children’s daily basic needs[,]
including [providing the Children with] food and clothing[]
and [to] correct or stabilize [the Children’s] physical health,
vision, hearing, or dental problems; and[,] to facilitate
reunification by complying with appropriate services and
recommendations. Mother participated in the FSP and
signed the document on April 24, 2012. On April 24, 2012,
the [trial] court took notice that Mother was substantially
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compliant with the permanency plan. The [trial] court
ordered that Mother’s visitation [was to] continue as
previously ordered and that she be re-referred to ARC.
On July 17, 2012, the [trial] court took notice that Mother
had shown minimal compliance with the permanency plan.
The [trial] court ordered that Mother continue with
supervised visits in the foster home and that her
unsupervised community day visits be suspended. The
[trial] court took notice that Mother had reconnected with
ARC and that she had been referred to [the] Achieving
Independence Center [(hereinafter “AIC”)]. Mother was
ordered to continue to participate and comply with ARC and
AIC. Mother resided with her father at the time of the
hearing. . . .
On October 15, 2012, the [trial] court took notice that
Mother continued to be minimally compliant with the
permanency plan. The [trial] court took notice of [the]
Children’s [father’s] name and that he resided in Africa.
The [trial] court ordered that [Mother’s] agency supervised
[] visits [] may be modified to overnight, prior to the
Children’s next hearing, if appropriate. Liberal supervised
visits in the home of the foster parents were ordered to
stand. . . .
On October 26, 2012, [an] FSP meeting was held. . . .
Mother did not attend this meeting.
On or around January 14, 2013, DHS learned that Mother
was no longer residing in the home of her father and that
she did not have stable housing. Mother was unable to
work on her educational goals due to [her] lack of a stable
residence. On January 14, 2013, the [trial] court ordered
that Mother be referred to the Behavioral Health System for
a consultation or evaluation specifically for grief counseling.
...
On February 4, 2013, [an] FSP meeting was held. The FSP
parental objectives were: to provide adequate and safe
living conditions; to stabilize [Mother’s] mental health
problems; to learn and understand age appropriate behavior
and expectations for [the C]hildren; to maintain
relationship[s] between parent and child through regular
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visitation and participation in placement activities; to obtain
and complete job training and/or seek and maintain
employment; to correct or stabilize physical health, vision,
hearing, or dental problems; and[,] to facilitate reunification
by complying with appropriate services and
recommendations. Mother attended [the FSP meeting and]
signed the FSP. [Father’s] whereabouts were unknown to
DHS.
On April 16, 2013, the [trial] court took notice that Mother
was in moderate compliance with her FSP objectives and
that DHS was willing to give her additional time to complete
her FSP parental objectives. The [trial] court ordered [that]
Mother’s supervised [] visits [were] to continue and that
planned unsupervised visits shall occur in the community;
however, Mother would have to submit a planned activity to
DHS once a week in advance of the visits. The [trial] court
referred Mother to [the Behavioral Health System] for
consultation. . . .
On July 15, 2013, the [trial] court took notice that Mother
was in substantial compliance and ordered her visits to
continue as arranged. DHS was ordered to make outreach
to [the] Children’s father. . . .
On October 7, 2013, the [trial] court took notice that
Mother was in minimal compliance with the permanency
plan. The [trial] court took notice that Mother had visited
[the] Children sporadically. The concurrent plan for the
[C]hildren was adoption. Mother had failed to comply with
her objectives designed to facilitate reunification with her
Children. Mother had failed to visit the Children
consistently. The outcome of the visits depend[ed] entirely
on Mother’s mood. She struggle[d] to concentrate on the
Children when she [did] visit. [At the time,] Mother
reside[d] at Eddy’s House, a nine[-]month program that
assists with housing[,] GED, and employment. Father []
failed to parent the Children. Father’s whereabouts were
unknown to DHS; however, Mother stated that [Father]
reside[d] in Benin, Africa.
[On January 14, 2014, DHS filed petitions to involuntarily
terminate both Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the
Children. With respect to Mother, DHS sought to terminate
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her parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(8) and (b)].
...
The [trial] court found Mother [minimally compliant on her
FSP objectives] in the permanency review hearing[] that
took place [on] January 31, 2014[.]
Trial Court Opinion, 7/23/14, at 1-5 (some internal capitalization omitted).
On April 28, 2014, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on DHS’s
petition to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights. At the hearing,
DHS presented the testimony of Courtney Ransome, its social services
manager assigned to the family. N.T. Hearing, 4/28/14, at 20. DHS also
presented the testimony of Adrianna Garcia, who is employed by Children’s
Choice as the agency caseworker. Id. at 37. Finally, Mother testified on her
own behalf. Id. at 52.
Of note, during the hearing, Mother testified that she is still unable or
unwilling to care for the Children. As Mother testified:
Q: [] And as far as the children are concerned, would it be
your preference today that the children be reunified with
you or that they go to live with their father in Nigeria?
A: Honestly –
Q: What is it you’re looking to have happen?
A: Honestly, I’m not going to sit here and lie. No, I do not
think my children should be with me at this very second
today because at the end of the day, I’m 20. I’m still trying
to get my life together. I’m still trying to finish school. I’m
still trying to maintain the person that I am. I’m still trying
to find me.
N.T. Hearing, 4/28/14, at 71.
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Further, during the hearing, DHS social services manager Courtney
Ransome testified: that Mother has been minimally compliant with her FPS
goals; that “Mother has not made any substantial progress towards
alleviating the circumstances that necessitated the original placement;” that
the Children would not suffer irreparable harm if Mother’s parental rights
were terminated; and, that the Children would suffer serious harm if they
were removed from the foster mother’s home. Id. at 22-23, 26-27, 29, and
50. Children’s Choice caseworker Adrianna Garcia also testified that the
foster mother is willing to adopt the Children and that adoption would be in
the Children’s best interests. Id. at 41.
On April 28, 2014, the trial court entered its decrees involuntarily
terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children pursuant to section
2511(a)(8) and (b), and changing their permanency goal to adoption
pursuant to section 6351 of the Juvenile Act. On May 23, 2014, Mother
timely filed a notice of appeal, along with a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).
In her brief on appeal, Mother raises four issues, as follows.
1. Did the trial court commit an error of law and abuse of
discretion by involuntarily terminating [Mother’s] rights and
changing the goal for [the Children] to adoption where
[DHS] failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
grounds for termination existed under 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a)(8)?
2. Did the trial court commit an error of law and abuse of
discretion by involuntarily terminating [Mother’s] parental
rights and changing the goal for [the Children] to adoption
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where the reasons for termination were environmental
factors beyond [Mother’s] control?
3. Did the trial court commit an error of law and abuse of
discretion by involuntarily terminating [Mother’s] parental
rights and changing the goal for [the Children] to adoption
where [DHS] failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that involuntar[y] termination [of Mother’s]
parental rights would best serve the emotional needs and
welfare of [the Children] under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)?
4. Did the trial court commit an error of law and abuse of
discretion by involuntarily terminating [Mother’s] parental
rights and changing the goal for [the Children] to adoption
without fully considering the impact of termination on the
emotional needs and welfare of [the Children]?
Mother’s Brief at 3-4.2
In her brief, Mother asserts that she is a 20-year-old, single mother
who, without any familial support, remedied all of the conditions that led to
the placement of the Children, except for her housing situation. See
Mother’s Brief at 15. Mother claims that, because of her poverty, she was
unable to remedy her lack of stable housing despite her best efforts. Id.
Mother asserts that her inability to obtain adequate housing was beyond her
control, as she could not maintain permanent and suitable housing despite
her completing the DHS-recommended housing course, residing in the
shelter to which she was referred by AIC, and maintaining employment. Id.
2
We observe that Mother subtly changed the issues from those stated in her
concise statement, but we find that she sufficiently preserved her issues for
our review. Cf. Krebs v. United Ref. Co., 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super.
2006) (holding that any issue not set forth in or suggested by an appellate
brief’s statement of questions involved and concise statement is deemed
waived).
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at 16. Mother urges that the termination is improper, as she has
accumulated savings that will enable her to eventually secure suitable
housing. Id.
Mother alleges that, although the Children were removed from her
care and custody at the age of ten weeks, she has cultivated a strong
emotional bond with them, and has assumed an important role in their lives.
Id. at 15. Mother urges that the Children could benefit from the love,
affection, and support that she can provide them in the future. Id.
Mother also contends that the record lacks clear and convincing
evidence that the termination of her parental rights best serves the needs
and welfare of the Children. Id. at 17. She relates this argument to section
2511(a)(8) and 2511(b). See id.
We review an appeal from the termination of parental rights under the
following standard.
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion
standard when considering a trial court’s determination of a
petition for termination of parental rights. As in
dependency cases, our standard of review requires an
appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility
determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the
record. In re: R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the
factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to
determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused
its discretion. As has been often stated, an abuse of
discretion does not result merely because the reviewing
court might have reached a different conclusion. Instead, a
decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only
upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness,
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.
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As [the Pennsylvania Supreme Court] discussed in R.J.T.,
there are clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion
standard of review in these cases. [The R.J.T. Court]
observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not
equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold
record, where the trial judges are observing the parties
during the relevant hearing and often presiding over
numerous other hearings regarding the child and parents.
Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite
result, as is often the case in dependency and termination
cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second
guess the trial court and impose its own credibility
determinations and judgment; instead [appellate courts]
must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings
are supported by the record and the [trial] court’s legal
conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse
of discretion.
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012) (some internal
quotations omitted).
The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental
rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). We
have explained:
[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined
as testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty[,] and
convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise
facts in issue.”
Id., quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003).
This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the
termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section
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2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en
banc).
In the case at bar, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights
under section 2511(a)(8) and (b). These subsections read:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a
child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:
...
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with
an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the
date of removal or placement, the conditions which led
to the removal or placement of the child continue to
exist and termination of parental rights would best serve
the needs and welfare of the child.
...
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6), or (8), the court shall
not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.
There is no dispute that the Children were out of Mother’s care and
custody for more than twelve months at the time of the hearing, as they
were removed from her care and custody on October 26, 2011, and the
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hearing on the termination petition, filed on January 14, 2014, was held on
April 28, 2014. Thus, as this Court has explained,
[o]nce the 12–month period has been established, the court
must next determine whether the conditions that led to the
child's removal continue to exist, despite the reasonable
good faith efforts of [the agency] supplied over a realistic
time period. Termination under Section 2511(a)(8) does
not require the court to evaluate a parent’s current
willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that initially
caused placement or the availability or efficacy of [the
Agency] services.
In the Interest of K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759-760 (Pa. Super. 2008),
quoting In re Adoption of K.J., 936 A.2d 1128, 1133 (Pa. Super. 2007).
After our careful review of the record in this matter, we find that the
trial court’s credibility and weight determinations are supported by
competent evidence in the record. In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-
827. The trial court properly considered the history of the case, including
Mother’s neglect as a parent to the Children, and her failure to complete the
FSP objectives, particularly the housing, mental health, and visitation
objectives, and determined that she would not remedy her failure to parent.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/23/14, at 8.
The trial court also considered the best interests of the Children under
section 2511(a)(8). The trial court noted that Mother admitted that she was
unwilling or unable to assume her parental duties with regard to the
Children. Trial Court Opinion, 7/23/14, at 8, citing N.T., 4/28/14, at 71.
Mother cannot now shift the blame to DHS for her failure to parent the
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Children. Accordingly, we find that the trial court’s determinations regarding
section 2511(a)(8) are supported by sufficient, competent evidence in the
record.
After we determine that the requirements of section 2511(a) are
satisfied, we proceed to review whether the requirements of subsection (b)
are satisfied. See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa.
Super. 2008) (en banc). This Court has stated that the focus in terminating
parental rights under section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child
pursuant to section 2511(b). Id. at 1008.
In reviewing the evidence in support of termination under section
2511(b), our Supreme Court recently stated as follows.
if the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met,
a court “shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of
the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). The emotional needs
and welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to
include “intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and
stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super. 2012).
In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993), the
Pennsylvania Supreme] Court held that the determination of
the child’s “needs and welfare” requires consideration of the
emotional bonds between the parent and child. The
“utmost attention” should be paid to discerning the effect on
the child of permanently severing the parental bond. In re
K.M., 53 A.3d at 791.
In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (some internal corrections
omitted).
With respect to this issue, the trial court concluded:
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When asked about Mother’s compliance with her FSP
objectives during the life of the case, [the] DHS social
worker described compliance as minimal. In explaining the
reasons for Mother’s level of compliance, [the] DHS [social]
worker testified that[:] Mother’s housing is still unstable[;]
Mother’s mental health [issues have] not been addressed[;]
Mother’s visitation has been inconsistent[; and,] Mother is
not currently attending mental health treatment[] and she
has [historically] been inconsistent with [receiving mental
health treatment]. . . . Mother’s lack of compliance with her
mental health [treatment] constitutes a major concern due
to Mother’s admission of her own current incapability to
assume her parental role and duties. Consequently, the
record clearly establishes that Mother's parental rights were
not solely terminated based on environmental factors. . . .
The testimony of the social workers established that
termination of [Mother’s] parental rights is in the best
interest of the Children. The Children do not depend for
their needs on the biological Mother. Furthermore, the
testimony demonstrates that the Children would not suffer
irreparable harm[] if Mother’s parental rights were
terminated. [The] Children are attached to the[ir] foster
mother because she is the primary caretaker that has been
with them since the Children were placed in care. [The]
Children did cry for their foster mother, the first time they
were left in day care. No maternal bond exists with
Children’s biological Mother as the[ Children] do not seek
her to satisfy their needs and the Children do not refer to
her as “Mother” during visitations. In one of the last visits,
[the] Children did cry and were a bit sad when Mother left
but they did not cry for [very] long. In previous visits,
before leaving, [the] Children hugged their biological Mother
and then went back to what they were doing before she left.
[The] Children recognize Mother to play, but not to be the
primary caregiver. There is a bond, but it is not a
parent/child bond. The foster [m]other has a strong
influence on the Children and provides for all their needs.
[Further, during the April 28, 2014 termination of parental
rights hearing, Children’s Choice caseworker Adrianna
Garcia testified that the foster mother is willing to adopt the
Children and that the adoption would be in the Children’s
best interests]. . . .
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The trial court determined that the testimony from DHS and
agency workers was credible. Consequently, the court
found it to be in the best interest of the Children to change
the goal to adoption, and the bond between Mother and
Children can be severed without irreparable harm.
For the aforementioned reasons, the [trial] court finds that
DHS met its statutory burden by clear and convincing
evidence to terminate the parental rights of Mother
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a) (8) and (b). The court
also finds that it will not cause irreparable harm to the
Children to sever any bond, and it is in the best interest of
the Children since it would best serve their emotional needs
and welfare.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/23/14, at 8-10 (internal record citations omitted).
The trial court found that the foster mother, not Mother, has provided
for the Children’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare,
and that Mother will not be able to provide for their needs. Trial Court
Opinion, 7/23/14, at 9. Further, there was sufficient, competent evidence
from which the trial court properly found that the Children’s primary
attachment is with the foster mother, and there is no parental bond between
the Children and Mother. Id. We have stated that, in conducting a bonding
analysis, the court is not required to use expert testimony, but may rely on
the testimony of social workers and caseworkers. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d
1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010). This Court has observed that no bond worth
preserving is formed between a child and a natural parent where the child
has been in foster care for most of the child’s life, and the resulting bond
with the natural parent is attenuated. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 764 (Pa.
Super. 2008).
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A parent’s own feelings of love and affection for a child, alone, will not
preclude termination of parental rights. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. We
stated in In re Z.P., a child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold in the hope
that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of
parenting.” Id. at 1125. Rather, “a parent’s basic constitutional right to the
custody and rearing of [her] child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill []
her parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting and
fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe
environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004).
As there is competent evidence in the record that supports the trial
court’s credibility and weight assessments regarding the Children’s needs
and welfare, and the absence of any positive bond with Mother that, if
severed, would cause the Children to be irreparably harmed, we conclude
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Mother’s
parental rights to the Children with regard to section 2511(b). See In re
Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27. Accordingly, we affirm the
termination decrees and the goal change orders.3
Decrees and orders affirmed.
3
Mother does not support her contention regarding the change of
permanency goal to adoption with any discussion or citation to statutory or
case law. Mother has thus waived any challenge to the change of goal to
adoption. See In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2011) (“where
an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to
relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful
fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.”).
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/26/2015
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