UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4571
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DOUGLAS THOMAS, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Lynchburg. Norman K. Moon, Senior
District Judge. (6:13-cr-00009-NKM-1)
Submitted: January 30, 2015 Decided: February 11, 2015
Before WYNN, DIAZ, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Larry W. Shelton, Federal Public Defender, Christine Madeleine
Lee, Research and Writing Attorney, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant. Timothy J. Heaphy,
United States Attorney, Charlene R. Day, Assistant United States
Attorney, Christopher R. Wilson, Third Year Law Student,
Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Douglas Thomas, Jr., appeals the district court’s
judgment revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to
five months’ imprisonment and four years’ supervised release.
Thomas contends that the imposition of an additional term of
supervised release is substantively unreasonable because he has
shown himself to be unable to comply with the terms of his
supervised release. Finding no error, we affirm.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a
sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United States
v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). A revocation
sentence that is both within the applicable statutory maximum
and not “plainly unreasonable” will be affirmed on appeal.
United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437-38 (4th Cir. 2006).
In conducting this review, we assess the sentence for
reasonableness, utilizing “the procedural and substantive
considerations” employed in evaluating an original criminal
sentence. Id. at 438. A revocation sentence is substantively
reasonable if the district court states a proper basis for
concluding that the defendant should receive the sentence
imposed, up to the statutory maximum. Id. at 440. Only if a
sentence is found procedurally or substantively unreasonable
will we “then decide whether the sentence is plainly
unreasonable.” Id. at 439.
2
We find that Thomas’s past failure to comply with the
conditions of supervised release does not render the district
court’s imposition of an additional term of supervised release
substantively unreasonable. Cf. id. at 440 (holding that
defendant’s “admitted pattern of violating numerous conditions
of his supervised release” justified more severe sentence). To
the extent Thomas argues that it is impossible for him to comply
with the terms of supervised release by refraining from using
marijuana, the record does not support this contention,
especially in view of the evidence that Thomas has never
earnestly participated in substance abuse treatment.
Accordingly, we find that Thomas’s sentence is substantively
reasonable.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
3