14-842
Velazco v. Columbus Citizens
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
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August Term, 2014
(Submitted: January 14, 2015 Decided: February 13, 2015)
Docket No. 14-842
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HUGO VELAZCO,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
—v.—
COLUMBUS CITIZENS FOUNDATION, JOHN BODEN, an individual,
Defendants – Appellees,
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B e f o r e:
KATZMANN, Chief Judge, KEARSE and RAGGI, Circuit Judges.
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Appeal from a district court’s judgment (Daniels, J.), granting summary
judgment in defendants’ favor on plaintiff’s claims for age discrimination under,
inter alia, the New York City Human Rights Law (‚NYCHRL‛), N.Y.C. Admin.
Code § 8-101 et seq. We conclude that the district court failed to separately and
independently analyze plaintiff’s NYCHRL claim. We therefore VACATE that
portion of the district court’s judgment and REMAND for further proceedings
consistent with this Opinion.
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Michael J. Borrelli, Alexander T. Coleman, Jeffrey R. Maguire, Borrelli
& Associates, P.L.L.C., Great Neck, New York, for Plaintiff-
Appellant.
Michael A. Miranda, Miranda Sambursky Sloane Sklarin Verveniotis
LLP, Mineola, New York, for Defendants-Appellees.
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PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff-Appellant Hugo Velazco appeals from an award of summary
judgment entered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York (Daniels, J.), on February 24, 2014, in defendants’ favor on Velazco’s
claims of age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(‚ADEA‛), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634, and the New York City Human Rights Law
(‚NYCHRL‛), N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-101 et seq. We affirm the ADEA portion of
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the judgment in a separate summary order. We write here to reiterate that district
courts who exercise pendent jurisdiction over NYCHRL claims are required by
the Local Civil Rights Restoration Act of 2005 (‚Restoration Act‛), N.Y.C. Local L.
No. 85, to analyze those claims under a different standard from that applicable to
parallel federal and state law claims. Because the district court did not analyze
Velazco’s NYCHRL claim separately and independently, we vacate the NYCHRL
portion of the judgment and remand to the district court for further proceedings
consistent with this Opinion.
DISCUSSION
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, drawing
all reasonable factual inferences in the non-moving party’s favor, here, Velazco.
See, e.g., Wrobel v. Cnty. of Erie, 692 F.3d 22, 27 (2d Cir. 2012).
We have previously explained that for many years, the NYCHRL was
construed ‚to be coextensive with its federal and state counterparts.‛ Mihalik v.
Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 108 (2d Cir. 2013). But in 2005,
the New York City Council passed the Restoration Act, which amended the
NYCHRL. Id. at 109. Specifically, the Restoration Act created ‚two new rules of
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construction.‛ See id. First, it explicitly created a one-way ratchet, by which
‚*i]nterpretations of New York state or federal statutes with similar wording may
be used to aid in interpret[ing+‛ the NYCHRL, insofar as ‚similarly worded
provisions of federal and state civil rights laws [would constitute] a floor below
which the [NYCHRL] cannot fall.‚ Restoration Act § 1; see Loeffler v. Staten Island
Univ. Hosp., 582 F.3d 268, 278 (2d Cir. 2009). Second, it amended the NYCHRL to
require a liberal construction of its amendments ‚for the accomplishment of the
*NYCHRL’s+ uniquely broad and remedial purposes . . . , regardless of whether
federal or New York State civil and human rights laws, including those laws with
provisions comparably-worded to provisions of [the NYCHRL], have been so
construed.‛ Restoration Act § 7 (amending N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8–130).
Thus, ‚*i+n amending the NYCHRL, the City Council expressed . . . that the
NYCHRL had been ‘construed too narrowly’ and therefore ‘underscore*d+ that
the provisions of [the NYCHRL] are to be construed independently from similar
or identical provisions of New York state or federal statutes.’‛ Mihalik, 715 F.3d at
109 (second alteration in the original) (quoting Restoration Act § 1); see also Albunio
v. City of N.Y., 16 N.Y.3d 472, 477 (2011) (recognizing that the Restoration Act
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requires courts to construe the NYCHRL ‚broadly in favor of discrimination
plaintiffs‛); Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 61 A.D. 3d 62, 67 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009)
(‚[T]he Restoration Act notified courts that . . . all provisions of the [NYCHRL]
required independent construction to accomplish the law’s uniquely broad
purposes . . . .‛) (emphasis in the original). We have therefore held that
‚[p]ursuant to these revisions, courts must analyze NYCHRL claims separately
and independently from any federal and state law claims.‛ Mihalik, 715 F.3d at
109. Indeed, ‚even if the challenged conduct is not actionable under federal and
state law, federal courts must consider separately whether it is actionable under
the broader New York City standards.‛ Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 109.
Of course, a federal court need not undertake such a review of a NYCHRL
claim if, after disposition of the parallel federal claim, it declines to exercise
pendent jurisdiction. But the district court did not choose this route, instead
ruling that plaintiff’s NYCHRL claim failed as a matter of law. Such a decision
could only be made by undertaking the independent analysis required by the
Restoration Act, which the district court failed to do here.
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In urging otherwise, defendants maintain that the district court effectively
applied the NYCHRL standard when, in granting summary judgment, it found
that the plaintiff’s age was not a motivating factor in the decision to terminate
him. We do not think the district court spoke with sufficient clarity, however, as
to whether the evidence was insufficient to support any causal link between age
bias and plaintiff’s firing, as required by the NYCHRL, see Bennett v. Health Mgmt.
Sys., Inc., 936 N.Y.S.2d 112, 120 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (‚It is not uncommon for
covered entities to have multiple or mixed motives for their action, and the
*NYCHRL+ proscribes such ‘partial’ discrimination . . . .‛), or whether the
evidence was simply insufficient to support the but-for causation required by the
ADEA, see Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs. , Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177–78 (2009). In sum,
because we cannot confidently conclude that the district court analyzed plaintiff’s
NYCHRL claim under the standard applicable thereto, we must vacate the
portion of the district court’s judgment related to the plaintiff’s NYCHRL claim.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is VACATED in part and
REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
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