DLD-104 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 14-2688
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
DUMONT BUSH,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Crim. No. 2-95-cr-00407-006)
District Judge: Honorable James Knoll Gardner
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal due to Untimeliness
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
February 5, 2015
Before: FISHER, SHWARTZ and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: February 13, 2015)
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OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Dumont Bush appeals the District Court’s order denying his motion filed pursuant
to Fed. R. Crim. P. 36. For the reasons below, we will summarily affirm the District
Court’s order.
In 1996, Bush was convicted of bank robbery and conspiracy. He was sentenced
to 210 months in prison. We affirmed his conviction and sentence on appeal. See United
States v. Bush, 151 F.3d 1027 (3d Cir. 1998) (table). In December 2012, Bush filed a
motion to correct a clerical error pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. R. 36. By order entered
December 12, 2013, the District Court denied the Rule 36 motion as moot. On January
31, 2014, Bush filed a “Motion to Reinstate Deadline to File Notice of Appeal,” and on
March 5th, he filed a “Motion to File Notice of Appeal.” Citing Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(5)(a), the District Court granted the “Motion to Reinstate” and gave Bush until May
14th to file his notice of appeal. Bush filed a notice of appeal dated May 5th. The parties
were notified that the appeal might be dismissed because the notice of appeal was
untimely filed.
Bush’s motion was filed pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 36. Thus, the time to appeal
is governed by Fed. R. App. P. 4(b) which provides that an appeal must be filed with the
district court within fourteen days of the entry of the judgment or order being appealed.
See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i). Bush’s notice of appeal was dated May 5, 2014, more
than fourteen days after entry of the District Court’s December 12, 2013 order denying
his Rule 36 motion. However, the deadline is not jurisdictional and may be waived if the
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Government does not invoke it. United States v. Muhammad, 701 F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir.
2012). Here, the Government has failed to raise the issue. Thus, we will not dismiss the
appeal as untimely.
Under Rule 36, a District Court may correct a clerical error in a judgment at any
time. Bush argued that the District Court “erred in failing to adhere to it’s [sic] oral
pronouncement which contradicts the time and placement of defendant in federal
custody.” He contended that “[t]he absence of a reference in Mr. Bush’s judgment
concerning whether Mr. Bush was to receive credit for being in federal custody
constitutes a clerical error pursuant to Rule 36.” He requested that the District Court
amend its judgment to recommend that he receive credit for being in custody since 1996.
Bush submitted a copy of his criminal judgment in which the District Court noted
that “[Bush] is to receive credit for all federal time served in custody pending disposition
of this case.” Thus, the criminal judgment does include a statement on Bush’s credit for
time served in federal custody. Bush does not point to any oral announcement at
sentencing which conflicts with the written judgment. Rather, he appears to believe that
a discussion at a pre-trial hearing in 1996 about his transfer to federal custody after
serving a state sentence conflicts with his criminal judgment. The alleged error here does
not involve a failure to accurately record an action or statement by the District Court.
See United States v. Bennett, 423 F.3d 271, 277-78 (3d Cir. 2005). Because there was no
clerical error to be corrected, the District Court did not err in denying Bush’s Rule 36
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motion. Moreover, as noted by the District Court, it is the Bureau of Prisons which has
the authority to calculate the credit that defendants receive for detention before
sentencing, not the District Court. See United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333
(1992).
Summary action is appropriate if there is no substantial question presented in the
appeal. See Third Circuit LAR 27.4. For the above reasons, as well as those set forth by
the District Court, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order. See Third Circuit
I.O.P. 10.6.
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