IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-1813
Filed February 25, 2015
IN THE INTEREST OF M.S.,
Minor Child,
E.S., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Union County, Monty Franklin,
District Associate Judge.
A mother challenges the juvenile court’s termination of her parental rights
to her child. AFFIRMED.
Karen K. Emerson Peters, Atlantic, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Janet L. Hoffman, Assistant Attorney
General, and Timothy R. Kenyon, County Attorney, for appellee State.
Tamara Knight, West Des Moines, attorney and guardian ad litem for
minor child.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Potterfield and Bower, JJ.
2
POTTERFIELD, J.
A mother challenges the juvenile court’s termination of her parental rights
to her child.1
I. Background
The child was removed from the mother’s custody in January 2013 due to
the mother’s substance abuse and mental health issues. The mother also had
taken in a paramour who had a history of criminal activity, substance abuse, and
violence. Even after the child was removed from the mother’s custody, she
allowed the paramour to continue to reside with her. She failed to complete
treatment services offered to her. The last time she visited her child in person
was in July 2013.
The mother was arrested on drug charges in August 2013 and
incarcerated until December 2013. In January 2014, she completed a substance
abuse program but continued to use drugs. She was arrested again in February
and entered a residential treatment program in May.
The State petitioned to terminate the mother’s rights in the child on June
10, 2014. The juvenile court terminated her rights on October 23, 2014, citing
four different statutory bases supporting its ruling.2 The mother now appeals,
challenging each of the four bases. We may affirm the termination order if we
find any one of the four grounds relied upon is supported by clear and convincing
evidence. In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010).
1
The State did not petition to terminate the parental rights of the father, who did not
participate in the termination proceedings. The court found the father’s health conditions
prevented him from being considered a placement option.
2
The juvenile court relied on Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(b), (e), (f), and (l) (2013).
3
II. Standard of Review
We review the juvenile court’s termination order de novo. In re A.M., 843
N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2014).
III. Discussion
The mother challenges the juvenile court’s statutory grounds for
terminating her rights. “We will uphold an order terminating parental rights if
there is clear and convincing evidence of grounds for termination.” D.W., 791
N.W.2d at 706. “Evidence is ‘clear and convincing’ when there are no serious or
substantial doubts as to the correctness [of] conclusions of law drawn from the
evidence.” Id.
One of the statutory grounds relied upon by the juvenile court was Iowa
Code section 232.116(1)(e).3 The mother claims the juvenile court cannot rely
on this provision to support termination of her parental rights because she “made
reasonable efforts to resume care of the child by participating in services when
she was available to do so.” The record belies this claim.
When she first began utilizing services in 2013, the mother failed to
complete her substance abuse program due to constant absences. She
3
Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) provides:
. . . [T]he court may order the termination of both the parental
rights with respect to a child and the relationship between the parents and
the child [if] . . . [t]he court finds that all of the following have occurred:
(1) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance
pursuant to section 232.96.
(2) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the
child’s parents for a period of at least six consecutive months.
(3) There is clear and convincing evidence that the parents have
not maintained significant and meaningful contact with the child during the
previous six consecutive months and have made no reasonable efforts to
resume care of the child despite being given the opportunity to do so.
4
restarted the program but failed to complete it again because she was arrested
on felony drug charges. Though she completed an inpatient treatment program
in January 2014, it later came to light that she had continued to use marijuana
while in the program. On May 16, 2014, she entered a residential treatment
program at House of Mercy. As the juvenile court specially noted, the mother
indicated she only entered the program because she was required to do so as a
condition of her probation—not because she desired to work toward resuming
care of her child.
The mother’s participation in services has been inconsistent, begrudging,
and not motivated by her relationship with her child. The juvenile court rightly
found there is clear and convincing evidence the mother has made no
reasonable efforts to resume care of the child despite being given the opportunity
to do so. It is uncontested that the remaining requirements of section
232.116(1)(e) are satisfied. We therefore affirm the juvenile court’s reliance on
section 232.116(1)(e) in its termination order.
In addition to our review of the statutory grounds for termination, on our de
novo review, we must next consider whether termination was in the best interests
of the child as defined in Iowa Code section 232.116(2). See In re P.L., 778
N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). We then determine whether the factors in section
232.116(3) mitigate the need to terminate. Id.
We affirm the juvenile court’s findings that termination is in the best
interest of the child. In making that determination, we “give primary consideration
to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing
5
and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and
needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2).
The record shows the child, who is twelve years old, is doing well in his
current placement. It would be against his long-term growth and benefit to have
him uprooted from that placement and join his mother in a residential treatment
program. As the juvenile court noted, the child “has lost all trust in [the mother]
as a mother and as an adult that can appropriately provide for his safety and
welfare. He states that he doesn’t want to live with [the mother] and, in fact,
wants no contact with her at all.” The mental and emotional condition and needs
of the child will be best served by terminating the mother’s parental rights and
allowing the child to move forward in his current placement.
Lastly, we affirm the district court’s finding that none of factors weighing
against termination found in Iowa Code section 232.116(3) are controlling on the
facts of this case. Though it is true the child is currently in the care of a relative,
the child’s expressed desire to be separated from his mother demonstrates there
is no closeness in the parent-child relationship that would be harmed by
termination. See id. § 232.116(3)(a), (3)(c). Because the requirements of Iowa
Code section 232.116(1)(e) are satisfied, termination is in the best interests of
the child, and none of the mitigating factors overcome our best-interests
determination, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.