IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
January 2015 Term FILED
_______________ February 26, 2015
released at 3:00 p.m.
RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
No. 14-0219 OF WEST VIRGINIA
_______________
DANIEL ALLEN WEATHERHOLT AND
ANITA DENICE WEATHERHOLT,
Defendants Below, Petitioners
v.
JEFFREY NEAL WEATHERHOLT,
Plaintiff Below, Respondent
____________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Hardy County
Honorable H. Charles Carl, III, Judge
Civil Action No. 13-C-52
AFFIRMED
____________________________________________________________
Submitted: January 27, 2015
Filed: February 26, 2015
Jason R. Sites, Esq. J. David Judy, III, Esq.
Sites Law Firm, PLLC Judy & Judy
Keyser, West Virginia Moorefield, West Virginia
Attorney for Petitioners Attorney for Respondent
JUSTICE BENJAMIN delivered the Opinion of the Court.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. “Unless an absolute right to injunctive relief is conferred by statute,
the power to grant or refuse or to modify, continue, or dissolve a temporary or a
permanent injunction, whether preventive or mandatory in character, ordinarily rests in
the sound discretion of the trial court, according to the facts and the circumstances of the
particular case; and its action in the exercise of its discretion will not be disturbed on
appeal in the absence of a clear showing of an abuse of such discretion.” Syl. pt. 11,
Stuart v. Realty Corp., 141 W. Va. 627, 92 S.E.2d 891 (1956).
2. “In reviewing challenges to findings and rulings made by a circuit
court . . . we review the circuit court’s underlying factual findings under a clearly
erroneous standard. Questions of law are subject to a de novo review.” Syl. pt. 3, in part,
State v. Vance, 207 W. Va. 640, 535 S.E.2d 484 (2000).
3. “A court of equity has jurisdiction, by injunction, to prevent a
continuing material interference with an easement.” Syl. pt. 4, Johnson v. Gould, 60 W.
Va. 84, 53 S.E. 798 (1906).
4. “Since equitable issues are generally determined by a court without a
jury, one is not entitled, as a matter of right under the law, to a jury trial of such issues. . .
i
.” Syl. pt. 1, in part, Human Rights Comm’n v. Tenpin Lounge, 158 W. Va. 349, 211
S.E.2d 349 (1974).
5. “Where already, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution,
equity exercised jurisdiction in a certain matter, the provision of the Constitution
guaranteeing trial by jury does not relate to or give right to trial by jury in suits in quity
involving such matter.” Syl. pt. 7, Davis v. Settle, 43 W. Va. 17, 26 S.E. 557 (1896).
6. “A person claiming a prescriptive easement must prove each of the
following elements: (1) the adverse use of another’s land; (2) that the adverse use was
continuous and uninterrupted for at least ten years; (3) that the adverse use was actually
known to the owner of the land, or so open, notorious and visible that a reasonable owner
of the land would have noticed the use; and (4) the reasonably identified starting point,
ending point, line, and width of the land that was adversely used, and the manner or
purpose for which the land was adversely used.” Syl. pt. 1, O’Dell v. Stegall, 226 W. Va.
590, 703 S.E.2d 561 (2010).
7. “In the context of prescriptive easements, an “adverse use” of land is
a wrongful use, made without the express or implied permission of the owner of the land.
An “adverse use” is one that creates a cause of action by the owner against the person
claiming the prescriptive easement; no prescriptive easement may be created unless the
person claiming the easement proves that the owner could have prevented the wrongful
ii
use by resorting to the law.” Syl. pt. 5, O’Dell v. Stegall, 226 W. Va. 590, 703 S.E.2d 561
(2010).
iii
Benjamin, Justice:
Petitioners Daniel and Anita Weatherholt appeal the January 15, 2014,
order of the Circuit Court of Hardy County that granted injunctive relief to the plaintiff
below and respondent herein, Jeffrey Weatherholt. The order prohibited the petitioners
from placing any obstructions in the respondent’s right-of-way and concluded that the
current location of the respondent’s water line is an appurtenant prescriptive easement
through the petitioners’ property. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the circuit
court’s order.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The petitioners, Daniel Weatherholt and his wife Denice Weatherholt, are
the owners of a tract of real estate on which they reside in Hardy County which is located
just off of a public road known as Frosty Hollow Road. The petitioners acquired this land
in 2001 from Daniel Weatherholt’s grandmother, Ruth Barr. Daniel Weatherholt’s
parents, Otis and Bette Weatherholt, live on a tract of real estate beside the petitioners.
Daniel Weatherholt’s brother, Respondent Jeffrey Weatherholt, lives on real estate
located on the other side of Otis and Bette Weatherholt.
The parties stipulated that a 20-foot wide right-of-way exists from Frosty
Hollow Road, across the petitioners’ property, across the property of Otis and Bette
Weatherholt, to the respondent’s property. The parties also stipulated that a 12-foot wide
utility easement was deeded to the respondent and exists on the east side of the 20-foot
1
wide right-of-way.1 The parties generally have agreed that the 20-foot wide right-of-way
is ten feet from either side of the centerline of the existing paved roadway that runs from
Frosty Hollow road to the respondent’s property.2 The paved roadway is about 12 feet
wide which means that approximately four feet on either side of the paved roadway is
within the 20-foot wide right-of-way.
In July 2013, Respondent Jeffrey Weatherholt filed a complaint against
Petitioners Daniel and Denice Weatherholt in the Circuit Court of Hardy County in which
he alleged that
[t]he [petitioners] have cause [sic] to be constructed certain
impediments and obstructions within the right of way and on
the paved roadway which provides deeded access to the
property of your [respondent], including having nailed
wooden boards into the pavement as purported speed barriers;
constructing buildings which have doors that open on the
access right of way of the [respondent]; leaving childrens’
toys within the right of way; constructing a flower garden and
rock garden within the right of way; placing wooden barriers
and firewood within the right of way; digging holes in the dirt
along the edge of the roadway; and parking equipment in the
right of way, all intentionally calculated to interfere with the
open access granted to your [respondent] for access to his real
estate as noted within his Deed.
1
Respondent Jeffrey Weatherholt acquired his property by deed from his
grandmother, Ruth Barr, in 1998. The deed expressly grants to the respondent a 20-foot
wide right-of-way, running from Frosty Hollow Road to the respondent’s property, and a
12-foot utility easement.
2
The parties do not agree that the right-of-way is ten feet from the center line of
the paved roadway at the entrance to the petitioners’ property from Frosty Hollow Road
and in the area of a rock garden placed by the petitioners near their home. These
disagreements, however, are not pertinent to this appeal.
2
Your [respondent] has approached the [petitioners] on
numerous occasions in an effort to have the obstructions and
restrictions in and on the roadway and rights of way removed
to allow free and open access contemplated within the Deed
of the [respondent]. The [petitioners] have refused to remove
the barriers placed within the right of way, including refusing
to remove the two (2) wooden “speed bumps” which have
nails protruding within the paved roadway. . .
The respondent sought a permanent injunction against the placement of impediments in
the right-of-way.
In their answer to the complaint, the petitioners included a counterclaim in
which they alleged the following: the respondent had caused or permitted to be
constructed a water line serving the respondent’s residence that crosses the petitioners’
property; the location of the water line is not within the utility easement owned by the
respondent; the impermissible placement of the water line constitutes a trespass; and as a
result of the trespass, the respondents have suffered injury in the loss of value to their
property and nuisance.
The circuit court originally granted a temporary injunction against the
petitioners regarding impediments in the respondents’ right-of-way. Subsequently, after a
bench trial, the circuit court entered a January 15, 2014, judgment order. Regarding the
20-foot wide right-of-way, the circuit court found as follows:
[T]he [petitioners] have constructed, caused, allowed and
permitted to be placed and remain, as constant obstructions
within the bounds of the twenty feet (20′) wide access right of
way, certain obstructions and hazards, including but not
limited to boards with nails protruding to serve as “speed
bumps” and children’s toys and equipment.
3
The [petitioners] further constructed and/or placed two
wooden out-buildings along the west side of the access right
of way. Although not constructed within the bounds of the
twenty feet (20′) wide easement, the doors of the buildings do
open into the bounds of the right of way, the doors swing
open into the access right of way, and persons utilizing the
two buildings must stand within the bounds of the right of
way to gain entry and exit into the buildings.
The Court further finds that all of the obstructions and
hazards as described . . . above, with the exception of the
wooden speed bumps, have been and are “habitual” in
occurrence and nature. Although not making the driveway
completely impassable, the obstructions are so close to the
twelve feet (12′) wide paved roadway so as to have made
passage inconvenient and at times unsafe for both [respondent
and petitioners] (citations to record omitted).
Accordingly, the circuit court permanently enjoined the petitioners from placing any
impediments or obstructions within the entirety of the 20-foot right-of-way.
Regarding the placement of the respondent’s water line across the
petitioners’ property, the circuit court found as follows:
[T]he [respondent] has proven by clear and convincing
evidence that he has a prescriptive easement with regard to
the water line. [Respondent] testified that the water line was
placed in 1998 or 1999. Otis Weatherholt [Petitioner Daniel
Weatherholt’s and Respondent Jeffrey Weatherholt’s father]
testified that he assisted and participated in the construction
of the water line and [Petitioner] Daniel Weatherholt testified
that he knew of the existence of the water line in its current
location prior to constructing his home in 2001. The Court
finds there was no evidence of permission having been asked
or received by the [respondent] from Ruth M. Barr, the owner
of the property prior to [petitioners], with regard to the
location of the water line. In fact, [respondent] testified that
he had the water line installed before he told his grandmother
about it and that he never asked her for permission to put the
water line in its current location.
4
Finally, the circuit court found that despite the fact that the petitioners had
actual notice of the water line from 2001 through the date of the filing of their
counterclaim in 2013, they made no objection to the water line’s location but rather
acquiesced to its location. Accordingly, the court concluded that the respondent has a
prescriptive easement appurtenant to his real estate for the location of the water line.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The petitioners challenge the circuit court’s grant of an injunction in favor
of the respondent and the circuit court’s finding that the location of the respondent’s
water line through the petitioners’ property constitutes a prescriptive easement.
Regarding our standard of reviewing the grant of a permanent injunction, this Court has
held:
Unless an absolute right to injunctive relief is
conferred by statute, the power to grant or refuse or to
modify, continue, or dissolve a temporary or a permanent
injunction, whether preventive or mandatory in character,
ordinarily rests in the sound discretion of the trial court,
according to the facts and the circumstances of the particular
case; and its action in the exercise of its discretion will not be
disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear showing of an
abuse of such discretion.
Syl. pt. 11, Stuart v. Realty Corp., 141 W. Va. 627, 92 S.E.2d 891 (1956). Further, “[i]n
reviewing challenges to findings and rulings made by a circuit court . . . we review the
circuit court’s underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard. Questions
of law are subject to a de novo review.” Syl. pt. 3, in part, State v. Vance, 207 W. Va.
5
640, 535 S.E.2d 484 (2000). With these standards to guide us, we now consider the
petitioners’ assignments of error.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Jury Trial Issue
In their first assignment of error, the petitioners argue that the circuit court
erred in denying their timely request for a jury trial.
The record indicates that in their answer the petitioners requested a jury on
both the respondent’s request for a permanent injunction and on the petitioner’s
counterclaim for trespass and nuisance arising from the placement of the respondent’s
water line. In a pre-trial hearing, the circuit court informed the petitioners that they were
not entitled to a jury trial on these issues. However, immediately before the start of the
bench trial, the circuit court revisited the jury trial issue and indicated that the petitioners
were entitled to a jury trial on their counterclaim. The court further indicated that the
petitioners could have a jury trial on their counterclaim separately from the trial on the
respondent’s request for a permanent injunction or they could proceed to have both
matters decided that day in a bench trial. Counsel for the petitioners indicated that “we’re
prepared to submit all claims to the Court in a trial before the Court today. . . . This case,
far more than most litigation, has been very emotionally taxing on the family and it needs
to be resolved.” Accordingly, both matters, the permanent injunction and the
counterclaim, were heard and decided in a bench trial.
6
In the petitioners’ first argument on the jury trial issue, they aver that the
circuit court erred in denying them a jury trial on the permanent injunction issue. The
petitioners are incorrect. Generally, there is no right to a jury trial in a proceeding in
which a permanent injunction is sought. This is because at common law, a proceeding in
which a permanent injunction was sought was heard in a court of equity, and there is no
right to a jury trial in a matter traditionally heard at equity. It has long been the law of this
State that “[a] court of equity has jurisdiction, by injunction, to prevent a continuing
material interference with an easement.” Syl. pt. 4, Johnson v. Gould, 60 W. Va. 84, 53
S.E. 798 (1906). Further, “[s]ince equitable issues are generally determined by a court
without a jury, one is not entitled, as a matter of right under the law, to a jury trial of such
issues. . . .” Syl. pt. 1, in part, Human Rights Comm’n v. Tenpin Lounge, 158 W. Va. 349,
211 S.E.2d 349 (1974). In addition, this Court has indicated that “[w]here already, at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution, equity exercised jurisdiction in a certain matter,
the provision of the Constitution guarantying trial by jury does not relate to or give right
to trial by jury in suits in equity involving such matter.” Syl. pt. 7, Davis v. Settle, 43 W.
Va. 17, 26 S.E. 557 (1896); see also Bishop Coal Co. v. Salyers, 181 W. Va. 71, 77, 380
S.E.2d 238, 244 (1989) (“Suits in equity were tried without juries.”); Marthens v. B & O
Railroad Co., 170 W. Va. 33, 38 n. 2, 289 S.E.2d 706, 712 n. 2 (1982) (“[T]hose issues
heretofore decided in equity should today be tried to the judge alone.”). Finally, as noted
above, “the power to grant or refuse . . . a permanent injunction . . . ordinarily rests in the
sound discretion of the trial court [not a jury], according to the facts and the
circumstances of the particular case. . . .” Syl. pt. 11, Stuart, 141 W. Va. 627, 92 S.E.2d
7
891. Therefore, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in denying the petitioners a
jury trial on the respondent’s suit for a permanent injunction.
Regarding the petitioners’ request for a jury trial on their counterclaim for
trespass and nuisance, the petitioners concede that they waived their right to a jury trial
but they assert that the waiver is invalid because it was made under duress. This Court
finds no merit to this assertion because the petitioners have presented no evidence
whatsoever of duress that would invalidate a waiver of the right to a jury trial.3 Therefore,
we reject the petitioners’ argument that they were wrongfully denied a trial on their
counterclaim for trespass and nuisance.
B. Propriety of Granting Permanent Injunction
The second assignment of error raised by the petitioners is that the circuit
court erred in granting a permanent injunction to the respondent that enjoins the
petitioners from placing any obstructions within the respondent’s 20-foot wide right-of
3
The petitioners also assert as part of this assignment of error that the complaint
and counterclaim were so closely joined that it was compulsory that they be tried
together. In addition, they complain that Respondent Jeffrey Weatherholt is a law clerk to
another judge in the same circuit as the judge who presided in the instant case. We
decline to address these arguments because they constitute nothing more than
unsupported assertions. “Typically, this Court will not address issues that have not been
properly briefed.” State v. White, 228 W. Va. 530, 541 n. 9, 722 S.E.2d 566, 577 n. 9
(2011). Indeed, we have reiterated that “casual mention of an issue in a brief is cursory
treatment insufficient to preserve the issue on appeal.” State v. Lilly, 194 W. Va. 595, 605
n. 16, 461 S.E.2d 101, 111 n. 16 (1995) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Finally, we have indicated that “a skeletal argument, really nothing more than an
assertion, does not preserve a claim.” State Dep’t. v. Robert Morris N., 195 W. Va. 759,
765, 466 S.E.2d 827, 833 (1995) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
8
way. Specifically, the petitioners challenge the circuit court’s finding that the location of
children’s toys and the open doors of outbuildings into the easement were “habitual.” The
petitioners further dispute the circuit court’s finding that the toys located in the unpaved
portion of the right-of-way were inconvenient and unsafe. According to the petitioners,
the toys and outbuilding doors did not constitute obstructions because they were not
within the 12-foot paved portion of the easement in which the respondent traveled.
We find no merit to this assignment of error. It is undisputed that the 20
foot right-of-way expressly was conveyed to the respondent by deed. In addition, the
parties generally agreed that the 20-foot right-of-way is located ten feet from either side
of the centerline of the paved portion of the right-of-way.4 The respondent presented
testimony that the petitioners erected outbuildings at the edge of the unpaved portion of
the right-of-way, and that when the outbuilding doors are open they obstruct a portion of
the unpaved portion of the right-of-way. The respondent also testified that specific toys
were placed in the unpaved portion of the right-of-way and that these toys remained in
the right-of-way for a period of months. Finally, the respondent presented several
photographs in support of his testimony. In light of this evidence, we find no error in the
circuit court’s finding that the outbuilding doors and toys constituted a continuing
material interference with the respondent’s use of the right-of-way. Although these
obstructions were not placed within the paved portion of the right-of-way, the petitioner
expressly was granted a right-of-way 20 feet in width, and he has the right to the
4
See supra n. 2.
9
convenient use of the entire width of the right-of-way. Accordingly, we conclude that the
circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting the respondent a permanent
injunction enjoining the petitioners from placing any obstructions within the respondent’s
right-of-way.
As part of this assignment of error, the petitioners also challenge the denial
of their request that permanent speed bumps be placed on the respondent’s right-of-way.
The circuit court found in regard to this issue:
The primary complaint of [petitioners] and Otis and Bette
Weatherholt were for the potential safety of the [Petitioners’]
children, ages 15, 11, and 7, while playing in and alongside
the roadway. However, no evidence was offered at trial that
demonstrated that any of [petitioners’] children were ever in
danger by anyone traveling on the right of way, and the
concerns expressed were general in nature. . . . No accidents
or injuries have resulted from this use of the right of way.
The petitioners fail to cite to any evidence in the record that contradicts the circuit court’s
findings on this issue. Therefore, we find no error in the circuit court’s findings.5
C. Respondent’s Water Line As A Prescriptive Easement
5
In addition, the petitioners set forth the following contentions in support of this
assignment of error: the respondent should have pled his action as a nuisance action; the
circuit court erred in failing to balance the rights of both parties; the circuit court erred in
failing to require the respondent to post a bond prior to the court’s granting of a
temporary injunction; and the respondent failed to show that the petitioners’ actions
resulted in irreparable harm to the respondent. Again, these contentions amount to
nothing more than unsupported assertions that this Court declines to address. See supra n.
3.
10
In their final assignment of error, the petitioners challenge the circuit
court’s finding that the respondent’s placement of his waterline across the petitioners’
property constitutes a prescriptive easement.
At the time of the placement of the respondent’s waterline, the petitioners’
property belonged to Ruth Barr, the grandmother of Daniel and Jeffrey Weatherholt. The
respondent testified below that the water line was not placed in the 12-foot utility because
rocks within the utility easement made it too difficult to dig the necessary trench there.
As a result, the respondent had to locate the water line elsewhere through Ms. Barr’s
property. The respondent testified further on direct examination as follows:
Q. Did anyone object at that time?
A. No.
Q. Did your grandmother object at that time?
A. No.
Q. Was she aware of where [the water line] was put?
A. I asked her – I didn’t ask her. I mean, I said, “Grandma,
we had to run the water line down through the woods.” And –
or she said – I said, “We needed to run it down through the
woods.”
And she said, “Well, why did you need to do that?” I
said, “Well --” I said, “It was hard to dig it there,” as I recall,
and she said okay. I mean, she was very easygoing. I mean,
you know, Grandma didn’t – it didn’t matter to grandma.
Q. So there was no objection?
A. No.
11
Q. You did not go to her before you did it and asked
permission?
A. No, sir. I don’t recall doing that.
Evidence adduced at trial indicates that the petitioners subsequently
acquired the property from Ms. Barr. The petitioners learned of the waterline’s location
in 2001 when they began construction of their home, and they did not challenge the
placement of the waterline until 2013 when they filed their counterclaim to the
respondent’s suit for an injunction.
The circuit court found, in pertinent part, as follows on the issue of the
prescriptive easement:
From the testimony and evidence at trial, the Court
finds that the [respondent’s] water line was constructed in
1998 or 1999 with the knowledge and assistance of Otis
Weatherholt, through what was then property owned by Ruth
M. Barr, to the home of [respondent]. Based upon the
uncontroverted testimony of the [respondent], the Court finds
that he did not obtain the permission of the grandmother,
Ruth M. Barr, prior to constructing the water line outside his
confines of his twelve feet (12′) wide utility easement, that he
built the water line in its current location with the knowledge
and even assistance of his father, Otis Weatherholt, and that a
friend of his father’s [sic] installed the line in its current
location after having trouble digging the line within the
twelve feet (12′) wide utility easement.
After installing the water line outside the confines of
the utility easement, [respondent] informed the owner, Ruth
M. Barr, of the location of the water line and she did not
object or take any subsequent action so long as she owned the
12
property to have [respondent] remove or relocate the water
line.
Ruth M. Barr subsequently sold her real estate,
through which the [respondent’s] water line was constructed,
to [petitioners] by deed dated March 30, 2001. [Petitioner]
Daniel Weatherholt’s testimony confirmed that he was aware
of the location of the water line, as it crossed through and
under his real estate, during the construction of his home in
2001. The Court finds that Otis Weatherholt and the
[Petitioner] Daniel Weatherholt had knowledge of the exact
location of the water line as it crossed the real estate then
owned by Ruth M. Barr.
....
The [petitioners] had actual knowledge of the
existence and exact location of the [respondent’s] water line
prior to constructing their home in 2001, a period of more
than ten years, prior to objecting to it by the filing of their
counterclaim in this action on August 8, 2013. . . . [Petitioner]
Daniel Weatherholt . . . testified that although he was aware
of the existence and location of the water line and access road
easements, he was unaware of the deeded location of the
twelve feet (12′) wide utility easement. . . .
The Court finds that the [petitioners] took no adverse
action and made no objection as to the location of the water
line from the fall of 2001 until the filing of the Counter Claim
in this action by Certificate dated August 5, 2013, a period of
more than ten years. The Court further finds that the
[petitioners] acquiesced to the location of the water line for a
period exceeding ten years.
The petitioners argue that the circuit court erred in finding that the location
of the respondent’s water line through the petitioners’ property constitutes a prescriptive
easement. The crux of the petitioners’ argument is that the respondent’s placement of the
water line outside of his utility easement was not an adverse use of Ruth Barr’s property
13
because Ms. Barr granted implied permission to the location of the water line after she
was informed of its location by the respondent.
This issue is governed by this Court’s definitive opinion on prescriptive
easements, O’Dell v. Stegall, 226 W. Va. 590, 703 S.E.2d 561 (2010). In syllabus point 1
of O’Dell, this Court held:
A person claiming a prescriptive easement must prove
each of the following elements: (1) the adverse use of
another’s land; (2) that the adverse use was continuous and
uninterrupted for at least ten years; (3) that the adverse use
was actually known to the owner of the land, or so open,
notorious and visible that a reasonable owner of the land
would have noticed the use; and (4) the reasonably identified
starting point, ending point, line, and width of the land that
was adversely used, and the manner or purpose for which the
land was adversely used.
At issue in the instant case is the first element: the adverse use of another’s land.
Regarding this element, this Court explained in O’Dell that
[i]n the context of prescriptive easements, an “adverse
use” of land is a wrongful use, made without the express or
implied permission of the owner of the land. An “adverse
use” is one that creates a cause of action by the owner against
the person claiming the prescriptive easement; no prescriptive
easement may be created unless the person claiming the
easement proves that the owner could have prevented the
wrongful use by resorting to the law.
Syl. pt. 5, Id.
When we apply our law in O’Dell to the instant facts, we find no error in
the circuit court’s determination that the respondent’s placement of his water line outside
14
of the utility easement constituted an adverse use of the petitioners’ property. Contrary to
the petitioners’ contention, the evidence clearly indicates that the respondent did not ask
permission of Ms. Barr, the owner of the property, to place the water line outside of the
utility easement. Instead, the respondent placed the water line outside of the utility
easement and thereafter informed Ms. Barr of the location of the water line. As we held
in syllabus point 5 of O’Dell, “[a]n ‘adverse use’ is one that creates a cause of action by
the owner against the person claiming the prescriptive easement.” In the instant case, the
respondent’s placement of the water line through Ms. Barr’s property outside of the
utility easement without first seeking Ms. Barr’s permission created a cause of action by
Ms. Barr against the respondent for trespass. Therefore, the respondent’s placement of
the water line outside of the utility easement without first seeking Ms. Barr’s permission
meets the definition of “adverse use” set forth by this Court in O’Dell.
The petitioners’ argument that implied permission means the same as
acquiescence must fail when applied to the facts of this case. It is significant that there is
no evidence that Ms. Barr had knowledge of the water line until after it was installed
outside of the utility easement. If Ms. Barr knowingly had acquiesced to the placement of
the water line outside of the utility easement prior to its placement, her acquiescence
could be construed as implied permission. Instead, she acquiesced to the placement of the
water line after learning that the water line already had been placed outside of the utility
easement. The fact that Ms. Barr acquiesced to the placement of the water line after it
was installed is actually proof of one of the elements of a prescriptive easement.
15
Specifically, element three requires a person claiming a prescriptive easement to prove
that “the adverse use was actually known to the owner of the land, or so open, notorious
and visible that a reasonable owner of the land would have noticed the use.” Syl. pt. 1, in
part, id (emphasis added). In other words, a person claiming a prescriptive easement must
prove that the owner of the land had knowledge of the adverse use and acquiesced to the
adverse use for the requisite number of years. In the present case, the evidence shows that
Ms. Barr had actual knowledge of the location of the water line outside of the utility
easement, and she acquiesced to the location. Therefore, we find that the circuit court did
not err in ruling that the respondent proved by clear and convincing evidence that his
placement of the water line outside of the utility easement constituted an adverse use of
the petitioners’ land.6
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we find no error in the January 15, 2014,
order of the Circuit Court of Hardy County that granted injunctive relief to the respondent
prohibiting the petitioners from placing any obstructions in the respondent’s easement
and concluding that the current location of the respondent’s water line is an appurtenant
prescriptive easement through the petitioners’ property. Accordingly, the January 15,
2014, order of the Circuit Court of Hardy County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
6
Finally, it is undisputed that Petitioner Daniel Weatherholt, after acquiring the
property from Ms. Barr, had knowledge of the location of the water line in 2001 and did
not contest the location until 2013.
16