IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN THE MATTER OF THE §
PETITION OF DEVIN L. § No. 70, 2015
COLEMAN FOR A WRIT OF §
MANDAMUS §
Submitted: February 24, 2015
Decided: March 9, 2015
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; HOLLAND, and VALIHURA, Justices.
ORDER
This 9th day of March 2015, upon consideration of the petition of Devin L.
Coleman for an extraordinary writ of mandamus, it appears to the Court that:
(1) The petitioner, Devin L. Coleman, seeks to invoke the original
jurisdiction of this Court, under Supreme Court Rule 43, to issue a writ of
mandamus compelling the Superior Court to review his 2006 conviction for
Possession with Intent to Deliver. The State of Delaware has filed an answer and
motion to dismiss Coleman’s petition. After careful review, we find that
Coleman’s petition manifestly fails to invoke this Court’s original jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the petition must be dismissed.
(2) On June 17, 2014, Coleman pled guilty to five charges arising from
two different indictments. On the charge of Possession of a Firearm by a Person
Prohibited, Coleman was sentenced to eight years of Level V incarceration as a
habitual offender under 11 Del. C. § 4214(a). Coleman was sentenced to seven
years of Level V incarceration, suspended for decreasing levels of supervision, on
the remaining charges. This Court dismissed Coleman’s untimely appeal of the
Superior Court’s judgment.1
(3) Coleman filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in this Court on
February 13, 2015. In the petition, Coleman claims that his 2006 guilty plea to
Possession with Intent to Deliver—one of the predicate offenses for his 2014
sentence as a habitual offender—was involuntary and unknowing. Coleman
further contends that he cannot collaterally attack the 2006 conviction because
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”), as of June 4, 2014, was limited to
“an application by a person in custody under a sentence of this court seeking to set
aside the judgment of conviction”2 and he is not in custody for the 2006
conviction. Before June 4, 2014, Rule 61 applied to “an application by a person in
custody or subject to future custody under a sentence of this court seeking to set
aside the judgment of conviction.”3 According to Coleman, the amendment of
Rule 61(a)(1) entitles him to issuance of a writ of mandamus compelling review of
his 2006 conviction even though he is not in custody for that conviction.
1
Coleman v. State, 2014 WL 4629376 (Del. Sept. 16, 2014).
2
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(a)(1) (as of June 4, 2014).
3
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(a)(1) (before June 4, 2014) (emphasis added).
2
(4) A writ of mandamus will only issue if the petitioner can show: (i) a
clear right to the performance of a duty; (ii) that no other adequate remedy is
available; and (iii) the Superior Court has arbitrarily failed or refused to perform its
duty.4 This Court “will not issue a writ of mandamus to compel a trial court to
perform a particular judicial function, to decide a matter in a particular way, or to
dictate the control of its docket.”5 A writ of mandamus may not be used as a
substitute for an appeal.6
(5) A writ of mandamus is not warranted here because Coleman cannot
show that the Superior Court has arbitrarily failed or refused to perform a duty
owed to him. Coleman’s assumption that he could challenge his 2006 conviction
before the June 4, 2014 amendment of Rule 61(a), even if he was no longer in
custody for the 2006 conviction, is incorrect. As we stated in 2008, “a person loses
standing to move for postconviction relief under Rule 61 where the defendant is
not in custody or subject to future custody for the underlying offense or challenged
sentence.”7 Coleman did not have standing before or after the amendment of Rule
4
In re Bordley, 545 A.2d 619, 620 (Del. 1988).
5
Id.
6
In re Noble, 2014 WL 5823030, at *1 (Del. Nov. 6, 2014) (citing Matushefske v. Herlihy, 214
A.2d 883, 885 (Del. 1965)).
7
Ruiz v. State, 2008 WL 1961187, at *3 (Del. May 7, 2008). See also Epperson v. State, 2003
WL 21692751, at *1 (Del. July 18, 2003) (affirming denial of postconviction motion because
movant had been discharged as unimproved from probation associated with charges for which he
3
61(a)(1) to challenge his 2006 conviction once he was no longer in custody for that
conviction. If Coleman wished to challenge his 2006 conviction, he could have
filed a timely appeal or a motion for postconviction relief while in custody for the
2006 conviction.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the petition for the issuance of
a writ of mandamus is DISMISSED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr.
Chief Justice
sought postconviction relief and was therefore no longer subject to custody for those charges);
Summers v. State, 2003 WL 1524104, at *1 (Del. March 20, 2003) (holding movant was not
entitled to seek postconviction relief for 1993 conviction because he had been discharged from
probation for 1993 conviction and was no longer in custody for 1993 conviction).
4