J-S10036-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
ERIC MICHAEL REISNER
Appellant No. 1853 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 27, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-45-CR-0002592-2013
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., STABILE, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED MARCH 12, 2015
Appellant, Eric Michael Reisner, appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered in the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas, following
his jury trial convictions for one count of corruption of a minor, one count of
unlawful contact with a minor, and one count of indecent assault of a person
less than 13 years of age.1 We affirm.
In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly sets forth the relevant
facts and procedural history of this case as follows:
On December 10, 2013, a Criminal Information was filed
charging [Appellant] with the following: one count of
Corruption of a Minor, one count of Unlawful Contact with
a Minor, one count of Indecent Assault of a Person Less
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1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6301(a)(1)(ii), 6318(a)(1), 3126(a)(7), respectively.
_________________________
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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than 13 Years of Age. [Appellant’s] conviction stems from
facts which occurred in the victim’s home located
at…Monroe County, Pennsylvania when the victim was
under 13 years of age. [Appellant] knew S.A., the minor
victim, as [Appellant] was best friends with S.A.’s
stepfather. S.A. referred to [Appellant] as “Uncle Eric.”
The incident underlying [Appellant’s] conviction occurred
sometime in July or August of 2011. At that time,
[Appellant] and S.A. were "roughhousing" in the
basement. By this, S.A. clarified that [Appellant] and she
were "poking each other, or just like tickling each other, or
just joking around." Then, [Appellant] pinched her nipple
over her shirt, and then under. S.A. stopped playing and
backed away. [Appellant] then went under her shirt and
under her bra and proceeded to pinch her nipple. S.A. told
[Appellant] to stop, and he did. [Appellant’s] family,
including her parents and siblings, were upstairs at the
time. Following the incident, S.A. sat down with
[Appellant] to watch television. In the following year, S.A.
began having trouble in school, namely with her friends.
S.A. testified that she began to cut herself. S.A. opened
up to one of her friends about the incident that occurred
between [Appellant] and her. In February of 2013, S.A.
was called to her guidance counselor’s office after her
friend reported the incident. Thereafter, [Appellant] was
arrested. Following a preliminary hearing which occurred
on December 11, 2013, all charges were bound over to the
Monroe County Court of Common Pleas. A trial on this
matter was held on March 13 and 14 of 2014. A jury
found [Appellant] guilty on all counts listed in the criminal
information. On May 27, 2014, this Court sentenced
[Appellant] to a total aggregate sentence of nine (9) to
eighteen (18) months in the Monroe County Correctional
Facility. [Appellant] was not classified as a Sexually
Violent Predator. …[Appellant] was classified as a Tier III
offender pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.14(d)(16). As
such, this [c]ourt imposed lifetime registration
requirements on [Appellant].
(Trial Court Opinion, filed August 4, 2014, at 1-2) (internal citations to the
record omitted). Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on June 23, 2014.
That same day, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of
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errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant
timely filed his statement on July 14, 2014.
Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
SHOULD [APPELLANT] HAVE TO REGISTER AS A LIFETIME
MEGAN’S LAW REGISTRANT AS THE CONDUCT FOR WHICH
HE WAS CONVICTED, WHILE CONSTITUTING MULTIPLE
CRIMINAL ACTS, WAS A SINGLE NONVIOLENT ACT
LASTING NO MORE THAN A FEW SECONDS?
(Appellant’s Brief at 5).
Appellant argues the conduct constituting criminal behavior lasted no
more than a few seconds. Appellant asserts at trial, the court agreed there
was no continuing course of conduct on Appellant’s part. Appellant contends
his conviction stemmed from a single incident. Under the plain language of
the statute, Appellant argues it is simply illogical to require lifetime
registration for one criminal act that occurred over a few seconds and was
“nonviolent” in nature. Appellant claims he is not a person who committed
multiple offenses or had multiple victims. Appellant directs our attention to
the opinion in support of reversal in Commonwealth v. Gehris, 618 Pa.
104, 115, 54 A.3d 862, 869 (2012), for the proposition that the intent of the
General Assembly was to set up a graduated registration scheme for sex
offenders, with violent offenders and true recidivists subject to lifetime
registration, while first time, nonviolent offenders should be given the
opportunity for rehabilitation. Appellant concludes this Court should vacate
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the order for lifetime registration and remand for imposition of the fifteen-
year registration requirement under SORNA. We cannot agree.
Section 9799.14 governs the classification of sexual offenses for
registration requirements in relevant part as follows:
§ 9799.14. Sexual offenses and tier system
(a) Tier system established.−Sexual offenses shall be
classified in a three-tiered system composed of Tier I
sexual offenses, Tier II sexual offenses and Tier III sexual
offenses.
(b) Tier I sexual offenses.−The following offenses
shall be classified as Tier I sexual offenses:
* * *
(8) 18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1)(ii) (relating to corruption
of minors).
* * *
(c) Tier II sexual offenses.−The following offenses
shall be classified as Tier II sexual offenses:
* * *
(5) 18 Pa.C.S. § 6318 (relating to unlawful contact
with minor).
* * *
(d) Tier III sexual offenses.−The following offenses
shall be classified as Tier III sexual offenses:
* * *
(8) 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(7).
* * *
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(16) Two or more convictions of offenses listed as Tier
I or Tier II sexual offenses.
42 Pa.S.C.A. § 9799.14 (a)-(d). Section 9799.15 governs the length of time
an individual must register with the Pennsylvania State Police as a sexual
offender in pertinent part as follows:
§ 9799.15. Period of registration
(a) Period of registration.−Subject to subsection (c),
an individual specified in section 9799.13 (relating to
applicability) shall register with the Pennsylvania State
Police as follows:
* * *
(3) An individual convicted of a Tier III sexual offense
shall register for the life of the individual.
* * *
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.15(a)(3).2 Pennsylvania law makes clear that the
registration requirements under the Sexual Offender Registration and
Notification Act (“SORNA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.41, do not
constitute criminal punishment. Commonwealth v. McDonough, 96 A.3d
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2
The Commonwealth Court recently decided a SORNA provision in Section
9799.15 was punitive where it required an offender to update registration
information including temporary lodging, cell phone number, and information
relating to motor vehicles owned or operated, in person at a registration site
within three business days, but the provision could be severed from the
remainder of the statute while preserving the otherwise valid subsections.
See Coppolino v. Noonan, 102 A.3d 1254 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2014). The
present case does not implicate the provision declared punitive in
Coppolino. Nevertheless, the appellate Court’s vigilance confirms the
statutory purpose is public safety and remediation, not punishment.
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1067 (Pa.Super. 2014) (rejecting argument that mandating registration
under SORNA is punitive; reiterating that registration requirements for sex
offenders is product of remedial legislation with non-punitive goal of public
safety).
“Statutory interpretation ‘is a question of law and, as such, our
standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.’” J.C.B. v.
Pennsylvania State Police, 35 A.3d 792, 794 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal
denied, 616 Pa. 653, 49 A.3d 444 (2012), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 133
S.Ct. 1808, 185 L.Ed.2d 827 (2013).
The basic tenet of statutory construction requires a court
to construe the words of the statute according to their
plain meaning. When the words of a statute are clear and
free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be
disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. 1
Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b).
Generally speaking, the best indication of legislative intent
is the plain language of a statute…. Under [1 Pa.C.S.A.]
Section 1921(c), it is only when the words of a statute are
not explicit that a court may resort to other considerations,
such as the statute’s perceived “purpose,” in order to
ascertain legislative intent. Consistently with the Act, this
Court has repeatedly recognized that rules of construction,
such as consideration of a statute’s perceived “object” or
“purpose,” are to be resorted to only when there is an
ambiguity. Finally, we note the maxim of statutory
interpretation that the expression of one thing in a statute
implies the exclusion of others not expressed. Similarly,
the court may not supply omissions in the statute when it
appears that the matter may have been intentionally
omitted.
Commonwealth v. Finley, 860 A.2d 132, 140 (Pa.Super. 2004) (some
internal citations, footnotes, and quotation marks omitted). Subsection
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9799.14(d)(16) demonstrates without ambiguity that two or more
convictions of offenses listed as Tier I or Tier II sexual offenses qualifies
under Tier III for lifetime registration. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.14(d)(16),
9799.15(a)(3). See also Gehris, supra at 108, 54 A.3d at 864 (citing
Commonwealth v. Merolla, 909 A.2d 337 (Pa.Super. 2006) (refusing to
inject recidivist philosophy into statute; it is irrelevant whether convictions
arose out of same criminal episode)).
Instantly, a jury convicted Appellant under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(7),
of one count of indecent assault of a person less than 13 years of age.
Section 9799.14(d)(8) of SORNA unequivocally states a conviction of
indecent assault of a person less than 13 years of age requires Tier III,
lifetime sex offender registration. A jury additionally convicted Appellant of
two Tier I sex offenses. Section 9799.14(d)(16) of SORNA makes clear that
convictions for two or more Tier I sex offenses also requires Tier III lifetime
sex offender registration. The language of SORNA is clear and unambiguous
as it pertains to the registration requirements; therefore; courts are obliged
to observe those legislative parameters. Thus, Appellant qualifies for and is
subject to SORNA’s lifetime registration, regardless of how his convictions
are reviewed. Accordingly, we affirm.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/12/2015
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