14-1122
Singh v. Holder
BIA
Christensen, IJ
A200 938 517
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
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APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING
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At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
New York, on the 16th day of March, two thousand fifteen.
PRESENT:
DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
SUSAN L. CARNEY,
CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
GULZAR SINGH,
Petitioner,
v. 14-1122
NAC
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Jaspreet Singh, Law Office of
Jaspreet Singh, Fremont,
California.
FOR RESPONDENT: Joyce R. Branda, Acting
Assistant Attorney General;
Derek C. Julius, Senior
Litigation Counsel; John M
McAdams, Jr., Trial Attorney,
Office of Immigration
Litigation, United States
Department of Justice,
Washington D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Petitioner Gulzar Singh, a native and citizen of India,
seeks review of a March 18, 2014, decision of the BIA,
affirming the July 5, 2012, decision of an Immigration
Judge (“IJ”), denying his application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Gulzar Singh, No. A200 938
517 (B.I.A. Mar. 18, 2014), aff’g No. A200 938 517 (Immig.
Ct. N.Y. City July 5, 2012). We assume the parties’
familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural
history in this case.
Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA, i.e., minus the
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IJ’s determination that relocation to another part of the
country was possible, which the BIA declined to reach. See
Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522
(2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review are
well established. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v.
Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).
We conclude that the agency’s adverse credibility
determination is supported by substantial evidence. For
asylum applications like Singh’s, governed by the REAL ID
Act, the agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the
circumstances,” base a credibility determination on
inconsistencies in an applicant’s statements and other
record evidence “without regard to whether” they go “to the
heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162,
163-64 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
The IJ reasonably relied on material discrepancies
among Singh’s testimony, his application, and his
corroborating documents. Singh testified that he was
beaten by Alkali Dal Badal (“ADB”) members and had only one
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encounter with police after he tried to report ADB abuse;
his wife, however, wrote that he was beaten by police at
the behest of the ADB, not by ADB members. Moreover, Singh
testified to numerous ADB threats prior to the two beatings
in 2010, but neither his application nor his wife’s letter
mentioned any ADB threats. These discrepancies are
material to Singh’s claim of persecution, as they concern
mistreatment by the ADB—the very activity upon which his
claim of persecution rests. Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 446 F.3d 289, 295 (2d Cir. 2006); see also
Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 166 n.3 (holding that omission is
functionally equivalent to an inconsistency).
The IJ was not required to accept Singh’s explanation
for the discrepancies in his wife’s letter—that she is
uneducated—because, as the IJ noted, the remainder of
Singh’s wife’s letter is accurate as to the details of
Singh’s involvement with the Alkali Dal Mann (“ADM”). See
Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir. 2005).
The IJ also reasonably relied on the discrepancy
between Singh’s testimony and the letter from an ADM
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official. Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64. Singh
testified to only one encounter with the police and
insisted that there were no other encounters, but the ADM
letter states that Singh and his family were consistently
harassed by police. The IJ was not required to credit
Singh’s explanation that the author of the letter was
mistaken. Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80-81.
Finally, the IJ reasonably found Singh’s corroborating
evidence insufficient to rehabilitate his discredited
testimony. Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d
Cir. 2007) (per curiam). Singh submitted no evidence that
ADB members persecute ADM members. The State Department
report in the record said nothing about ADB mistreatment of
ADM members or conflict between political parties in the
Punjab generally. Other than the letters from his wife and
an ADM official, Singh submitted a letter from his local
Sikh temple stating that the ADB had “bothered” him, as
well as a doctor’s note listing his injuries but providing
no cause for them. The IJ was not required to give any
particular weight to these documents, particularly given
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their lack of detail. Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir. 2006). Accordingly,
the IJ reasonably found that Singh failed to rehabilitate
his testimony.
Considering the discrepancies among Singh’s testimony,
his application, and his supporting documents, as well as
his failure to submit evidence corroborating his story, the
IJ’s adverse credibility determination is based on
substantial evidence. Accordingly, because all of Singh’s
claims were based on the same factual predicate and relied
on his credibility, the agency did not err in denying
asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. Paul v.
Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of
removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request
for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance
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with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and
Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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