14-2365
Singh v. Lynch
BIA
Balasquide, IJ
A087 992 903
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
8th day of February, two thousand sixteen.
PRESENT:
BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
REENA RAGGI,
DENNY CHIN,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
AMANBIR SINGH,
Petitioner,
v. 14-2365
NAC
LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Sanjay Chaubey, New York, New York.
FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy
Assistant Attorney General; Blair
O’Connor, Assistant Director;
Timothy Bo Stanton, Trial Attorney,
Office of Immigration Litigation,
United States Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
DENIED.
Petitioner Amanbir Singh, a native and citizen of India,
seeks review of a June 5, 2014 decision of the BIA, affirming
a May 13, 2013 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying
Singh’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re
Amanbir Singh, No. A087 992 903 (B.I.A. June 5, 2014), aff’g
No. A087 992 903 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. May 13, 2013). We assume
the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
procedural history in this case, which we reference only as
necessary to explain our decision to deny the petition.
Because the BIA summarily affirmed the IJ’s decision, we
have reviewed the IJ’s decision as the final administrative
determination. See Balachova v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 374, 380 (2d
Cir. 2008). The applicable standards of review are well
established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin v.
Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008).
2
The agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the
circumstances,” base a credibility finding on inconsistencies
in an asylum applicant’s statements and other record evidence
“without regard to whether” they go “to the heart of the
applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see Xiu
Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64. Substantial evidence supports the
IJ’s determination that Singh was not credible.
The IJ reasonably found that Singh’s testimony differed
from his asylum applications. Singh testified that he was
beaten in India twice on account of his Sikh faith, but his two
asylum applications omitted any mention of these attacks and
stated only that he and his family had been threatened for
political reasons. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 166 n.3 (“An
inconsistency and an omission are . . . functionally
equivalent.”). When asked why his asylum applications did not
reference these attacks, Singh gave evasive and nonresponsive
answers. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005)
(“A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation
for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must
demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled
to credit his testimony.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
3
With Singh’s credibility called into question, the IJ
reasonably identified a failure to provide certain
corroborating evidence to rehabilitate Singh’s testimony. An
applicant’s failure to corroborate testimony may bear on
credibility, either because the absence of particular evidence
is viewed as suspicious, or because the absence of corroboration
in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony
already called into question. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496
F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). Singh failed to present evidence
of his attacks in India, either in the form of medical
documentation or letters from his family. See Chuilu Liu v.
Holder, 575 F.3d 193, 198 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he alien bears
the ultimate burden of introducing such evidence without
prompting from the IJ.”). And, contrary to Singh’s contention,
the IJ considered the letter from the president of the Akali
Dal Party and the evidence regarding country conditions in
India, and reasonably found that this evidence did not support
his claim of past persecution or his fear of future harm. The
letter did not provide any details about the attacks that Singh
purportedly suffered, and the 2012 U.S. Department of State
Human Rights Report in the record details anti-Sikh violence
in the 1980s, but does not reference anything more current.
4
Given the inconsistency and corroboration findings, the IJ
reasonably found Singh not credible. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d
at 165-67. That finding is dispositive of asylum, withholding
of removal, and CAT relief because all three claims are based
on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d
148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).
Finally, contrary to Singh’s argument, the BIA was
permitted to consider the Government’s untimely brief on
appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(c)(1) (“In its discretion, the
Board may consider a brief that has been filed out of time.”).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal
that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED,
and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition
is DISMISSED as moot.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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