14-756
Singh v. Lynch
BIA
Rohan, IJ
A087 996 322
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED
WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
11th day of March, two thousand sixteen.
PRESENT:
JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
REENA RAGGI,
SUSAN L. CARNEY,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
BHUPINDER SINGH, AKA KAMBOJ SINGH,
Petitioner,
v. 14-756
NAC
LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Bhupinder Singh, pro se, Floral
Park, New York.
FOR RESPONDENT: Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant
Attorney General; Terri J. Scadron,
Assistant Director; Siu P. Wong, Trial
Attorney, Office of Immigration
Litigation, United States Department of
Justice, Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board
of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.
Petitioner Bhupinder Singh, a native and citizen of India,
seeks review of a February 7, 2014 decision of the BIA affirming
a June 12, 2012 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying
Singh’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). See In re
Bhupinder Singh, No. A087 996 322 (B.I.A. Feb. 7, 2014), aff’g
No. A087 996 322 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. June 12, 2012). Under the
circumstances of this case, we review the decision of the IJ
as supplemented by the BIA, see Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d
268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005), applying well established standards
of review, see Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d
Cir. 2008). In doing so, we assume the parties’ familiarity with
the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.
For asylum applications like Singh’s, the agency may,
“[c]onsidering the totality of the circumstances,” base a
credibility finding on inconsistencies in an asylum applicant’s
statements and other record evidence “without regard to whether”
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they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64. We
“defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from
the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable
fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu
Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167.
Here, the agency reasonably relied on several discrepancies
in the record in finding Singh not credible. Singh testified
that members of the Shiromani Akali Dal Badal political party
beat him while he attended a Shiromani Akali Dal Amritsar
political rally. When confronted with his inconsistent
statements regarding whether this attack occurred during or
after the rally, Singh stated for the first time that he was
attacked twice that day, a fact not included in his written
statement. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 166 n.3 (“An
inconsistency and an omission are . . . functionally
equivalent.”). The IJ was not compelled to credit Singh’s
explanation that he did not remember the second attack when
questioned by his attorney. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d
77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005). Singh’s testimony regarding the extent
of his medical treatment after this attack was similarly
inconsistent: he testified alternately that the doctor
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administered medication for pain and released him, and that the
doctor hospitalized him for two days.
With respect to an alleged attack in May 2009, Singh
repeatedly testified that he suffered pain as a result, but that
he was not seriously injured. He later testified that he
dislocated two discs in his spine as a result of the attack.
Singh also repeatedly testified that the doctor sent him home
after giving him medication and that he did not stay at the
hospital. His doctor’s affidavit, however, stated that Singh
was in critical condition and spent five days in the hospital.
Singh failed to provide any explanation for these discrepancies.
Having questioned Singh’s credibility, the agency
reasonably faulted his failure to provide corroborating evidence
to rehabilitate his testimony, including affidavits from his
mother and sister who witnessed two of the alleged attacks. See
Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). Given
the inconsistency and corroboration findings, we identify no
basis to disturb the agency’s adverse credibility determination,
which is dispositive of Singh’s claims for asylum, withholding
of removal, and CAT relief. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii);
Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).
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Insofar as Singh argues in his reply brief that he also seeks
to challenge the BIA’s denial of his motion to remand to the
IJ for consideration of new evidence, he failed adequately to
raise such a challenge in either his opening or reply brief.
Thus, Singh has waived any challenge to the BIA’s denial of his
motion to remand. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540,
541 n.1, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Issues not sufficiently argued
in the briefs are considered waived and normally will not be
addressed on appeal.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
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