UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4509
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
STEVEN EDWARD ROSS,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. Malcolm J. Howard,
Senior District Judge. (7:13-cr-00057-H-1)
Submitted: January 28, 2015 Decided: March 12, 2015
Before DUNCAN, WYNN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jeffrey M. Brandt, ROBINSON & BRANDT, P.S.C., Covington,
Kentucky, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States
Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States
Attorney, Phillip A. Rubin, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Steven Edward Ross pleaded guilty to the use of a firearm
during a drug trafficking offense, a felony in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c). With Ross’s consent, a magistrate judge
accepted and entered that plea. Ross now argues that the
magistrate judge lacked the statutory authority to accept his
guilty plea. Because there is binding Fourth Circuit precedent
to the contrary, we affirm.
The Federal Magistrates Act authorizes magistrate judges to
perform three types of duties: (1) enumerated duties that do not
require the parties’ consent, such as entering a sentence for a
petty offense, 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(4); (2) enumerated duties that
require the parties’ consent, such as presiding over a
misdemeanor trial, id. § 636(a)(3); and “such additional duties
as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States,” id. § 636(b)(3).
The Supreme Court has recognized that the keystone in
construing this third “additional duties” clause is the
defendant’s consent. See Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923,
933 (1991). Such consent “significantly changes the
constitutional analysis” and eliminates the concern that
authorization of a duty would “be read to deprive a defendant of
any important privilege.” Id. at 932. Accordingly, a
magistrate judge may undertake actions “comparable in
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responsibility and importance” to those duties enumerated in the
Act as requiring the defendant’s consent. Id. at 933.
Ross argues that, notwithstanding his consent, the
magistrate judge violated the Federal Magistrates Act by
accepting his guilty plea. Ross relies on United States v.
Harden, in which the Seventh Circuit recently held that “[t]he
task of accepting a guilty plea is a task too important to be
considered a mere ‘additional duty’ permitted under [the Federal
Magistrates Act].” 758 F.3d 886, 888 (7th Cir. 2014). The
Harden court reasoned that accepting a guilty plea goes beyond
the scope of the Act because such a plea, which is “a waiver of
important constitutional rights designed to protect the fairness
of a trial,” id. (quoting Johnson v. Ohio, 419 U.S. 924, 925
(1974) (quotation mark omitted)), “is dispositive . . . [and]
results in a final and consequential shift in the defendant’s
status,” id. at 889. The Harden court therefore analogized the
acceptance of a guilty plea to the conducting of a felony trial,
noting that “it is clear that a magistrate judge is not
permitted to conduct a felony trial, even with the consent of
the parties.” Id.
The government responds that our decision in United States
v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424 (4th Cir. 2008), forecloses Ross’s
argument. We held in Benton that the Magistrates Act authorizes
magistrate judges to accept a guilty plea and find a defendant
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guilty when, as here, “the parties have consented to the
procedure” and the district court retains “ultimate control
. . . over the plea process.” Id. at 433; cf. Harden, 758 F.3d
at 891 (noting that the Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits
“authorize magistrate judges to accept felony guilty pleas with
the parties’ consent”).
We agree with the government. Benton rejected the precise
argument that Ross now makes. That decision binds us today. We
may not depart from it “unless it is overruled by a subsequent
en banc opinion of this court or ‘a superseding contrary
decision of the Supreme Court.’” Etheridge v. Norfolk & Ry.
Co., 9 F.3d 1087, 1090 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Busby v. Crown
Supply, Inc., 896 F.2d 833, 840-41 (4th Cir. 1990) *
*
We imply no disapproval of Benton. Indeed, in Peretz, the
Supreme Court held that when enumerated and unenumerated duties
of magistrate judges are similar in level of responsibility and
importance, the defendant’s consent and the district court’s
supervision cure any constitutional concerns about a magistrate
judge’s actions. 501 U.S. at 936-39. Following this reasoning,
we held in Benton that “acceptance of a plea is merely the
natural culmination of a plea colloquy” and that “the district
court’s ultimate control over the magistrate’s plea acceptance
satisfies any [constitutional] concerns.” 523 F.3d at 431-32.
We also noted that the ability of a judge to supervise voir dire
proceedings in a felony trial, which was upheld in Peretz,
“implicates far greater discretion” than the plea colloquy,
which is “largely ministerial” in nature. Id. at 431 (quoting
United States v. Osborne, 345 F.3d 281, 288, 287 (4th Cir. 2003)
(internal quotation mark omitted)).
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Because no case has overruled Benton, we affirm the
judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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