CQURT OF
APPEALS
DIVISION II
ZDIS 24
8: 34
STS
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF O\ I IGTO
WASHING
DIVISION II
BRYENT FINCH and PATRICIA FINCH, a No. 45792 -0 -II
marital community,
Appellants,
v.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
THURSTON COUNTY, THURSTON
COUNTY SHERIFF' S OFFICE, ROD
DITRICH ANI) JANE DOE DITRICH,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS HUSBAND AND
WIFE AND THE MARITAL COMMUNITY
COMPRISED THEREOF,
Respondents.
SUTTON, J. — Officer Bryent Finch' and Patricia Finch appeal the superior court' s order
granting partial summary judgment dismissing their strict liability claim2 against Thurston County,
the Thurston County Sheriffs Office, and Rod and Jane Doe Ditrich for injuries suffered when a
3
police dog bit Finch during a search for a robbery suspect. We hold that ( 1) the legislature
1 We refer to Officer Bryent Finch individually as Finch. We intend no disrespect.
2 The Finches voluntarily dismissed their claims of negligence and intentional infliction of
emotional distress after leaving
the superior court' s ruling, only their strict liability claim. Thus,
our opinion addresses only their strict liability claim.
3 RCW 4. 24.410 grants immunity from any civil action to police dog handlers who use the dog in
the line of duty in good faith. The Finches' arguments relate solely to their strict liability claim
against Thurston County; they do not argue that Ditrich' s use of the dog was in bad faith. Under
RCW 4. 24. 410, Rod and Jane Doe Ditrich are immune from any civil liability in this case. We
refer to the remaining two respondents, Thurston County and Thurston County Sheriff' s Office,
collectively as Thurston County.
No. 45792 -0 -II
abolished strict liability claims for injuries resulting from lawfully used police dogs and ( 2) the
superior court properly dismissed the Finches' strict liability claim because the Finches failed to
show a genuine issue of material fact as to an unlawful use of Rex, the police dog. We affirm.
FACTS
I. OFFICER FINCH' S INJURY
On November 14, 2010, Finch, a Tumwater police officer, was dispatched to investigate
an in-progress burglary at an abandoned brewery at approximately 7: 00 PM. Thurston County
Deputy Rod Ditrich and K -9 Rex also responded to the scene after Finch requested assistance.
Rex was not leashed.
Finch and Ditrich entered the building to search for the burglary suspect. The building
interior was very dark. After Ditrich announced their presence three times without receiving a
response from the suspect, Ditrich commanded Rex to search. Rex located a scent and began
tracking the suspect through the building. Dietrich and Finch followed the dog.
When Ditrich saw that Rex was tracking directly to the suspect ahead of them, Ditrich
called to the dog to come back to him by shouting, "[ hjere, here, here." Clerk' s Papers ( CP) at
287. Finch, who had been following behind Ditrich, interpreted Ditrich' s shouting as telling him
where the suspect was located and Finch came up to Ditrich' s side. As Finch approached Ditrich,
he too saw the suspect and shouted at the person to show his hands. According to Ditrich, Rex
believed that Finch was a threat to Ditrich and responded by biting Finch' s right testicle and right
inner thigh. Ditrich commanded Rex to release Finch from the dog' s bite. Ditrich then detained
the suspect and Finch drove himself to the hospital. Finch underwent surgery that night and the
urologist removed one -quarter of Finch' s right testicle.
2
No. 45792 -0 -II
II. LEGISLATURE' S AMENDMENT TO RCW 16. 08. 040.
In 1941, the Washington Legislature enacted RCW 16. 08. 040, making a dog owner strictly
liable for injuries caused by his or her dog. LAws OF 1941, ch. 77, § 1. 4 In 2012, the legislature
amended RCW 16. 08. 040 to prohibit strict liability claims for injuries caused by " the lawful
application of a police dog." Codified in RCW 16. 08. 040( 2). The amendment, part of Substitute
House Bill (SHB) 2191, became effective on June 7, 2012.
III. PROCEDURE
The Finches sued Thurston County for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and strict liability under RCW 16. 08. 040. They filed their complaint on June 6, 2012,
one day before the amendment to former RCW 16. 08. 040 became effective. Both parties moved
for summary judgment on the strict liability claim. The superior court granted Thurston County' s
motion, denied the Finches' motion, and dismissed the Finch' s strict liability claim because RCW
16. 08. 040( 2) prohibits strict liability for injuries resulting from lawfully used police dogs. The
Finches appeal.
4
That statute remains unchanged today, but is now codified as RCW 16. 08. 040( 1): " The owner
of any dog which shall bite any person while such person is in or on a public place or lawfully in
or on a private place including the property of the owner of such dog, shall be liable for such
damages as may be suffered by the person bitten, regardless of the former viciousness of such dog
or the owner' s knowledge of such viciousness.
3
No. 45792 -0 -II
ANALYSIS
We review summary judgment orders de novo. Durland v. San Juan County, 182 Wn.2d
55, 69, 340 P. 3d 191 ( 2014). Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue
of material fact in the pleadings, affidavits, and depositions on file, and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56( c). We review a trial court' s statutory interpretations de
novo. Ass 'n of Wash. Spirits and Wine Distribs. v. Wash. State Liquor Control Bd., Wn.2d
340 P. 3d 849, 853 ( 2015).
The Finches argue that ( 1) RCW 16. 08. 040( 2) does not bar their strict liability claim
because the amendment applies prospectively and they filed their complaint the day before the
amendment' s effective date; and ( 2) alternatively, even if RCW 16. 08. 040( 2) were to apply
the lawful dog. We
retroactively, Finch' s injuries were not caused by application of a police
disagree.
I. THE LEGISLATURE ABOLISHED STRICT LIABILITY FOR INJURIES RESULTING FROM THE LAWFUL
USE OF A POLICE DOG
The legislature may abolish an accrued cause of action that does not affect a substantive or
vested right. 1000 Va. Ltd. P' ship v. Vertecs Corp., 158 Wn.2d 566, 586, 146 P. 3d 423 ( 2006). A
cause of action that exists solely " by virtue of a statute" is not a vested right.5 Ballard Square
Condo. Owners Ass 'n v. Dynasty Constr. Co., 158 Wn.2d 603, 617, 146 P. 3d 914 ( 2006). The
legislature can abolish a statutory cause of action even if a plaintiff' s lawsuit is pending, but it
5
An accrued cause of action is a vested right only if it "' springs from a contract or from the
principles of the common law. "' 1000 Va. Ltd. P 'ship, 158 Wn.2d at 587 ( quoting Robinson v.
McHugh, 158 Wash. 157, 163, 291 P. 330 ( 1930)).
4
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cannot do so after a trial court enters final judgment. Ballard Square, 158 Wn.2d at 618; Wash.
State Farm Bureau Fed' n v. Gregoire, 162 Wn.2d 284, 304, 174 P. 3d 1142 (2007).
We review the plain language of former and amended versions of RCW 16. 08. 040 to
determine their plain meaning and give effect to the legislature' s intent. Pac. Marine Ins. Co. v.
Dep' t of Revenue, 181 Wn. App. 730, 737, 329 P. 3d 101 ( 2014). If a statute is unambiguous, we
apply the plain language and our inquiry goes no further. Bowie v. Dep' t ofRevenue, 171 Wn.2d
1, 11, 248 P. 3d 504 ( 2011). Before the 2012 amendment, former RCW 16. 08. 040( 1) stated that
t] he owner of any dog which shall bite any person ... shall be liable for such damages as may
be suffered by the person bitten." LAWS of 1941, ch. 77, § 1. Amended RCW 16. 08. 040 prohibits
strict liability claims against the owner of a lawfully used police dog, stating: " This section does
6
dog, defined in RCW 4. 24. 410. " RCW
not apply to the lawful application of a police as
16. 08. 040( 2). The language in both the former and amended versions of RCW 16. 08. 040 is plain
and unambiguous. The Finches had no vested interest in their claim because the superior court
had not yet entered final judgment. Thus, the legislature abolished the Finches' strict liability
claim against Thurston County when it amended RCW 16. 08. 040, effective June 7, 2012.
6
RCW 4. 24. 410( 1)( a) defines a "[ p] olice dog" as " a dog used by a law enforcement agency
specially trained for law enforcement work and under the dog handler." RCW
control of a
4. 24. 410( 1)( c) defines a "[ d] og handler" as " a law enforcement officer who has successfully
completed training as prescribed by the Washington state criminal justice training commission in
police dog handling." RCW 4. 24. 410( 2) provides that "[ a] ny dog handler who uses a police dog
in the line of duty in good faith is immune from civil action for damages arising out of such use of
the dog or accelerant detection dog." The Finches cite this good faith immunity provision
police
as further evidence of legislative intent to subject municipalities to strict liability claims for police
dog bite injuries, but that immunity applies to negligence claims, not strict liability claims.
5
No. 45792 -0 -II
II. LAWFUL USE OF A POLICE DOG
The Finches argue that the County does not qualify for strict liability immunity under RCW
16. 08. 040( 2) because the County cannot prove that Rex was lawfully used as a police dog. 7 But
the Finches present no facts to support this argument. There is no dispute that Finch and Ditrich
were searching for a burglary suspect when Ditrich deployed Rex. The fact that Finch was
mistakenly bitten by Rex does not convert a lawful use of Rex to an unlawful use. The Finches
present no facts to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the unlawful use of a police dog.
Because no Washington appellate court has defined the " lawful application of a police
dog," the Finches rely on federal cases to interpret RCW 16. 08. 040( 2). If we were to rely on
federal cases, Thurston County cites Miller v. Clark County, 8 the only published Ninth Circuit
case on this issue, which limited strict liability for police dog bite injuries to only those injuries
caused by use of a police dog that violates the Fourth Amendment. We decline to rely on federal
cases to interpret RCW 16. 08. 040( 2). We do not reach the issue of defining " lawful application
of a police dog" because the Finches did not present any facts to create a genuine issue of material
fact as to the unlawful use of Rex.
CONCLUSION
We hold that ( 1) the legislature abolished strict liability claims for injuries resulting from
lawfully used police dogs and ( 2) the superior court properly dismissed the Finches' strict liability
7
The Finches also present four alternative arguments. Because we hold that the Finches did not
present any genuine issue of material fact as to the lawful application of Rex, we decline to address
these alternatives.
8
Miller v. Clark County, 340 F.3d 959, 968 n. 14 ( 9th Cir. 2003) ( citing McKinney v. City of
Tukwila, 103 Wn. App. 391, 409, 13 P. 3d 631 ( 2000)).
6
No. 45792 -0 -II
claim because they fail to show a genuine issue of material fact as to an unlawful use of Rex, the
police dog. We affirm.
A majority of the panel having decided that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2. 06. 040, it is so ordered.
We concur: