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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-13937
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:07-cr-00242-CG-B-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ARNOLD KNIGHT,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
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(March 31, 2015)
Before HULL, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Arnold Knight appeals his 24-month sentence, imposed following revocation
of his term of supervised release and ordered to run consecutively to his state
sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment. On appeal, Knight argues that his revocation
sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable. After review, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS
In 2008, Defendant Knight pled guilty to possessing an unregistered short-
barrel shotgun, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). After serving his 43-month
prison term, Defendant Knight began serving his three-year supervised release
term in June 2011. Two conditions of Knight’s supervised release were that he not
commit another crime or unlawfully use any controlled substance.
In October 2012, Knight’s probation officer petitioned to revoke Knight’s
supervised release based on Knight’s: (1) September 26, 2012 attack on his former
girlfriend with a steel pipe, for which a Florida state charge of attempted murder
was pending; (2) July 5, 2011 threat to kill a man, for which Knight was arrested
on an Alabama state charge of harassment; and (3) positive tests for cocaine use on
August 9, 2011, and October 5, 2011, and admissions by Knight that he had used
cocaine three other times, on August 5, 2011, August 6, 2011, and November 10,
2011, despite the fact that Knight was enrolled in an intensive outpatient treatment
program.
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In July 2014, after a jury convicted Knight of attempted murder and a
Florida court sentenced him to thirty years in prison, the probation officer filed an
amended petition alleging the same three violations. Knight waived his right to an
initial revocation hearing and admitted the violations as charged in the amended
petition.
At his final revocation hearing, Knight did not request a particular sentence,
but requested that any sentence imposed run concurrent to his state sentence.
Knight argued that: (1) he was required to serve 85 percent of his thirty-year state
sentence and would not be released until 2037; (2) a consecutive federal sentence
“20 years from now” would not serve any purpose and “would probably interfere
with his reintegration into the community when he is released”; and (3) “the state
court, I’m sure, considered [Knight’s] record in imposing that 30-year sentence and
the fact that he was on probation at the time that he committed that [attempted
murder].” In response, the government asked for a 24-month sentence, at the high
end of the advisory guidelines range, and for the sentence to run consecutive to the
state sentence because Knight “owes that to this Court related to the underlying
firearms charge that he was serving the sentence and was on supervised release
for.”
After listening to the parties’ arguments, the district court stated that it had
“considered the chapter seven provisions in this case,” and noted that the resulting
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range was 18 to 24 months. The district court found “the 24-month sentence to be
appropriate in this case,” and “that a consecutive sentence is appropriate, given all
the facts and circumstances of this case.” After revoking Knight’s supervised
release, the district court reiterated that the “chapter seven provisions are
appropriate,” and imposed a 24-month sentence “to be consecutive to the sentence
[Knight is] now serving in the state of Florida.” The district court imposed a new
12-month term of supervised release following Knight’s 24-month prison term,
stated that all previous conditions of supervised release applied, and added the
condition that Knight was not to have contact with his former girlfriend or her
children.
The district court asked whether there were any objections to its “findings
and conclusions and the manner in which the sentence was imposed.” Knight’s
counsel responded, “Judge, I think the length of the sentence is unreasonable, in
light of the sentence that he’s serving in Florida.”
II. DISCUSSION
When a defendant violates a condition of supervised release, the district
court may revoke the supervised release term and impose a prison term. See 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Before imposing a prison term upon revocation, the district
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court must consider certain factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Id. § 3583(e).1 The
district court also must consider the policy statements in Chapter 7 of the
Sentencing Guidelines, which includes, inter alia, non-binding ranges of
imprisonment. United States v. Silva, 443 F.3d 795, 799 (11th Cir. 2006).
According to the policy statements in Chapter 7, any sentence imposed upon
revocation is a sanction for the defendant’s breach of trust, and, as such, “should be
in addition, or consecutive, to any sentence imposed for the new conduct.”
U.S.S.G. ch. 7, pt. A, 3(b). Thus, Chapter 7 also provides that “[a]ny term of
imprisonment imposed upon revocation of probation or supervised release shall be
ordered to be served consecutively to any sentence of imprisonment that the
defendant is serving, whether or not the sentence of imprisonment being served
resulted from the conduct that is the basis of the revocation.” U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f);
see also id. ch. 7, pt. B, introductory cmt.
Ordinarily, we review a sentence imposed upon the revocation of supervised
release for reasonableness, applying the deferential abuse of discretion standard.
United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014). In reviewing
for reasonableness, we first consider whether the district court committed any
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Specifically, the district court must consider: (1) the nature and circumstances of the
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence
imposed to afford adequate deterrence, protect the public, and provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training and medical care; (3) the Sentencing Guidelines range and
pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (4) the need to avoid unwarranted
sentencing disparities; and (5) the need to provide restitution. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (cross-
referencing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)-(D), and (a)(4)-(7)).
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significant procedural error and then whether the sentence is substantively
unreasonable in light of the relevant § 3553(a) factors and the totality of the
circumstances. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1190 (11th Cir. 2008). The
party challenging the sentence has the burden to show it is unreasonable. United
States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005).
A. Procedural Reasonableness
As to procedural reasonableness, Knight argues that the district court “failed
to make sufficient findings to support” running Knight’s federal prison term
consecutive to his state sentence. Knight did not object to the adequacy of the
district court’s explanation for the consecutive sentence during the revocation
hearing, arguing only that “the length of the sentence is unreasonable.” Where the
defendant “did not object to the procedural reasonableness at the time of his
sentencing, we review for plain error.” Vandergrift, 754 F.3d at 1307.
Here, Knight has not shown error, much less plain error. Under our
precedent, although the district court must adequately explain the chosen sentence,
it is not required to explicitly discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors on the record.
United States v. Livesay, 525 F.3d 1081, 1090 (11th Cir. 2008); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(c). Furthermore, “the district court is not required to give a lengthy
explanation for its sentence if the case is typical of those contemplated by the
Sentencing Commission.” Livesay, 525 F.3d at 1090.
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The district court explained that Chapter 7’s call for a consecutive sentence
was appropriate under the “facts and circumstances” of Knight’s case. While this
explanation was brief, nothing in the record suggests that Knight’s case was
atypical and warranted anything less than the consecutive sentence generally
contemplated by the Sentencing Commission. Indeed, Knight’s arguments for a
concurrent sentence were also brief and were either inconsistent with the
Commission’s policy statements or not based on facts in the record.
Knight contended that a consecutive sentence would not “serve any
purpose” and would “probably interfere with his reintegration into the community
when he is released,” without explaining how that claim was true. Indeed,
sanctioning Knight for his abuse of the district court’s trust is more likely to ensure
that Knight complies with the conditions of his new 12-month term of supervised
release and thus successfully reintegrates into the community. Knight also
suggested that the state court had considered Knight’s federal supervised release in
imposing the thirty-year sentence, but did not provide any evidence that the state
court had in fact done so. Under the circumstances, we cannot say the district
court was required to give a more detailed explanation of its decision to impose a
consecutive sentence.
B. Substantive Reasonableness
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We also cannot say that the 24-month consecutive term was substantively
unreasonable. Knight’s term is within both the statutory range of no more than two
years and the advisory guidelines range of 18 to 24 months. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(3); U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a). As already noted, the Sentencing Guidelines
generally contemplate any prison sentence imposed upon revocation is to be served
consecutive to any other sentence for the underlying criminal conduct. See
U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f). Knight admitted using cocaine on multiple occasions and
committing two crimes, including attempting to murder his former girlfriend with a
steel pipe. In light of these circumstances, we conclude a 24-month sentence to be
served consecutive to his thirty-year state sentence for attempted murder is not
outside the range of reasonable sentences.
AFFIRMED.
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