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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
BEATRIZ RHOADES, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
RODNEY VERNON RHOADES,
Appellee No. 493 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Order March 3, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County
Civil Division at No(s): 2004-1376-Civil
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and MUNDY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 1, 2015
Beatriz Rhoades (Wife) appeals pro se from the order entered on
March 3, 2014, that directed Rodney Vernon Rhoades (Husband) to name
Wife as the primary beneficiary of no less than 13% of his Pennsylvania
State Employees Retirement Pension. The order also directed that Husband
provide proof of this designation to the court and, thereafter, that the
Pennsylvania State Employees Retirement Board freeze all activity except
that Husband could designate beneficiaries for the remaining 87% of the
account. We quash the appeal as interlocutory.
The parties were married on October 4, 2001, and separated on
November 5, 2004. In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the trial court provided
the following background and status of this matter that gave rise to this
appeal, stating:
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This appeal concerns the primary marital asset of the
parties, the marital portion of [Husband’s] Pennsylvania State
Employees Retirement Pension account. On a number of
occasions, [Wife] has sought an order naming her as sole
beneficiary of the entire retirement account pending final
equitable distribution.1
1
Because of various delays occasioned by both
parties, the Master’s Hearing, which began on July
24, 2007, was not completed until September 11,
2014. The Master filed his report January 7, 2015.
On November 30, 2006, the [c]ourt ordered [Husband] to
designate [Wife] as primary beneficiary of thirty percent of the
retirement account, freezing all account activity except changes
to designated beneficiaries of the remaining seventy percent. In
the order being appealed, dated March 3, 2014, the [c]ourt
reduced that amount to thirteen percent of [Husband’s] pension,
in part because as [Husband] has continued to work over the
years, the marital share of his pension account has become a
smaller piece of the whole. The freeze in retirement account
activity remained in effect under the new Order, with the
exception that [Husband] was allowed to change the named
beneficiary to eighty-seven percent of the account.
As the [c]ourt stated in the March 3, 2014 Order, “The
purpose of this Order is merely to protect [Wife’s] interests until
an equitable distribution of marital assets has been accomplished
either by voluntary settlement or by the [c]ourt.” The Order
complained of is interlocutory and not appealable. Therefore,
the [c]ourt recommends dismissal of the appeal.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/6/15, at 1-2.
Wife appealed from the March 3, 2014 order, and raises the following
issues for our review:
1. Whether [the] court erred in denying the injured/Wife’s
petition to protect her status as the named sole primary
beneficiary of Husband’s SERS Retirement account[?] Injunctive
relief.
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2. Whether [the] court erred in directing Husband to cause
injured/Wife to be named the primary beneficiary of the thirteen
percent (13%) of his SERS retirement account upon his death[?]
3. Whether the court erred in rendering decision without
Master’s report, findings of fact, conclusions of law[?]
4. Whether there was an abuse of discretion by the lower
court[?]
Wife’s Brief at 4.
Before we can address the merits of Wife’s issues, we first must
determine the appealability of the order at issue. Although Wife does not
mention the appealability of the March 3, 2014 order in her initial brief, in
her reply brief, she responds to Husband’s contention that the appeal should
be quashed. She acknowledges that the order is not a final order. See
Pa.R.A.P. 341. We agree, and note that “[t]his Court has held that ‘where a
decree in divorce has not been entered and ancillary claims remain
unresolved, issues such as those seeking special relief, are interlocutory and
unappelable.’” Radakovich v. Radakovich, 846 A.2d 709, 714 (Pa. Super.
2004). See also Sneering v. Sneering, 876 A.2d 1036, 1038 (Pa. Super.
2005) (“This Court has interpreted the current version of Pa.R.A.P. 341(b),
and determined that interim matters in divorce actions do not become final
until a divorce decree is entered.”).
However, Wife claims that the March 3, 2014 order “meets the criteria
of the ‘collateral order doctrine’ that permit[s] [] immediate appellate review
under [Pa.R.A.P.] 313.” Wife’s Reply Brief at 7. We disagree.
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A collateral order is “an order separable from and collateral
to the main cause of action where the right involved is too
important to be denied review and the question presented is
such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case,
the claim will be irreparably lost.” Pa. R.A.P. 313(b). All three
factors must be present for an order to be deemed collateral.
Troescher v. Grody, 869 A.2d 1014 (Pa. Super. 2005).
Sneeringer, 876 A.2d at 1039.
Even if we were to conclude, which we do not, that the order on
appeal is separable from and collateral to the divorce action, or that the
right to a portion of Husband’s pension is too important to be denied review
at this time, we do not conclude that Wife’s right to a portion of Husband’s
pension will be irreparably lost. It is apparent that Wife claims that she is
entitled to Husband’s entire SERS pension because she had been the sole
beneficiary of the account prior to separation. Wife overlooks the fact that
the marriage was of short duration and that the portion of Husband’s
pension to which Wife is entitled is limited to that part that was earned
during the period of the parties’ marriage. The court was aware of this fact
and used it as the basis for ordering that 13% of the pension should remain
frozen, thus, protecting Wife’s right to the marital portion of Husband’s
pension.
Accordingly, we conclude that Wife has not satisfied all three elements
of a collateral order. As in Sneeringer, even if Wife could “show the order
is collateral to and separable from the divorce proceedings, and that the
right involved is important, her claim will not be irreparably lost.” Id. at
1039. Wife will be entitled to challenge the substance of the court’s March
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3, 2014 order after the divorce decree is entered upon the completion of the
equitable distribution of the marital assets. Because we conclude that this
appeal was filed from the entry of an unappealable, interlocutory order, we
are compelled to quash it.
Appeal quashed
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/1/2015
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