UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4734
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
REGINALD LASHAWN LOCKHART,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad,
Jr., District Judge. (3:12-cr-00359-RJC-1)
Submitted: March 31, 2015 Decided: April 7, 2015
Before KEENAN, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Aaron E. Michel, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anne
M. Tompkins, United States Attorney, Anthony J. Enright,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Reginald Lashawn Lockhart pled guilty to unlawfully
possessing a firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1), 924(e) (2012). Based on his 2002 convictions for
multiple armed robberies and assaults, the district court
sentenced Lockhart under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”)
and imposed 180 months of imprisonment, the statutory minimum
pursuant to § 924(e). On appeal, Lockhart challenges the
constitutionality of the ACCA as applied to him. We affirm.
“We generally review a defendant’s challenge to the
constitutionality of a statute de novo.” United States v.
Hager, 721 F.3d 167, 182 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 1936 (2014). “However, when the issue is not presented to
the district court, . . . then we review for plain error.” Id.
We conclude that three of Lockhart’s arguments were not
raised in the district court and, thus, are reviewable only for
plain error. Id.; see United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 579
n.4 (4th Cir. 2010). First, Lockhart argues that the ACCA’s
objective — incapacitating offenders until the age at which
their criminal careers normally end — could be achieved in his
case without application of the ACCA’s 15-year mandatory
minimum. Second, he contends that his ACCA sentence is
disproportionate to his underlying crime because he was never
afforded the intervening periods of incarceration between his
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predicate convictions, which, he claims, are necessary to make
imposition of a recidivist statute, like the ACCA, fair. Third,
Lockhart claims that, pursuant to the Second Amendment and the
affirmative defense of justification, he had a legitimate right
to possess the firearm in certain circumstances and that the
ACCA impeded that right.
To establish plain error, Lockhart must show that: (1) an
error occurred; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error
affected his substantial rights. Henderson v. United States,
133 S. Ct. 1121, 1126 (2013); United States v. Price, 777 F.3d
700, 711 (4th Cir. 2015). Even if Lockhart makes the required
showing, correction of the error lies within our discretion,
which we exercise only if “the error seriously affects the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Henderson, 133 S. Ct. at 1126-27 (internal
alterations, citations, and quotation marks omitted).
“To be plain, an error must be clear or obvious,” such as
when “the settled law of the Supreme Court or this circuit
establishes that an error has occurred.” United States v.
Ramirez-Castillo, 748 F.3d 205, 215 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Because Lockhart has pointed to no
decision from this court or the Supreme Court concluding that
the ACCA is unconstitutional when applied to circumstances, or
challenged by arguments, such as his, he has not demonstrated
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that the district court’s application of the ACCA was clear or
obvious error. Thus, Lockhart has not met his burden to
demonstrate plain error.
Only one of Lockhart’s claims was properly presented to the
court below, and we review it de novo. Hager, 721 F.3d at 182.
Lockhart argues that the ACCA, when applied to a defendant who,
like him, served no intervening sentence between predicate
convictions, is overinclusive because it incapacitates offenders
who are not career criminals, as traditionally defined in other
recidivist statutes. To the extent Lockhart believes the ACCA
must withstand heightened or intermediate scrutiny, that belief
is erroneous. United States v. Inglesi, 988 F.2d 500, 503 (4th
Cir. 1993) (citing Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 464-
65 (1991)). When reviewing challenges of this nature to the
ACCA’s classification scheme, we inquire whether the “statute
makes an irrational classification, unrelated to a valid
government purpose.” United States v. Presley, 52 F.3d 64, 68
(4th Cir. 1995). We conclude that the ACCA’s inclusion of
repeat offenders — such as Lockhart — whose predicate
convictions are not separated by intervening periods of
incarceration in its classification of armed career criminals is
neither irrational nor unrelated to a valid government purpose.
See id.; cf. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284-85 (1980).
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We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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