UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-1906
JAMES J. ROWE, and; SHARON H. ROWE,
Plaintiffs – Appellants,
v.
AURORA COMMERCIAL CORP., f/k/a Aurora Loan Services, Inc.,
a Delaware Corporation; NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, a Texas
Limited Liability Company,
Defendants – Appellees,
and
CITIBANK, N.A.; LEHAM XS TRUST MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH
CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2005-6,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Beckley. David A. Faber, Senior
District Judge. (5:13-cv-21369)
Submitted: January 29, 2015 Decided: April 7, 2015
Before SHEDD, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
L. Lee Javins, II, Guy R. Bucci, Mark A. Barney, BUCCI, BAILEY &
JAVINS, LC, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellants. John C.
Lynch, Jason E. Manning, TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP, Virginia Beach,
Virginia, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Appellants James and Sharon Rowe appeal from the
district court’s order dismissing their civil action contesting
the terms related to a note of obligation on their real
property in South Carolina against the loan servicers. The
Rowes also appeal the district court’s determination in the same
order that granting the Rowes leave to amend their complaint to
add additional claims would be futile because the claims were
barred or did not state a claim. The Rowes argue that the
district court erred in: (1) finding that they did not state a
claim for actual fraud; (2) not sufficiently ruling on their
constructive fraud claim; (3) denying leave to amend to add a
claim under the South Carolina Consumer Protection Code for
unconscionable conduct; and (4) finding that it would be futile
to assert claims against the creditor under the Truth in Lending
Act because the statute of limitations had run and there were
insufficient or inapplicable circumstances of equitable tolling.
We affirm.
We review the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim de novo. Weidman v. Exxon Mobil Corp., __ F.3d
__, 2015 WL 103954, *4 (4th Cir. Jan. 8, 2015) (No. 13-2007).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
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556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “The plausibility standard
is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570);
see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 n.1 (4th Cir.
2009) (noting that the Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-56
(1957), standard was explicitly overruled in Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 562-63)).
“On appeal from a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), we review the district court’s
factual findings with respect to jurisdiction for clear error
and the legal conclusion that flows therefrom de novo.” In re
KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., 744 F.3d 326, 333 (4th Cir. 2014)
(citation and internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, 2015
WL 231968 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2015) (No. 13-1241). “On review of a
Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, we consider a case de novo,” evaluating
“whether the complaint states a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” United States ex rel. Oberg v.
Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 745 F.3d 131, 136
(4th Cir. 2014) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
“Generally, we review a district court’s denial of a motion for
leave to amend for abuse of discretion,” “[b]ut where, as here,
the district court denied such a motion on grounds of futility,
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we employ the same standard that would apply to our review of a
motion to dismiss.” United States ex rel. Ahumada v. NISH, 756
F.3d 268, 274 (4th Cir. 2014) (citations and internal quotations
omitted).
We have carefully reviewed the briefs and record
before us and, with the appropriate standards of review in mind,
conclude that the district court did not err in granting the
motion to dismiss the contested claims and denying leave to
amend the complaint as to the claims the Rowes unsuccessfully
sought to add. Rowe v. Aurora Commercial Corp., No.
5:13-cv-21369 (S.D. W. Va. Aug. 1, 2014). We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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