J-S01031-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
CARRINGTON KEYS IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee No. 939 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Order May 22, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Forest County
Civil Division at No(s): C.D. 59 OF 2014
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., JENKINS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED APRIL 10, 2015
Appellant, Carrington Keys, appeals from the order entered in the
Forest County Court of Common Pleas, Civil Division, which denied his
petition to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and dismissed as frivolous the
complaint he called a petition for writ of habeas corpus. For the following
reasons, we transfer the matter to the Commonwealth Court.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
According to the record, the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole
issued a Notice of Board Decision as recorded February 27, 2013, which
denied Appellant parole/probation. The notice listed various reasons for the
Board’s decision, including: (a) Appellant’s need to participate in and
complete additional institutional programs; (b) Appellant’s risk and needs
assessment indicating Appellant’s level of risk to the community; (c) the
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negative recommendation from the Department of Corrections (“DOC”); (d)
reports, evaluations and assessments/level of risk indicating Appellant’s risk
to the community; (e) other pertinent factors, such as Appellant’s need for a
longer period of positive institution adjustment and completion of treatment.
The notice also said Appellant was to be reviewed in or after October 2013.
At the next interview, the Board would review Appellant’s file and consider
whether: (a) Appellant had successfully participated in/successfully
completed a treatment program for violence prevention; (b) Appellant had
received/maintained a favorable recommendation for parole from the DOC;
and (c) Appellant had maintained a clear conduct record. Finally, the notice
stated Appellant may file an application for parole/reparole no sooner than 1
year after the recording date of the last decision denying him
parole/reparole, i.e., no sooner than February 27, 2014. In response to the
notice, Appellant purports to have sent the Board a document Appellant
called an “Acceptance of Contract” which, he claimed, formed a “binding
contractual agreement” between Appellant and the Board.
On May 16, 2014, Appellant filed a petition for leave to proceed IFP
and a companion complaint he called a petition for writ of habeas corpus. In
his filing, Appellant essentially complained of actions and omissions of the
Board, based on the Board’s failure to fulfill the “contract” between the
Board and Appellant. Appellant complained he had satisfied the Board’s
conditions, but the Board denied him a meaningful review, told Appellant to
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satisfy those conditions again, and denied Appellant parole. Appellant
concluded he was entitled to enforce the purported “contract” and have the
court compel the Board to perform “its existing obligations.” As presented,
Appellant did not directly challenge the legality of his sentence or detention.
By order dated May 22, 2014, and filed May 23, 2014, the trial court
denied Appellant’s IFP application and dismissed the complaint as frivolous,
pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 240(j). A copy of the order was sent to Appellant on
May 23, 2014. On June 6, 2014, Appellant filed a notice of appeal. By order
filed and served on June 17, 2014, the trial court ordered Appellant to file
and serve a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal within 21
days, per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b); any issue not raised in a properly filed and
properly served statement would be deemed waived. As of July 23, 2014,
Appellant had not filed and served his Rule 1925(b) statement or requested
any enlargement of time to comply. So, the trial court deemed Appellant’s
issues on appeal waived.
Appellant raises two issues for review:
WHETHER THE [TRIAL] COURT ERRED IN CONSTRUING
APPELLANT’S HABEAS CORPUS AS A CIVIL COMPLAINT
AND DENYING APPELLANT RELIEF BASED UPON CIVIL
STANDARDS INSTEAD OF USING 42 PA.C.S.A. 6501-6505,
et seq.
WHETHER THE [TRIAL] COURT ERRED IN FILING
APPELLANT’S HABEAS CORPUS INTO THE WRONG VENUE
IN CONTRAST TO PA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
RULE 108(B).
(Appellant’s Brief at 4).
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Preliminarily, we address this Court’s appellate jurisdiction: “Even
when neither party has raised the issue of jurisdiction, this Court may, sua
sponte, determine whether retention of jurisdiction is appropriate, or
whether the matter should be transferred to the Commonwealth Court.”
Commonwealth v. Reed, 696 A.2d 199, 200 (Pa.Super. 1997) (quoting
Commonwealth v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 639 A.2d 1213, 1214
(Pa.Super. 1994)).
Jurisdiction over parole matters generally lies in the Commonwealth
Court. Commonwealth v. Snyder, 829 A.2d 783 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2003).
“[H]abeas corpus is not available to challenge the denial of parole because
the inmate is serving a legal sentence and parole is a matter of discretion. A
habeas corpus petition may be used only to challenge the legality of a
sentence, that is, the state’s right to confine the inmate or the length of
confinement, and not the denial of parole.” Id. at 785. See also Weaver
v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 688 A.2d 766, 775 n.17
(Pa.Cmwlth. 1997) (stating habeas corpus is not available to challenge
denial of parole, “irrespective of the factual underpinnings of the prisoner’s
contentions”).
Nevertheless, “[t]he form by which a suit seeking review of an agency
action is brought is not dispositive”; and the petition should be examined “to
determine whether it can be construed as challenging final agency action in
any form.” Kester v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 609
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A.2d 622, 624 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1992). Instead of dismissing a petition outright,
if a petition could be construed as a challenge to the Board’s actions in
denying parole, the trial court should transfer “the petition to the
Commonwealth Court for consideration of [its] original jurisdiction, per 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 5103(a), which mandates the transfer of a matter erroneously
filed in the wrong court.” Snyder, supra at 785.
Instantly, Appellant filed a petition for IFP status and a petition for writ
of habeas corpus in the trial court. Specifically, Appellant alleged he had
satisfied the Board’s requirements for parole eligibility, but the Board
refused to review Appellant’s case or grant him parole. Although styled as a
petition for writ of habeas corpus, Appellant’s petition complains about the
Board’s actions and omissions regarding his parole eligibility. Thus, we
conclude the matter lies within the original jurisdiction of the Commonwealth
Court, which has exclusive jurisdiction over Appellant’s complaint. Instead
of dismissing the complaint outright, the trial court should have transferred
it to the Commonwealth Court. See id. The best resolution of matter at
this point is to transfer it to the Commonwealth Court for disposition.1
Accordingly, we transfer this matter to the Commonwealth Court for
appropriate disposition.
Case transferred to Commonwealth Court. Jurisdiction is relinquished.
____________________________________________
1
Due to our disposition, we decline to deem any issues waived on the basis
of Rule 1925(b).
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/10/2015
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