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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA EX IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
REL. PATRICK VANDERPOOL PENNSYLVANIA
v.
MR. ABRAMS/MR. LEMASTERS, JOHN
DOE’S AND JANE DOE’S TO BE NAMED
APPEAL OF: PATRICK VANDERPOOL
No. 1420 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Order of August 6, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County
Civil Division at No(s): AD-108-2015
BEFORE: PANELLA, OLSON and PLATT,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED MAY 18, 2016
Appellant, Patrick Vanderpool, appeals pro se from the order entered
on August 6, 2015, dismissing his writ of habeas corpus. Upon careful
review of the record, we transfer this case to the Commonwealth Court.
We briefly summarize the background of this case as follows.
Appellant is a convicted sex offender who was released on parole from
prison to a secured facility in Greene County known as the Progress
Community Corrections Center (Progress). Sometime after his release on
parole, Appellant filed a pro se writ of habeas corpus that challenged his
confinement at Progress, arguing that, although paroled, he remained
essentially incarcerated. On behalf of the above-named defendants, general
counsel for the Commonwealth (the Commonwealth) filed a motion to
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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consolidate Appellant’s case with 21 other sex offender petitioners who
raised identical claims in similar filings.
On May 12, 2015, the trial court granted the Commonwealth’s motion
to consolidate the 22 cases. Thereafter, on May 18, 2015, the trial court
ordered the Commonwealth to respond to the writs of habeas corpus,
including the one filed by Appellant. The Commonwealth complied on July 6,
2015, arguing that all of the petitioners, including Appellant, “were unable to
secure an appropriate home plan prior to release from their respective state
correctional institutions” as required, but were paroled nevertheless “to
afford [them] an opportunity to maintain sexual offender counseling.” Brief
in Support of Motion to Dismiss, 7/6/2015, at 9. The Commonwealth argued
that there was nothing arbitrary or punitive about housing Appellant at
Progress, he was aware of the conditions of his parole prior to accepting
them, and he could have opted to stay in prison until an alternate home plan
was approved. Id. at 11-12.
By order filed on August 6, 2015, the trial court denied Appellant relief
without a hearing. Appellant filed a notice of appeal. The trial court filed an
order on October 21, 2015, directing the Prothonotary to transmit the case
file to this Court for appeal. The trial court did not prepare an opinion
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
The thrust of Appellant’s complaint is that his grant of parole was
illusory, because he was subsequently released from prison to a secured
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facility, Progress, which restricts his freedom in the same way as a state
correctional facility.
Initially, we confront whether Appellant properly filed his claims before
the Court of Common Pleas or whether his claims fall within the original
jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court. With exceptions not applicable
here, “[t]he Commonwealth Court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions or proceedings […a]gainst the Commonwealth government, including
any officer thereof, acting in his official capacity.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 761(a)(1).
In a challenge to the Board of Probation and Parole action in parole matters,
the nature of the allegations of the error and the relief sought determine
whether the case comes within the Commonwealth Court’s original
jurisdiction. McGriff v. Com., 809 A.2d 455, 458 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002),
affirmed per curiam, McGriff v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and
Parole, 838 A.2d 564 (Pa. 2003). “Jurisdiction over complaints sounding in
mandamus[1] against State agencies administering the parole system, where
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1
We recognize that Appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
this matter, however, we previously determined that where “a complaint
states a viable mandamus claim, we will treat that portion of the action as
such, regardless of the fact that the complaint is not titled properly as one
involving mandamus.” See Commonwealth ex. rel. Saltzburg v.
Fulcomer, 555 A.2d 912 (Pa. Super. 1989) (although action was titled as
one involving habeas corpus relief, it was clear that petitioner’s action was
one for mandamus to compel certain officials to act in conformity with the
regulations governing their public body and therefore, was treated as such).
In “stating a cause of action in mandamus to compel performance of a
ministerial act[, …p]etitioners must establish that they have a clear legal
right, that the respondents have a corresponding legal duty, and that there
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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the complaint is not a direct or collateral attack on the conviction or
sentence, is vested exclusively in the Commonwealth Court.” Id. (citation
omitted). After careful review, we conclude that Appellant’s claims, while
framed as a habeas corpus action, state an action sounding in mandamus
against an agency administering the parole system. As such, jurisdiction
over Appellant’s claims falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Commonwealth Court.
The situation presented to the Commonwealth Court in Barge v.
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 39 A.3d 530 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2012) provides support to our conclusion. In Barge, incarcerated sex
offenders filed a mandamus action before the Commonwealth Court
pursuant to the Court’s exclusive original jurisdiction. Therein:
Appellants, who [were] represented by counsel, [were]
convicted sexual offenders sentenced to state prison time[.]
[They] qualified for and [had] been “granted” parole by the
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (“PBPP”), which
determined that they present[ed] no or low risk of harm to
society. But, in their cases at least, the grant of parole was
illusory: their release to halfway houses (whether run by
the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) or contracted by the
DOC and run by private operators) ha[d] been delayed
significantly longer than the release times for non-sexual
offenders who [were] also [] found to pose no or low risk to
society and granted parole. Appellants argue[d]: (1) that
the DOC's inability or refusal to ensure their release and
placement into halfway houses within a time frame
comparable to that of non-sexual offenders wrongly
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
is no other adequate or appropriate remedy at law.” Madden v. Jeffes,
482 A.2d 1162, 1165 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984).
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interfere[d] with and usurp[ed] PBPP's core statutory
authority to grant parole; and (2) that there [was] no
rational basis for this different treatment of sexual
offenders, which therefore violate[d] their equal protection
rights under the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions.
* * *
In a published opinion, the Commonwealth Court rejected
appellants' statutory claim, agreeing with the DOC that
while the PBPP's governing statutes empower it to grant
parole, the statutory authority in place at the time relevant
here did not authorize the PBPP to actually place inmates in
halfway houses, force the DOC to accept all parolees, or
operate its own halfway houses where inmates like
appellants might be more easily admitted. Barge v. Pa. Bd.
of Prob. & Parole, 39 A.3d 530, 542–543 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2012).
Barge v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 96 A.3d 360, 361
(Pa. 2014) (Castille, concurring).
The nature of the claims raised in Barge are similar to those advanced
in the present case and lead us to conclude that the instant claims fall within
the scope of the Commonwealth Court’s exclusive original jurisdiction. In
Barge, imprisoned sex-offenders challenged the DOC’s and/or the PBPP’s
failure or refusal to release them to halfway houses despite their paroled
status. Here, Appellant challenges the decision to parole him to a halfway
house, claiming that the residential restrictions constitute imprisonment. In
both cases, the challenges sought to compel certain officials to act in
conformity with the regulations governing their public body. For this reason,
we transfer this case to Commonwealth Court and relinquish jurisdiction.
Case transferred to Commonwealth Court. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/18/2016
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