J-S17019-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
SHARON LYNN CORONA,
Appellee No. 661 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Order March 20, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0013881-2013
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED APRIL 10, 2015
The Commonwealth appeals from the trial court’s order granting the
motion filed by Appellee, Sharon Lynn Corona, to suppress evidence
obtained following her interaction with police after she was approached by
an officer while in her parked automobile. We affirm.1
The suppression court summarized the factual background of this case
as follows:
On July 3, 2013, Plum Borough Police Officer Daniel Moriarty was
on routine patrol in uniform in a marked vehicle. (T.T.)1 at 4.
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
We note that on February 10, 2015, Appellee filed a motion to suspend
consideration before the panel and nunc pro tunc request for extension of
time to file her appellate brief. Appellee filed her appellate brief on March 4,
2015. Accordingly, said request is denied as moot.
J-S17019-15
Officer Moriarty was driving west on Saltzburg Road at
approximately 2:30 a.m. when he noticed a car with its lights on
parked in the parking lot of a local business. (T.T.) at 4 and 20.
The car was completely off the road pulled off into that parking
lot. (T.T.) at 12 and 20-21. The officer thought it had to be
investigated because it was odd that a car was stopped at that
location. (T.T.) at 5. Officer Moriarty passed the vehicle and
then backed up his vehicle and put his window down to speak
with the driver and ask what she was doing. (T.T.) at 4, 5. The
driver, [Appellee], stated she was waiting for someone. (T.T.) at
5. Officer Moriarty noticed slurred speech on the driver and
decided to have a conversation with her. (T.T.) at 6. Officer
Moriarty does not recall which words were slurred in his very
brief conversation with [Appellee] and based his observation of
slurred speech on one sentence. (T.T.) at 23. Officer Moriarty
did not observe [Appellee’s] vehicle in operation, nor did he
observe a motor vehicle code violation. (T.T.) at 24. At that
point the Officer told [Appellee] to “hang on” and exited his
vehicle to further investigate. (T.T.) at 6.
1
T.T. refers to the Trial Transcript of March 20,
2014, followed by the page number.
After the Officer exited his vehicle[, Appellee] once again
stated she was waiting for someone. (T.T.) at 7. The person
she was waiting for drove by as they were speaking with each
other. (T.T.) at 7. Officer Moriarty later noticed glassy eyes and
an odor of alcohol on [Appellee’s] breath. (T.T.) at 7. Shortly
after that, a person did call [Appellee] on her cell phone and [the
call] then came through on [Appellee’s] Blue Tooth in her
vehicle. (T.T.) at 8. After the phone call, Officer Moriarty asked
[Appellee] to exit the car and perform field sobriety tests. (T.T.)
at 9. After administering the field sobriety tests, the officer
determined [Appellee] was intoxicated. (T.T.) at 12.
Subsequently, he placed [Appellee] in handcuffs and under
arrest. (T.T.) at 14.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/6/14, at 1-2.
On December 16, 2013, Appellee was charged with two counts of
driving under the influence. On February 18, 2014, Appellee filed a motion
to suppress. The trial court held a suppression hearing on March 20, 2014.
-2-
J-S17019-15
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted Appellee’s motion to
suppress. The Commonwealth then filed this timely appeal on April 21,
2014.2, 3
The Commonwealth presents the following issue for our review:
1. Whether the suppression court erred in finding that the police
officer’s actions and statements rendered the instant
encounter a seizure that was not supported by either
reasonable suspicion or probable cause?
Commonwealth’s Brief at 7.
The Commonwealth argues that the trial court erred in granting
Appellee’s motion to suppress. The Commonwealth contends that the
interaction between the police officer and Appellee was a mere encounter
because he did not give any commands or take any action that would have
indicated to a reasonable person that she was not free to leave. The
Commonwealth posits that the encounter did not escalate into an
investigatory detention until after the officer approached Appellee and
____________________________________________
2
We note that the Commonwealth needed to file its appeal by Monday, April
21, 2014 because April 19, 2014 was a Saturday. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908
(stating that, for computations of time, whenever the last day of any such
period shall fall on Saturday or Sunday, or a legal holiday, such day shall be
omitted from the computation).
3
The Commonwealth has certified, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of
Appellate Procedure 311(d), the trial court’s order prohibiting the
introduction of evidence substantially handicaps the prosecution of this case.
Commonwealth’s Brief at 4. Therefore, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(d), this
Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal from the trial court’s interlocutory
order, even though the order did not terminate the prosecution.
-3-
J-S17019-15
observed the indicia of intoxication. Upon review of pertinent case law and
the certified record, we disagree.
The standard of review an appellate court applies when considering an
order granting a suppression motion is well established and has been
summarized as follows:
We begin by noting that where a motion to suppress
has been filed, the burden is on the Commonwealth
to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
the challenged evidence is admissible. In reviewing
the ruling of a suppression court, our task is to
determine whether the factual findings are supported
by the record. If so, we are bound by those findings.
Where, as here, it is the Commonwealth who is
appealing the decision of the suppression court, we
must consider only the evidence of the defendant’s
witnesses and so much of the evidence for the
prosecution as read in the context of the record as a
whole remains uncontradicted.
Moreover, if the evidence when so viewed supports the factual
findings of the suppression court, this Court will reverse only if
there is an error in the legal conclusions drawn from those
findings.
Commonwealth v. Lindblom, 854 A.2d 604, 605 (Pa. Super. 2004)
(citations omitted).
With respect to factual findings, we are mindful that it is
the sole province of the suppression court to weigh the credibility
of the witnesses. Further, the suppression court judge is entitled
to believe all, part or none of the evidence presented. However,
where the factual determinations made by the suppression court
are not supported by the evidence, we may reject those findings.
Only factual findings which are supported by the record are
binding upon this court.
-4-
J-S17019-15
Commonwealth v. Benton, 655 A.2d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 1995)
(citations omitted). In addition, questions of the admission and exclusion of
evidence are within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be
reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v.
Freidl, 834 A.2d 638, 641 (Pa. Super. 2003).
Further, we are aware that Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure
581, which addresses the suppression of evidence provides, in relevant part,
as follows:
(H) The Commonwealth shall have the burden . . . of
establishing that the challenged evidence was not obtained in
violation of the defendant’s rights.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H).
Both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions prohibit
“unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. Amendment IV;
Pennsylvania Const. Art. 1, § 8.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect
individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures, thereby
ensuring the “right of each individual to be let alone.”
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 236, 36 L. Ed. 2d
854, 93 S. Ct. 2041 (1973); Commonwealth v. Blair, 394 Pa.
Super. 207, 575 A.2d 593, 596 (Pa. Super. 1990).
Commonwealth v. By, 812 A.2d 1250, 1254 (Pa. Super. 2002).
To secure the right of citizens to be free from intrusions by police,
courts in Pennsylvania require law enforcement officers to demonstrate
ascending levels of suspicion to justify their interactions with citizens as
-5-
J-S17019-15
those interactions become more intrusive. Commonwealth v. Beasley,
761 A.2d 621, 624 (Pa. Super. 2000).
It is undisputed that:
[s]tate case law recognizes three categories of interaction
between police officers and citizens, which include: (1) a mere
encounter, or request for information, which need not be
supported by any level of suspicion, but which carries no official
compulsion to stop or to respond; (2) an investigative detention,
which must be supported by reasonable suspicion as it subjects
a suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does not
involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional
equivalent of an arrest; and (3) arrest or custodial detention,
which must be supported by probable cause.
Commonwealth v. Acosta, 815 A.2d 1078, 1082 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en
banc). Thus, as the first level of interaction between police and citizens, a
mere encounter is itself a “request for information,” which needs no level of
suspicion. Id.
As we explained in Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108 (Pa.
Super. 2005):
A mere encounter can be any formal or informal interaction
between an officer and a citizen, but will normally be an inquiry
by the officer of a citizen. The hallmark of this interaction is that
it carries no official compulsion to stop or respond.
Id. at 116 (quoting Commonwealth v. DeHart, 745 A.2d 633, 636 (Pa.
Super. 2000)).
If the police action becomes too intrusive, a mere encounter may
escalate into an investigatory stop or a seizure. Commonwealth v.
Boswell, 721 A.2d 336, 340 (Pa. 1998). To effectuate an investigative
-6-
J-S17019-15
detention, the officers are required to have reasonable suspicion that
unlawful activity was in progress. In order to demonstrate reasonable
suspicion, the police must be able to point to specific facts and reasonable
inferences drawn from those facts in light of the officer’s experience.
Commonwealth v. Cook, 735 A.2d 673, 677 (Pa. 1999).
“Because the level of intrusion into a person’s liberty may change
during the course of the encounter, we must carefully scrutinize the record
for any evidence of such changes.” Commonwealth v. Blair, 860 A.2d
567, 572 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citing Commonwealth v. Strickler, 757 A.2d
884 (Pa. 2000)). In determining whether a mere encounter has risen to the
level of an investigative detention, our inquiry focuses on whether the
individual in question has been seized.
To guide the crucial inquiry as to whether or not a seizure has
been effected, the United States Supreme Court has devised an
objective test entailing a determination of whether, in the view
of all surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person would
believe that he was free to leave. In evaluating the
circumstances, the focus is directed toward whether, by means
of physical force or show of authority, the citizen-subject’s
movement has in some way been restrained.
Strickler, 757 A.2d at 889-890 (citations omitted).
In Commonwealth v. Caban, 60 A.3d 120 (Pa. Super. 2012), this
Court addressed whether a police officer’s direction to a driver to “hold tight”
was indicative of an investigatory detention. In Caban, a state trooper cited
a driver for speeding, returned her license and paperwork, and told her that
she was free to leave. Id. at 128. When the driver began walking back to
-7-
J-S17019-15
her car, the officer asked her if she would answer a few more questions,
which she did, before then saying she was ready to go. Id. The officer told
her to “hold tight” while he questioned the passenger, who was Caban. Id.
In determining that this conduct amounted to an investigatory detention,
this Court offered the following analysis:
Based upon this factual scenario, we conclude that Caban and
[the driver] were subjected to an investigatory detention. To the
extent that [the state trooper’s] renewed questioning of [the
driver] began as a mere encounter based upon the Strickler
factors, when [the state trooper] told [the driver] to “hold tight”
he unquestionably made clear to her that she was not free to
leave the scene. As our Supreme Court emphasized in
Strickler, the threshold issue in distinguishing between a mere
encounter and an investigatory detention is whether a
reasonable person would have believed that she was free to
leave, and to this end the inquiry must focus on whether the
police officer, either by physical force or show of authority, has
restricted the defendant’s movement in some way. Strickler,
563 Pa. [47,] 58-59, 757 A.2d at 889-[8]90. When [the state
trooper] informed [the driver] to “hold tight,” he restricted her
movements and made clear that she was not free to leave the
scene.
Caban, 60 A.3d at 128. Ultimately in Caban we determined that the facts
adduced by the state trooper by the time he told the driver to “hold tight”
provided the state trooper with sufficient reasonable suspicion to justify the
investigatory detention. Id. at 128-129.
In the instant matter, the suppression court offered the following
pertinent discussion:
In the case at hand, Officer Moriarty passed a vehicle
legally parked in a parking lot. The vehicle lights were on and
the emergency flashers were not on. (T.T.) at 6. Officer
Moriarty does not recall if he activated his lights or not when he
-8-
J-S17019-15
pulled off the road. (T.T) at 23. Further, he testified that he did
not observe [Appellee] commit any moving or traffic violations.
(T.T.) at 24. The officer testified that he pulled up alongside
[Appellee] because it was suspicious in nature for a car to be
parked at that location. (T.T.) at 25. In fact, on direct
examination the Officer testified that [Appellee] was pulled over
on the side of the road and that it was “odd for a vehicle to be
where it was” and that it definitely needed to be looked into.
(T.T.) at 5. The Officer later acknowledged that [Appellee] was
parked in a parking lot. (T.T.) at 12-13. He further testified
that his stop was investigatory in nature. (T.T.) at 26.
***
In this case, [Appellee] was legally parked in a parking lot.
There was no indication that she was in any distress. The officer
testified that his intention was to investigate due to the
suspicious nature of a car being parked in that location2. The
officer never testified that he was doing any kind of welfare
check, just that he was suspicious. Asked what she was doing,
[Appellee] stated that she was waiting for someone. In that
brief sentence the Officer stated that [Appellee’s] speech was
slurred but could not recall which words were slurred. At that
point Officer Moriarity then told [Appellee] to “hang on” and
decided to exit his vehicle to investigate. At that point no
reasonable person would believe that they were free to leave.
After assessing the evidence based on the totality of the
circumstances, the Motion to Suppress, and the credibility of
witnesses[,] I found that the Officer lacked reasonable suspicion
to detain [Appellee] to further investigate.
2
In the Affidavit of Probable Cause the Officer stated
that [Appellee’s] vehicle was pulled over to the right
side of the roadway on the berm.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/6/14, at 5-7.
Our review of the certified record reflects that at the suppression
hearing, Officer Moriarty testified and described what transpired in this
manner:
-9-
J-S17019-15
I was driving on Saltzburg Road. I was heading in a west
direction when I came across a vehicle. It was off onto the right
side of the roadway. The lights were on.
I didn’t know why the vehicle was stopped at that time of
night, so I pulled off, next to the vehicle.
***
Actually, as I think it went – I think I may have went past that
vehicle and I kind of noticed it, then I stopped and I backed up
to the vehicle. I put my window down. [Appellee] put her
window down.
We had a conversation. I asked her if there was
something wrong and why she was sitting there.
N.T., 3/20/14, at 4-5. Officer Moriarty explained that Appellee’s vehicle
lights were on, but her emergency flashers were not on. Id. at 6. Officer
Moriarty then offered the following testimony:
Q. You asked her was everything okay?
A. I did.
Q. What, if anything, did [Appellee] say to you?
A. She told me that she was waiting for somebody.
Id. at 6. Officer Moriarty then indicated that, due to a slur in Appellee’s
speech, he thought it necessary to further investigate. Id. at 6-7. He also
offered the following testimony:
Q. So you backed up, and put yourself in a safe place. And
what happened after that?
A. Then I got out of the vehicle. I told her to hang on. I got
out of the vehicle, then I had a conversation with her.
Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
- 10 -
J-S17019-15
Upon review of the certified record, we are constrained to conclude
that although Officer Moriarty’s initial interaction with Appellee when he
pulled up along the side of her vehicle was a mere encounter, the incident
then escalated into an investigatory detention. Indeed, when Officer
Moriarty told Appellee to “hang on,” parked his police vehicle, and then got
out to talk with Appellee, he unquestionably made clear to her that she was
not free to leave the scene. Caban, at 128. Hence, the officer subjected
Appellee to an investigatory detention at that point.
In order to justify the stop of Appellee, we reiterate that Officer
Moriarty was required to have reasonable suspicion that unlawful activity
was in progress at the time of the investigatory detention. To demonstrate
reasonable suspicion, the police must be able to point to specific facts and
reasonable inferences drawn from those facts in light of the officer’s
experience. Cook, 735 A.2d at 677.
During cross-examination, Officer Moriarty offered the following
relevant testimony concerning the incident:
Q. And you came upon a car that was not in motion; correct?
A. That’s correct.
***
Q. So it was in a parked position, in – you described it as a
business. Do you recall what type of business it was?
A. I don’t know. I see that place all the time, I have no idea
what that is.
- 11 -
J-S17019-15
***
Q. Where you positioned your vehicle you said you pulled up
kind-of past it; right, then backed up?
A. Yes.
***
Q. You said that you rolled down your window; correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. Did you roll down your window first or did she roll down her
window?
A. No idea.
Q. And there was a very brief conversation. In fact, you asked
is everything okay; right?
A. That is correct.
Q. And her answer was yes, I am waiting for someone?
A. Basically, yes.
Q. So in that period of time you say that you noticed slurred
speech?
A. That is correct.
Q. What exactly was it about the speech, do you recall? I
mean, those are very few words there?
A. Like which letters were actually slurred?
Q. Yes, do you recall what it was?
A. I don’t recall that. No, it was slurred speech. I don’t
recall which words.
- 12 -
J-S17019-15
Q. Based on basically one sentence you pulled your
vehicle back, and you activated your emergency lights;
right?
A. Well, I mean, that’s what I did do. I don’t know if I
activated emergency lights or not. I don’t know that for a fact.
Q. But you called in a traffic stop?
A. I did, I called in.
N.T., 3/20/14, at 20-23 (emphasis added).
Although Officer Moriarty stated that Appellee’s speech was slurred,
there is no doubt that Appellee only spoke a few words to the officer.
Indeed, upon questioning, Officer Moriarty admitted that he could not recall
which of the few words or letters spoken by Appellee were actually slurred.
In light of this testimony, we are constrained to agree with the trial court
that Officer Moriarty failed to articulate specific observations necessary to
establish reasonable suspicion to effectuate the investigatory detention of
Appellee.
In summary, when Officer Moriarty told Appellee to “hang on” and
then parked behind Appellee he subjected her to an investigatory detention.
Furthermore, Officer Moriarty failed to articulate specific observations
necessary to establish reasonable suspicion. Therefore, we agree with the
trial court’s determination that Appellee was subject to an investigatory
detention and that the police officer lacked the requisite reasonable
suspicion to effectuate the stop. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the trial
court granting Appellee’s motion to suppress.
- 13 -
J-S17019-15
Order affirmed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/10/2015
- 14 -