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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-13971
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 4:13-cr-00003-HLM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MILES L. GAMMAGE,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(April 13, 2015)
Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM:
Miles L. Gammage, a former attorney proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s order directing the garnishee, Andrew B. Roper, P.C., to deposit funds
owed to Gammage into the restitution fund to satisfy his restitution, and the denial
of his motion for reconsideration. Gammage’s brief, which we construe liberally,
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), asserts three arguments. Each
argument fails, as we discuss in turn.
First, Gammage argues the garnishment was improper because the
restitution obligation was allegedly fulfilled, at least in part, by payments made to
the victims by an insurance company and by the State Bar of Georgia. The district
court did not err by declining to reduce Gammage’s restitution based on these
alleged payments by third parties. Gammage has not presented any proof of the
payments to the victims. Even if he had, he would still owe the same restitution
amount because the payors would step in as substitute victims. See 18 U.S.C. §
3664(f)(1)(B) (“In no case shall the fact that a victim has received or is entitled to
receive compensation with respect to a loss from insurance or any other source be
considered in determining the amount of restitution”); 18 U.S.C. § 3664(j)(1) (“If a
victim has received compensation from insurance or any other source with respect
to a loss, the court shall order that restitution be paid to the person who provided or
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is obligated to prove the compensation”). Therefore, the district court did not did
not err by declining to reduce Gammage’s restitution amount.
Second, Gammage argues the garnishment was improper because a third
party has a prior security interest in the garnished funds. We liberally construe
Gammage’s brief to be arguing he lacks a “substantial nonexempt interest” in the
garnished funds See 28 U.S.C. § 3205(a) (explaining a court may order
garnishment only against property in which the debtor has a “substantial
nonexempt interest”). Gammage has not satisfied his burden of proof of showing
he lacks a substantial nonexempt interest in the Roper funds. See id. § 3205(c)(5)
(explaining “the judgment debtor may . . . object[] to the [garnishee’s] answer” but
he “bear[s] the burden of proof of proving [the] grounds” of his objection”). The
garnishee, Andrew Roper, stated Gammage had an interest in the funds, and
Gammage presented no evidence of a prior lien other than his statements that he
previously “pledged” the funds to someone else. Id. Gammage has not contended
a judgment was obtained in the third party’s favor; a prior security interest was
recorded; or a prior garnishment exists. Id. § 3205(c)(8) (“Judicial orders and
garnishments for the support of a person shall have priority over a writ of
garnishment issued under this section.”). Nor has Gammage established any other
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grounds for exempting the garnished funds. 1 Therefore, the district court did not
err by concluding Gammage had a substantial nonexempt interest in the funds.
Third, Gammage argues the district court abused its discretion by denying
his motion for reconsideration because it incorrectly determined his answer to the
government’s motion for entry of a final disposition order was untimely. The
district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to reconsider the
order of garnishment. Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 740 (11th Cir. 2010)
(reviewing the denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion). In
his motion for reconsideration, Gammage identified no new evidence or manifest
error. Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The only grounds
for granting [a motion for reconsideration] are newly-discovered evidence or
manifest errors of law or fact.”) (quotation and citation omitted). Even if the
district court erred by not considering Gammage’s answer, that did not rise to
manifest error because the FDCPA does not expressly grant Gammage a right to
respond to a motion for entry of a final disposition order, see 28 U.S.C. §
3205(c)(7), and Gammage has not identified any other statute or case law
providing him a right to respond to the government’s motion. Furthermore,
1
In Gammage’s request for hearing on the garnished funds, Gammage claimed an
exemption for “wages, salary and other income.” However, the district court concluded the
exemption did not apply, and Gammage has not addressed the issue in his brief on appeal. He
has therefore abandoned this issue. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008)
(“While we read briefs filed by pro se litigants liberally, issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se
litigant are deemed abandoned.”) (citation omitted).
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Gammage’s objections to the garnishment could have been raised in his objection
to Roper’s answer to the writ of garnishment, so he could not raise them in a
motion for reconsideration. See 28 U.S.C. § 3205(c)(5); Michael Linet, Inc. v. Vill.
of Wellington, Fla., 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005) (explaining a motion for
reconsideration cannot be used “to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present
evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.”). Therefore,
the district court did not err by denying Gammage’s motion for reconsideration.
AFFIRMED.
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